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This dissertation analyses the effect of the rise of Japan on the ‘British world’ during the early 
twentieth century, from the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5) to the outbreak of the First World 
War. Victory over Russia in 1905 transformed Japan’s international position, elevating it to the 
rank of a Great Power, and allowing it to become an increasingly significant actor in East Asia 
and the Pacific. As its presence expanded, so did the scope for interaction with the British 
imperial system, bringing Japan into closer, and often frictious contact with Anglophone 
communities from the China coast to western Canada. This dissertation seeks to analyse that 
process, and assess its significance both for the changing nature of the Anglo-Japanese 
relationship, and the evolution of the British imperial system. By incorporating sources from 
Britain, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the China coast within a single study, this 
dissertation integrates disparate historiographies that have taken either the imperial metropolis or 
the colonial nation as their object of study.  
  
It reaches three primary conclusions. First, it demonstrates that the imperial ‘periphery’ came to 
play an increasingly central role in how the British relationship with Japan was construed. 
Second, it showcases that a sense of external pressure from Japan, often interpreted in racial as 
much as geopolitical or commercial terms, became a prominent factor in how colonial elites 
came to redefine their position in a wider British world. Third, it shows that diverging racial 
views, in particular, came to constitute a structural problem in the management of the Anglo-
Japanese relationship. The following study opens with an analysis of British assessments of the 
Russo-Japanese War, and proceeds to scrutinise several contexts in which Japan’s rise presented 
new forms of competition and rivalry: the British ‘informal empire’ in China; Japanese 
immigration to North America; and naval defence in the Pacific. Finally, it examines how these 
new controversies, in turn, forced the Anglo-Japanese alliance to evolve. As such, this 
dissertation aims to shed new light on both on the internal dynamics of the British imperial 
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 Japan joined the great powers on the morning of 27 May 1905, when the Russian Baltic 
Fleet steamed into the Strait of Tsushima. Seven months earlier, the tsar had ordered the armada 
to leave its base in Kronstadt and embark for the Far East, in an attempt to wrest back control of 
the sea from Japan. Its progress had been slow and difficult. Following an incident in the North 
Sea, where the fleet mistook a group of British fishing trawlers for Japanese torpedo boats, it was 
barred from taking on coal at British ports. Supplying the fleet during its 18,000-mile voyage had 
been a logistical nightmare. Exhausted, demoralised, and in desperate need of supplies, it steamed 
on, hoping to make a dash for Vladivostok, Russia’s sole remaining naval base in eastern waters. 
At Tsushima, the narrow strait between Korea and Japan, the Russians finally met their Japanese 
adversaries. By the morning of the following day, it was over. Japan had won a crushing victory: 
without losing a single major vessel, it had destroyed six Russian battleships and captured the 
remaining two. Over five thousand sailors, including the Admiral Rozhestvensky, the fleet’s 
commanding admiral, were taken prisoner.   
 News of Tsushima rippled around the globe. In Britain, Japan’s treaty ally since 1902, 
and where rivalry with Russia ran deep, it met with general elation. When the Russo-Japanese 
War broke out in February 1904, the terms of the Anglo-Japanese alliance had allowed Britain to 
remain on the sidelines, but as London celebrated Japan’s latest victory, the British press made 
no claim to neutrality. ‘Every Englishman will join in the joy which is felt in the land of his allies’, 
wrote the North China Herald, the mouthpiece of British trading communities on the China coast.1 
In the centenary of Trafalgar, parallels were inevitably drawn to Britain’s own naval past. ‘In the 
hundred years gone by since Nelson decided the destinies of Europe,’ opined The Times, ‘no such 
action has been fought at sea as that which begun on Saturday in the Straits of Tsushima, and no 
such victory has been won.’2 
 Almost overnight, Tsushima catapulted Japan into the upper ranks of the international 
order. Its rise over the previous decade had been dramatic; indeed, compared to the miseries that 
befell its larger Chinese neighbour during the same period, it was nothing short of astonishing. 
Before the 1890s, certainly, Japan had barely featured in the politics of East Asia except as the 
subject of the ambitions of other powers. Its foreign relations were hemmed in by a quasi-
colonial regime of ‘unequal treaties’. Japan’s modernisation, its victory over China in the Sino-
Japanese War (1894-95), and the revision of its commercial treaties with the Western powers had 
improved its international standing, but still few observers had expected the island kingdom to be 
able to stand up to Russia’s vastly greater resources. In the event, not only did Japan win, the 
                                                      
1 “The War”, NCH, 2 June 1905. 
2 Editorial, The Times, 30 May 1905. 
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scale of its victory took even its most sanguine supporters by surprise. Tsushima, as the first 
occasion on which an Asian state defeated a European great power in a modern war, seemed to 
signal a turning point in world history. ‘The line of demarcation between Europe and Asia has 
been broken down,’ declared H.W. Wilson, a leading pro-Japanese journalist. ‘The era of 
inequality between the races is over. Henceforth white and yellow man must meet on an equal 
footing.’3 The Times drew the same conclusion: Japan had proved itself equal to the great 
European powers ‘judged by every standard of modern civilization’. As for the fear that Japan’s 
victory portended a conflict between Europe and a rising Asia – the so-called ‘Yellow Peril’ – The 
Times waved it aside: 
 
We can conceive no surer way of averting the danger or racial antagonism, if it in reality 
exists, than an alliance between the two Island Empires of the West and the East based 
on a community of peaceful interests, on joint responsibilities of mutual defence, and on 
kindred ideals of patriotism, progress, and freedom.4 
 
 To The Times then, the Russo-Japanese War was a vindication of the liberal and ‘civilised’ 
international order, the face that the pax Britannica liked to present to the world. Yet many others 
saw it differently. According to Harry Johnston, an old colonial hand, Japan’s triumph was less a 
vindication of liberalism than a rallying cry against the West, an ‘electric shock to the coloured 
peoples of the world’. It offered proof that white Europeans, despite the staggering expansion of 
their collective empires over the past decades, were not invincible. ‘It was the first set-back of the 
Caucasian since the Neolithic period; of the Christian since the relief of Vienna.’5 This may have 
exaggerated Japan’s Promethean touch, but not by too much: Tsushima spoke to the imagination 
of nationalists and modernisers across Eurasia, from China to Egypt. Jawaharlal Nehru, still a 
schoolboy at Harrow, recalled rushing down for the papers for news of the war, and trying to 
immerse himself in Japanese history – though he felt ‘rather lost’ in it. The Chinese nationalist 
Sun Yat-sen found himself congratulated on the news of Tsushima by Egyptian dockworkers as 
he passed through the Suez Canal. When he arrived in Tokyo to found the Tongmenhui, a 
nationalist society, he found eager recruits among the thousands of Chinese students now 
flocked to Japanese schools and military academies. In Aceh, in northeast Sumatra, local 
nationalists hoped for Japan’s assistance in the ‘speedy expulsion of the Dutch’. To all, Japan 
appeared as a model of successful resistance to European encroachment, a country that had 
adopted the tools of Western modernity without falling either into the twinned traps of colonial 
tutelage or slavish imitation.6  
                                                      
3 H.W. Wilson, “Japan’s Trafalgar”, National Review, July 1905. 
4 Editorial, The Times, 5 June 1905. 
5 Harry Johnston, Views and Reviews from the Outlook of an Anthropologist, (London, 1912), pp. 260-61. 
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 It was easily possible then, to interpret the Japanese victory as a blow to the global 
imperial order, and to the British ‘world system’ that formed its dominant component.7 Certainly, 
this interpretation seemed to become more persuasive in the years that followed, as Japanese 
expansion – in a commercial and demographic as well as territorial sense – began to press on the 
outer fringes of the British system. New zones of Anglo-Japanese friction developed. The British 
expatriate communities in the ‘treaty-ports’ scattered along the China coast had once cheered 
Russia’s defeats; after 1905, they increasingly denounced Japan’s growing power. In the 
Anglophone settler societies on the Pacific, Japan’s rise added a geopolitical coating of to existing 
hostilities towards Asian immigration. A modern, assertive Japan, they feared, would soon 
demand the revision of the restrictive immigration policies – the ‘great white walls’ – they had 
built up over the previous decades.8 A racialist backlash was already in the making. Two weeks 
before Tsushima, delegates from local labour organisations in San Francisco founded the 
Japanese and Korean Exclusion League, an organisation dedicated to stopping all further East 
Asian immigration into California.9 In the summer of 1907, a wave of anti-Japanese agitation 
swept the western coast of North America, culminating in race riots in Vancouver in September. 
In Australia and New Zealand, racial angst fed calls for the formation of autonomous military 
forces to secure their self-declared ‘white man’s countries’ against the looming menace to the 
north. Amid growing anti-Japanese agitation in the ‘white Pacific’ and the China coast, Britain’s 
relationship with its Asian ally became increasingly Janus-faced: while the British government 
continued to view the alliance as beneficial and necessary, other parts of the British world viewed 
Japan through a darkening prism of geopolitical and racial antagonism.  
 This dissertation examines how Britain and the British world responded to the 
challenges that arose with Japan’s growing power. It traces the evolution of the Anglo-Japanese 
relationship, in its political, strategic, and cultural dimensions, from the Russo-Japanese War to 
the outbreak of the First World War, examining the major issues and controversies that came to 
                                                                                                                                                            
1904-1905,” Turkish Review of Middle East Studies 11 (2000): 9–42; Renée Worringer, “"Sick Man of Europe" or ‘Japan of 
the Near East’?: Constructing Ottoman Modernity in the Hamidian and Young Turk Eras,” International Journal of 
Middle East Studies 36, no. 1 (May 24, 2004): 207–30; Selcuk Esenbel, “Japan's Global Claim to Asia and the World of 
Islam: Transnational Nationalism and World Power, 1900-1945,” The American Historical Review 109, no. 4 (October 
2004): 1140–70; Steven G. Marks, “Bravo, Brave Tiger of the East: the Russo-Japanese War and the Rise of 
Nationalism in British Egypt and India,” in John Steinberg et al. (eds.) The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective: World 
War Zero, Vol. I, (Leiden, 2005), 609–27; Harold Schiffrin, “The Impact of the War on China,” in Rotem Kowner (ed.), 
The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War, (New York, 2007), 169–82; and Cemil Aydin, The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: 
Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought, (New York, 2007).  
7 John Darwin, The Empire Project: the Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830-1970, (Cambridge, 2011); for an 
assessment of the term, see Stephen Howe, “British Worlds, Settler Worlds, World Systems, and Killing Fields,” The 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 40, no. 4 (November 2012): 691–725. 
8 Robert A. Huttenback, Racism and Empire: White Settlers and Colored Immigrants in the British Self-Governing Colonies, 1830-
1910, (Cornell, 1976); Charles A. Price, The Great White Walls Are Built: Restrictive Immigration to North America and 
Australia, 1836-88, (Canberra, 1978); Andrew Markus, Fear and Hatred: Purifying Australia and California, 1850-1901, 
(Sydney, 1979); Adam McKeown, Melancholy Order: Asian Migration and the Globalization of Borders, (New York, 2008). 
9 Roger Daniels, The Politics of Prejudice: the Anti-Japanese Movement in California and the Struggle for Japanese Exclusion, 
(Berkeley, 1977). 
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define it during this period: competition in China; disputes over immigration; the spectre of naval 
rivalry in the Pacific; and Japan’s growing frustration that its achievements in peace and war had 
translated into fully equal standing. It shows how Japan’s racial identity, in particular, proved an 
enduring complication that could encroach on traditional considerations of strategy and 
diplomacy. Since the impact of Japan’s rise was felt most sharply on what is still sometimes 
referred to as the imperial ‘periphery’, it also offers a window on the dynamics of imperial policy-
making, and the making of national, racial, and imperial identities in the British world.  
 It posits three primary arguments. First, it contends that the rise of Japan had a 
profound impact on British policy, and the cultural, racial and geopolitical assumptions in which 
it was embedded. In so doing, it addresses a subject only patchily covered by the existing 
literature: much historical writing on British foreign and strategic policy in the Edwardian era 
remains overcast by the shadow of the First World War, and affords little space either to Japan or 
to East Asia in a broader sense.10 Other studies, which deal specifically with Anglo-Japanese 
relations, have also left chronological gaps in their rush to bring their narratives forward to 
1914.11 No study has comprehensively addressed how Britain coped with Japan’s rise to the 
standing of great power, an omission that this dissertation seeks to redress. In the process, it 
highlights a number of developments that tend to be left by the wayside on the road to Sarajevo, 
including the formation of a new regional order in East Asia; immigration as a major 
international controversy; and the emergence of the Pacific as a zone of geopolitical rivalry – all 
three of which resurfaced with a vengeance in the immediate aftermath of the First World War.  
 Second, it argues that the evolution of Anglo-Japanese relations unfolded within a wider 
‘British world’, and needs to be understood as such. After 1905, London attempted to turn the 
growth of Japanese power to its advantage, soliciting Tokyo’s assistance in the defence of India 
and leaning ever more heavily on its Asian ally for naval support in Asia. Yet in those areas of the 
British world where Japan’s sudden proximity was felt more directly, the story was very different. 
In Australia, New Zealand, and western Canada, the emergence of a strong, assertive Japan was 
magnified into a new ‘Yellow Peril’, held by many to pose a lethal menace to the survival of white 
civilisation in the Pacific. Exclusionist leagues in Vancouver, Seattle, and San Francisco 
denounced the Japanese immigrants arriving in North America as the vanguard of a ‘yellow 
invasion’. Some were haunted by nightmares of a racial Armageddon: thus according to the 
Australian journalist Frank Fox, the Pacific would be the site of ‘the next great struggle of 
civilisation, which will give as its prize the supremacy of the world.’12 This might have struck 
                                                      
10 The pitfalls of looking at Edwardian foreign policy ‘backwards’ from the First World War are cogently set out in 
Keith Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar, 1894-1917, (Oxford, 1995), xii-iii.  
11 For the major studies of Anglo-Japanese relations during this period, see Peter Lowe, Great Britain and Japan, 1911-
15: a Study of British Far Eastern Policy, (London, 1968); and especially Ian Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy 
of Two Island Empires, 1894-1907, (London, 1966); and Nish, Alliance in Decline: a Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908-
1923, (London, 1972). 
12 Frank Fox, Problems of the Pacific, (London, 1912), pp. 1-2.  
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many in London as empty sensationalism; to the governments of Australia and New Zealand, it 
was deadly serious.    
 The ‘Japanese question’ provoked a set of disputes between Britain and its Pacific 
dominions – replicated within Canada between Ottawa and British Columbia – on connected 
issues of diplomacy, strategy, and immigration, and became a vexed question in broader debates 
on the future of the imperial system. Competing strategic priorities – Germany in the North Sea 
against Japan in the Pacific – bedevilled efforts for a joint programme on imperial defence. As 
late as the summer of 1914, with war clouds gathering over Europe, the Australasian dominions 
were decrying Britain’s neglect of their oceanic neighbourhood. In turn, racial exclusion, and the 
rise of anti-Japanese rhetoric across the British Pacific, came to intrude ever more persistently on 
the strategic dimensions of the Anglo-Japanese relationship. As the Round Table, a new imperial 
review, pointed out in 1911, when it came to the Japanese question, neither Britain nor the 
dominions were ‘masters of their own policy’: 
England cannot carry on her alliance with Japan if the Dominions are unreasonable in 
their treatment of the Japanese and the Dominions cannot secure the purity of their 
white society without the support of the British navy.13  
 
Worse, given that the Japanese scares ran in parallel with a rising controversy over Indian 
immigration, they also risked sharpening the racial fault lines within the empire itself. ‘The danger 
of it is obvious,’ concluded a leading official in the Colonial Office. ‘We may conceivably have to 
choose between our self-governing Dominions and the Japanese alliance; we may conceivably 
have to choose at some future date between India and the self-governing Dominions.’14 
Third, as the above illustrates, these controversies could not be separated from the 
problem of race, an aspect of the Anglo-Japanese relationship that has long remained 
understudied. Here, this dissertation analyses the interplay of several developments. As the 
responses to Tsushima cited above illustrate, Japan’s rise severely complicated existing notions of 
international hierarchy, and gave a new urgency to the issue of racial equality. Its dramatic 
triumph over Russia showed just how well it had appropriated the Western institutional arsenal; 
indeed, the belief that Japan had discovered a new standard of ‘national efficiency’ made it the 
subject of considerable interest in Britain.15 Certainly, it meant that Japan could insist that, after 
four decades of being subjected to the ‘unequal treaties’, it should now be treated in every respect 
as an equal member of the West. This was not merely a matter of national pride: as the sole non-
white great power, Japan continued to fear international isolation. For its part, had Britain played 
a key role in facilitating Japan’s entry into the international order, and London understood that 
the health of the Anglo-Japanese relationship hinged, to a significant degree, on avoiding signs of 
                                                      
13 [Philip Kerr], “The Anglo-Japanese Alliance,” Round Table, March 1911.  
14 C.P. Lucas, “Asiatic Immigration,” 23 Sept 1908, TNA, CO 532/9/34812. 
15 Geoffrey Searle, The Quest for National Efficiency: a Study in British Politics and Political Thought, 1899-1914, (Oxford, 
1972), pp. 57-59. 
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differential treatment towards its ‘Asiatic’ ally.  
In the wake of the Russian war, the optimists expected lingering racial prejudice to melt 
away as Japan presented its civilised credentials. In fact, the opposite happened: the harder Japan 
was seen to push against the boundaries of its status, the firmer they became. The issue of 
immigration, which required the racial boundary to be laid down in law, became particularly 
controversial. Within a few years of the war, tentative moves towards liberalisation were reversed 
in the face of overwhelming pressure from white opinion on the Pacific coast. Although the 
Japanese government acquiesced in practical exclusion, so long as its equal status was recognised 
in theory  (this was the essence of the ‘gentlemen’s agreements’ it concluded with Canada and the 
United States), suspicion of Tokyo’s intentions continued to be rife. In the treaty-ports of China, 
where the colour bar was a lived reality, racial paranoia took on a different form, as British 
settlers resented the intrusion of a new, Asian competitor, and fretted that Chinese anti-foreign 
sentiment (or ‘Boxerism’) might prove susceptible to Japanese manipulation. Although ‘Yellow 
Perilist’ fears of invasion and displacement were most intense in zones of direct contact, they 
were also not without influence in Britain itself: here too, a fixation on racial prestige could 
provoke ambivalence about the Anglo-Japanese alliance.   
 While race exercised a powerful influence, it is important to place its role into context. 
Alternative markers of difference could be stressed to include Japan in the global society of 
‘civilised nations’. During the Russo-Japanese War, the loudest voices in British public opinion 
were those that portrayed the Anglo-Japanese alliance as a coming together of like-minded, 
progressive island-nations: ‘the Englands of East and West’.16 Tokyo’s own propaganda similarly 
insisted that, in its fight against Russian autocracy, Japan was effectively fighting for ‘civilisation’ 
and free trade. Although such ideas dissipated after the war, they nonetheless offered an antidote 
to the ‘Yellow Peril’ at a crucial time. In addition, the emergence of a powerful Japan also gave 
new weight to the careful management of the racial question: allowing global politics to be 
conducted along the colour line might leave Japan remain permanently alienated from the 
international order, and dangerously susceptible to the siren song of pan-Asianism. The only 
‘Yellow Peril’ the West had to fear, some commentators stressed, would be a Frankenstein’s 
monster of its own creation.17 By the same token, openly identifying British policy with the cause 
of white solidarity, as some settler politicians now demanded, might well heighten racial tensions 
within the imperial system itself – thus connecting the Japanese issue to wider debates on race, 
identity, and ‘imperial citizenship’.  
 This dissertation, then, attempts to reveal and analyse the variety of ways in which elites 
in Britain and the wider British world engaged with the emergence of the first Asian great power. 
In the process, it uses the rise of Japan as a case study to converse with several larger themes in 
                                                      
16 See, for instance Henry Dyer, Dai Nippon, the Britain of the East, (Glasgow, 1904). 
17 Demetrius Boulger, “The Yellow Peril Bogey,” Academy, Jan 1904; Sidney L. Gulick, The White Peril in the Far East: 
An Interpretation of the Significance of the Russo-Japanese War (London, 1905). 
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British international and imperial history, and it engages with two historiographical developments 
in particular. First, it seeks to contribute to the growing willingness of international historians to 
apply insights from other disciplines, notably cultural history and the history of ideas, to their 
understanding of global politics. Second, by taking Japan as an external influence on the 
formation of national, imperial, and racial identities in some of Britain’s major settler colonies – 
Australia, New Zealand, and western Canada – this dissertation engages with the recent boom in 




 Japan’s ascent to the ranks of the great powers was rapid: barely a decade elapsed 
between the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), often taken as the start of its rise to 
prominence, and its victory over Russia. By the end of the First World War, certainly, it appeared 
self-evident that Japan was to be included in the ‘Council of Ten’ that would steer the 
proceedings of the peace conference, and that it would subsequently join the Council of the 
League of Nations as a permanent member. Its relationship with Britain had been crucial to this 
process. In 1894, Britain became the first Western power to revise its ‘unequal treaty’ with Japan, 
effectively recognising that it had become a ‘civilised’ power that could be trusted to abide by 
Western conventions of international conduct. During the Boxer crisis (1900-1) British and 
Japanese forces cooperated closely in defence of the ‘civilised’ order in China. Above all, it was 
the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1902 that secured Japan’s seat at the 
international table, and allowed it to become a full participant in the hitherto Eurocentric world 
of great power politics. 
 The history of British engagement with Japan during this period, and the alliance in 
particular, has broadly been examined through two major strands of interpretation. The 
traditional view, first articulated in Ian Nish’s foundational study, has presented the alliance (at 
least in its initial years) as a cordial and mutually beneficial partnership, resting on a foundation of 
overlapping diplomatic and strategic interests.18 Most accounts identify two prime movers for its 
emergence. First, a general problem of British overstretch and diplomatic isolation, felt acutely 
after the South African War (1899-1902); and second, a specific anxiety over the political future 
of China, following its defeat to Japan in 1895. The key problem was Russia, whose advance in 
northeast Asia, driven along the new trans-Siberian railroad, seemed most likely to initiate a 
general partition of China. Japan had its own reasons to fear Russian encroachment, which 
                                                      
18 Studies exploring the origins of the alliance from a strategic-diplomatic perspective include Nish, Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance; and Nish, “The Origins of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance: In the Shadow of the Dreibund,” in Philips Payson 
O’Brien (ed.), The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902-1922, (London, 2004), 8-25; Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar; Otte, China 
Question. For the historical memorialisation of Anglo-Japanese cordiality, see Antony Best, “The ‘Ghost’ of the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance: an Examination Into Historical Myth-Making,” The Historical Journal 49, no. 3 (September 2006): 1–
22. 
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seemed to edge perilously close to Korea, the proverbial ‘dagger’ pointed at the Japanese home 
islands. The alliance could arise, then, out of a mutual interest in containing Russia. It proved an 
unexpectedly successful diplomatic coup: the alliance reinforced Japan’s determination to resist 
Russia’s intrusions, and allowed it to fight its duel of 1904-5 in a closed international arena. 
Although Japan’s victory marked the recession of the common threat that had bound the allies 
together, Nish stressed that the alliance continued to yield benefits for both parties. For Japan, it 
was the instrument that tied it into the European alliance system; it gave legitimacy to its 
expansion on the Asian continent; and blunted the antagonism of the United States. For Britain, 
which became increasingly concentrated on the deterrence of Germany, Japan’s friendship kept 
the empire’s flank in East Asia while the Royal Navy concentrated its fighting strength in 
European waters.  
 Yet as Japan’s power grew, a greater degree of friction came to spoil this picture of 
Anglo-Japanese harmony. As Peter Lowe has demonstrated, the Chinese revolution in 1911, 
which collapsed the regional order, widened the scope for conflict.19 Matters grew worse when 
the outbreak of the First World War provided further openings for Japanese expansionism, as 
epitomised by its attempt to impose the so-called ‘Twenty-One Demands’ on China in January 
1915.20 In the absence of a common enemy, the Anglo-Japanese alliance gradually became an 
instrument to manage the growing rift between the allies themselves. In the traditional 
interpretation, then, both the rise and the decline of the Anglo-Japanese relationship flowed with 
the shifts in the international landscape, and followed a reasonably objective assessment of the 
respective interests of both powers. It assumes that British policy towards Japan obeyed the rules 
of strategy and diplomacy as understood by the ‘official mind’, and did not differ in essence from 
that towards other world powers: its ‘Asianness’ in other words, did not play a major role. This 
assumption broadly resonates, furthermore, with a set of studies that have examined Japan’s 
entry into ‘international society’ by stressing its adoption of Western concepts of diplomacy and 
international law.21    
 More recently, this narrative has been complicated by a second strand of interpretation, 
which has sought to widen the study of Japan’s integration in the international order from this 
traditional emphasis on diplomacy to other forms of engagement, particularly in the cultural 
realm. The influence of this turn has been particularly pronounced in the study of Japanese-
American relations, where the work of Akira Iriye has been an early guide, but has also made 
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inroads into the British case.22 In the process, scholars have begun to draw attention to one of 
the central paradoxes of the Anglo-Japanese relationship: how did these two powers, thought to 
be separated by a wide cultural and racial gulf, draw closer together in an age where racial ideas 
exercised a growing influence on political culture? Recent work on Japan, certainly, has shown 
that the Japanese elite was not only aware the prevalence of racial thinking in the West, but was 
deeply anxious over its political implications. As Naoko Shimazu has demonstrated, Japan’s bid 
to introduce a ‘racial equality clause’ into the Covenant of the League of Nations had a long pre-
history, rooted in the insecurity of its position as the sole Asian power in a world dominated by 
white Europeans and their transatlantic progeny.23 Scholarship on the origins of pan-Asianist 
thought, moreover, has shown that the notion of an inherent antagonism between ‘East’ and 
‘West’ acquired a considerable following, even if it remained on the political margins until the 
1930s.24  
 The literature on the British side has been sparser. Here, a number of studies have 
examined the construction of the image of Japan in British society, or the formation of particular 
cultural tropes  – from the ‘queer and quaint’ exoticism of The Mikado to the Edwardian 
infatuation with the samurai. 25 Others have specifically engaged with racial views towards Japan. 26 
For the most part, however, these are self-contained cultural histories that steered clear of the 
implications for the Anglo-Japanese relationship. Insofar as the political implications of racial 
views have been considered at all, this has mostly been done in reference to the issue of Japanese 
immigration to the dominions, where the alarmist rhetoric in Australia, New Zealand, and British 
Columbia provided an obvious counterpoint to the traditional story of diplomatic alignment. 
Both Nish and Lowe recognised this difficulty, and tried to assess the significance of the issue on 
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the evolution of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.27  Yet their studies retained a tight focus on 
decision-making in Whitehall: both confined their analysis to those moments, such as the 
imperial conferences of 1911 and 1921, when the dominion governments were able to engage 
directly with British officialdom. As such, their assessments were limited in scope, and hampered 
further by their lack of access to dominion sources. Overall, one emerges from these studies with 
the impression that while dominion antagonism was a factor, it was one that London, armed with 
the logic of Realpolitik, could marginalise without undue difficulty.  
 Historians in the former dominions themselves have presented a very different picture. 
In Australia, and to a lesser extent in New Zealand, the rise of Japan has been generally 
understood as a transformative event in the development of an autonomous perspective on 
global affairs, and a key external driving force in the development of Australian nationality. Early 
disputes over the establishment of the ‘White Australia’ policy at the turn of the twentieth 
century; Australia’s decades-long ‘search for security’ against the growth of Japanese power; and 
the post-war Australian-Japanese rapprochement have all formed prominent avenues of inquiry. 
28 Scholars have also begun to recover the histories of Australia’s Japanese communities.29 
Canadian studies have been fewer, but follow a similar narrative arc: an early history of contact, 
followed by rising racialism, and finally a gradual post-war liberalisation.30 Most of these studies 
remained guided by the notion that anti-Japanese views developed alongside an emerging 
‘colonial nationalism’; their aspiration was to scrutinise the role that fears of Asia played in the 
evolution of national identity, racial warts and all. Reflection on specific racial traumas, especially 
the interment of Japanese during the Second World War, was often crucial to their framing. As a 
result, many of these histories retain a strong national or local focus, and remain relatively 
inattentive to the wider context in which their engagement with Japan and the rest of East Asia 
unfolded.31  
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 This persistent bifurcation between ‘metropolitan’ and ‘colonial-nationalist’ studies 
obscures that when it came to dealing with Japan, diplomatic and strategic considerations could 
not be kept neatly separated from awkward questions of immigration and race. The ‘Japanese 
question’ involved actors and interests from across the imperial system – a point that many 
contemporary observers considered self-evident. This dissertation, therefore, seeks to piece this 
fragmented historical picture back together. In doing so, it seeks to build on a broader tendency 
to read the histories of Britain and its major settler colonies as distinct, but nonetheless closely 
integrated stories. Beginning in the 2000s, scholars in different parts of the Anglophone world 
have pioneered the concept of a ‘British world’, that held the global British diaspora within a 
single cultural fabric, and which was sustained through long-term patterns of exchange.32 The 
effects of this turn, which itself forms part of a still broader move away from the nation-state as 
the central framework of historical enquiry, have been wide-ranging, although its primary effects 
may be summed up as twofold. First, it has allowed historians of the dominions to recognise the 
enduring importance of a sense of ‘Britishness’ or a ‘Britannic nationalism’ to the development of 
distinct identities in the settler colonies. It is now increasingly acknowledged that for most 
Australians, New Zealanders, and Anglophone Canadians, a sense of belonging to larger family 
of ‘British nations’ was not at odds with the development of an individual national identity. 
Indeed, it was often vital to it.33 The same can be said of Britain itself. Historians have found it 
difficult to capture the effects of the imperial experience on British society, yet the recognition 
that the idea of ‘empire’ sooner evoked notions of kinship rather than domination has opened up 
new and fruitful avenues of inquiry.34 Second, it has allowed historians to situate the evolution of 
the British world within broader currents of global economic, geopolitical, and ideological 
change.35 This in turn has allowed for a greater recognition of the role of the settler sphere in the 
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expansion of the British imperial system, as well as its contribution to that system’s ‘tenacious 
survival’ in the twentieth century.36  
 As a historical concept, ‘Greater Britain’ remains somewhat tainted by the ethnic 
triumphalism of its original Victorian progenitors, and its recent historians have been quick to 
acknowledge that if a British world existed, it was girded by ideas of race. ‘Racism,’ as James 
Belich has noted, ‘enabled settlers to perpetuate their European-ness over generations, and to 
claim continuing parity with and connection to their metropolis.’37 Imperial ideology, as Duncan 
Bell has shown, also incorporated this idea. As the Victorian era gave way to the Edwardian, talk 
of imperial unity quietly abandoned the dream of a unitary ‘Greater British’ nation state. Instead, 
it came to favour a looser association of nationalities, bound by shared strategic and economic 
interests, but above all by a common racial heritage: ‘the bond of common blood, a common 
language, common history and tradition,’ as one prominent exponent put it, was stronger than 
any ‘material interest’ holding the empire together.38 This vision of racial imperialism could 
appear breathtakingly expansive – in its looser forms, it clearly reached outwards towards the 
United States.39  Yet it was also a highly reductionist definition, which often sat awkwardly with 
the reality of a multiracial empire that pivoted strategically on India.40 While the boundaries of 
Britishness could be stretched to accommodate non-Anglophone whites, such as the Afrikaners 
and French Canadians, it explicitly excluded the empire’s non-white subjects, even though many 
claimed ‘imperial citizenship’ on their own terms. ‘Whiteness’, as Carl Bridge and Kent 
Fedorowich have noted, formed a pivotal element in how a common pan-British identity was 
constituted.41  
 Some have sought to advance this argument further. In Drawing the Global Colour Line – 
the title nods to a 1900 essay by W.E.B. Dubois – Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds argue that 
racial views, hardened in the battle to exclude Asian immigrants, became the totem of white 
settler identity both in the British dominions and the United States.42 As colonists insisted on 
racial purity as the sine qua non of national life, they came to subordinate their view of global 
politics, and their attachment to the British Empire, to ‘the new religion of whiteness’. Lake went 
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on to argue that race could offer an alternative vision of a transnational community – a ‘white 
man’s world’, in which California fitted more comfortably than metropolitan Britain – that could 
compete with and even supplant Britishness.43 This has been an influential interpretation, which 
resonates with several other works that have pointed to the circulation of racial knowledge, and 
the establishment of new forms of transnational cooperation between different settler societies.44 
Work on the extensive collaboration of the exclusionist projects in British Columbia and the 
Pacific states of the United States has been especially productive.45 Yet Lake and Reynolds 
underestimated just how pivotal the British system was, both as an ideological and a political 
framework, to the establishment and endurance of racial exclusion. As a number of studies on 
New Zealand have pointed out, the aspiration to create and maintain an ideal ‘British nation’ was 
often central to the exclusionary impulse.46 In practical terms, moreover, the vision peddled by 
exclusionists – of an expansive, prosperous, ethnically cohesive society – assumed a continuous 
supply of British trade, migrants, and investment, and on insulation from the diplomatic 
repercussions of their policies. Empire was the precondition of its existence.  
 This dissertation shows how the rise of Japan brought these issues into clearer focus. 
From the 1890s onward, Tokyo had insisted that the exclusion of Japanese immigrants violated 
its claim to international equality. After 1905, it seemed to possess the means to back up its 
protests with diplomatic clout and even military force. By extension, the growth of Japanese 
power also drew a more explicit connection between race, immigration, and imperial defence. 
The latter in particular has, again, long remained fragmented between individual national 
contexts. In the Australian case, beginning with the work of Neville Meaney, the rise of Japan has 
often been understood as a turning point in the development of an autonomous defence policy, 
and particularly as a catalyst for the establishment of an Australian navy in 1909.47 Some scholars 
have since called the centrality of Japan into question, arguing that the formation of an 
autonomous naval policy is more properly understood as an expression of colonial nationalism 
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than a response to a new external threat.48 The smaller literature on New Zealand, meanwhile, 
gives similar precedence to the role of nation-building over strategic imperatives.49  
 These positions are not fundamentally opposed, but rather stress different aspects of a 
single process. In the increasingly threatening strategic climate of the early twentieth century, in 
which Japan loomed largest (though not alone), Australasian nation-building came to be 
understood a matter of strategic urgency: true security could only be obtained by shedding a 
passive, ‘colonial’ mentality, and replacing it with a vigorous commitment to a ‘national’ defence. 
To its local advocates, moreover, this was not to repudiate the British connection, but to 
strengthen it: self-sufficiency was held to be their prerogative as ‘British nations’, and was 
typically tied to the aspiration to play a more active role in the defence of the imperial system. It 
did not, however, imply meek subordination to British policy: for Australia, and with some delay 
for New Zealand, the desire for imperial cooperation was increasingly geared towards 
consolidating the Pacific presence of the ‘British race’ (or ‘Anglo-Saxon’, if the Americans were 
included), against the latent threat of Asia. As Stuart Ward has noted, the ‘expectation of racial 
solidarity’ marked Australian and New Zealand attitudes to defence until the 1960s.50 ‘It seems to 
me that this question is fundamental,’ wrote the Australian Round Tabler Frederic Eggleston in 
1913. ‘If the Empire does not stand to protect the British race or nationality I do not know that it 
has any real justification for its existence as an Empire.’51 
 This was an expectation, however, that often went unreciprocated, both in practice and 
in the subsequent historiography. Historians of British defence policy have been traditionally 
inclined to see the Edwardian period as the run-up to the First World War, and as such, 
considered colonial fretting about Japan a distraction from weightier questions. The growth of 
German naval power in the North Sea was the real issue.52 Some may have imbibed the 
prejudices of their subjects: Winston Churchill, in particular, had little but contempt for colonial 
‘tin-pot navies’ during his time at the Admiralty.53 Recent work, however, has begun to reveal a 
greater complexity in the Edwardian debates on imperial defence. Some have attempted to 
contextualise the German menace, by showcasing the alternative pressures on British strategy.54 
Russia, in particular, continued to be a source of concern: by the summer of 1914, only the 
outbreak of the First World War appeared to have forestalled a new round of the ‘Great Game’ 
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in Central Asia.55 In the naval sphere, too, recent work has challenged the notion that British 
policy after 1905 was solely governed by the German factor. As Nicholas Lambert has argued, 
although Germany loomed undoubtedly large, Britain’s strategic orientation remained 
emphatically global in scope.56 Nor can these debates be entirely reduced to cold calculations of 
strategy and tactics. Defence, and naval power in particular, carried strong cultural connotations: 
throughout the British world, it came to form a key element in local, national, and imperial 
identities.57 In racial terms, it found expression in the popular belief that the bonds between the 
British ‘family of nations’ revealed themselves at their finest through military cooperation. This 
notion was to reach its apogee during the First World War, yet as recent work by John Mitcham 
has demonstrated, it was already firmly in place by the Edwardian era.58 In light of this, the 
anxieties over Japanese naval power raised in Australasia, and their growing demands for a 
system that expressed the racial solidarity of the ‘British peoples’, appear less as voices crying in 
the wilderness, and more as participants in a broader set of debates on strategy, identity, and the 
future of the British imperial system. 
  In the Pacific, fears of Japanese expansionism before 1914 remained mostly speculative. 
In its immediate neighbourhood of East Asia, by contrast, the growth of Japanese power was 
already remaking the regional order. After 1905, it declared a protectorate over Korea, formally 
annexing the territory in 1910. China offered a still greater field for Japanese visions of territorial, 
commercial, as well as demographic expansion; tens of thousands of settlers crossed the Yellow 
Sea settle in Korea, Manchuria, and the treaty ports.59 ‘The rise of Japan,’ noted the British envoy 
in Beijing in 1905, ‘has as completely upset our equilibrium as a new planet the size of Mars 
would derange the solar system.’60 The metaphor was well chosen: the awareness that British 
relations with Japan evolved within the context of a broader ‘Far Eastern’ question, constantly in 
motion and subject to conflicting gravitational forces, has long shaped the historiography. L.K. 
Young, Ian Nish, and (most thoroughly) T.G. Otte have all noted how British anxieties about the 
future of China were a crucial forcing-house for the formation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.61 
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Yet it remains an equally common assumption that the formation of that alliance, and Japan’s 
subsequent victory over Russia, settled the ‘China question’ as it had preoccupied the 
chancelleries of Europe since 1895. Otte, who takes the Russo-Japanese War as the end-point of 
his study, makes the point explicitly: Russia’s defeat had foreclosed the scenario of a partition 
directed from Europe. ‘Far eastern diplomacy now ran in quieter channels’. 62  From the 
perspective of the Foreign Office (the centrepiece of Otte’s study) such a conclusion might be 
justified: as E.W. Edwards has shown, in the crucial matter of railways, British China policy after 
1905 was increasingly marked by financial cooperation with its erstwhile European rivals.63 But 
the return to normality it suggests is deceptive: the years after 1905 were marked by the rapid 
growth of the Chinese nationalist movement, culminating in the revolution of 1911, as well as the 
consolidation of the Japanese sphere in southern Manchuria – an imperial project that was, as 
Yoshihisa Matsusaka has argued, far more ambitious than anything attempted by the Europeans 
during the so-called ‘scramble for China’.64 The war, then, terminated one ‘China question’ only 
to replace it with another: how would the British presence – the ‘Raj’, as some China coasters 
significantly described it – navigate the straits between a Japanese Scylla and a Chinese 
Charybdis? 
 This dissertation approaches that question from the perspective of the British 
communities in China’s treaty-ports, who felt the ripples of Tsushima keener than most. After 
1905, as the commercial and demographic impact of Japanese expansion made itself felt, coastal 
China became another zone of interaction between Japan and the British world. Here too, Japan 
emerged as a focal point for debates on the future of the British world-system – all the more so 
since it challenged the delicate racial order that was central to treaty-port life.65 Long neglected, 
recent work by Robert Bickers has done much to salvage the historical role of the port 
communities, both as conduits for Britain’s engagement with China, and as ‘colonial’ societies in 
their own right.66 Like the larger, more successful settler communities in the dominions, the 
‘Shanghailanders’ vocally claimed membership of the British world. They also developed their 
own particular ideas on the proper application of imperial power – although, as John Darwin has 
noted, when measured against the ambitions of some of its exponents, Shanghai’s sub-
imperialism in the Yangzi valley failed miserably.67 After 1905, Japan came to occupy a central 
role in these debates, both as a menace to local British interests – of which, the China coasters 
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complained, the ‘little Englanders’ back home were sorrowfully neglectful – and a model for the 
kind of imperial projects they themselves wished to pursue. This is a story which, in many 
aspects mirrors many of the concerns expressed in the British Pacific, and which this dissertation 
examines as part of a wider story of hopes, fears, and challenges with which the rise of Japan 




 This dissertation pursues that story across a ten-year period, from the outbreak of the 
Russo-Japanese War in 1904 until the beginning of the First World War. It does not pretend to 
offer a full picture of the Anglo-Japanese relationship  – as this would require a sustained analysis 
of Japanese-language materials – but rather examines the role of Japan as an external force, 
capable of shaping politics, ideas, and identities throughout the British world. As such, its source 
base is considerably broader than that of previous studies of Anglo-Japanese relations, and marks 
the first attempt to bring the available archival material from Britain, the dominions, and the 
China coast within the scope of a single study. Its narrative draws from three founts in particular. 
First, this dissertation does not dispense with the sources that have formed the traditional basis 
of our understanding of British engagement with Japan: the official correspondence housed in 
the records of the Foreign and Colonial offices, triangulated with the papers of officials, 
ambassadors, and government ministers, both in Britain and its major dominions.68 These clearly 
remain indispensible. Yet the workings of the ‘official mind’ can only offer a partial picture of the 
chaotic reality of international politics, and official records are often poorly situated to capture 
either the political processes that drive decision-making, or the more nebulous role of cultural 
and ideological factors. To address this, this dissertation also explores the role of those who 
sought to shape attitudes or influence policy from outside the official channels of government. 
This includes the private papers of journalists and editors – the archive of The Times being a 
particularly valuable and underused source – as well as a coterie of self-declared ‘imperialist’ 
thinkers, many of whom conducted a regular correspondence with policy-makers throughout the 
British world. For the British communities in China, which maintained few institutional ties to 
Britain – the heir of the once-powerful China lobby, the China Association, was a much-reduced 
force by 1904 – these informal connections are particularly necessary, and this dissertation was 
able to draw on the extensive personal records of several prominent China coast residents to 
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assemble an image of Anglo-China’s evolving relationship with Japan.69 Finally, this dissertation 
supplements the official documentary record with public sources, particularly the newspaper and 
periodical press, and parliamentary debates. As such, it acknowledges a debt to the ongoing 
process of digitisation, which has made it possible for the historian to access vast amounts of 
material in more targeted ways.   
 The dissertation follows a broadly chronological structure, though individual chapters 
focus thematically on particular aspects of Japan’s interaction with the British world. The first 
two chapters focus on the Russo-Japanese War and its immediate consequences. Chapter one 
examines the competing interpretations of the war in the British public sphere. It shows how 
both the Japanese government and its supporters in Britain came to portray the conflict as a ‘war 
for civilisation’: a confrontation between a progressive, modern Japan, and a ‘backward’, 
autocratic Russia. Such an interpretation, however, was in constant conflict with racialist 
interpretations of the war, and prompted significant politicking between Japan’s supporters and 
detractors in different corners of the press. Chapter two analyses the war’s immediate aftermath, 
and concentrates on the effects of the bid for international equality that lay implicit in Japan’s 
victory. It begins by examining the revision of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, amended during the 
war to reflect Japan’s new status. It also shows how the war re-opened the issue of Japanese 
immigration in the Pacific, and how both Canada and – albeit more hesitantly – Australia, 
explored new ways of accommodating their policies to a Japan that had demonstrated its 
‘civilised’ credentials.  
 These were the halcyon days of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. In subsequent years, 
however, Japan’s expanding presence in the international order – in both a material and symbolic 
sense – began to touch on (and grate against) the boundaries of the British world. The following 
three chapters examine the emergence of these new pressure points. Chapter three examines 
China, where the impact of Japan’s growing military and economic heft was most pronounced. 
As hopes of a commercial renaissance gave way to alarm over Japan’s own ambitions in the 
region, the ‘Shanghai mind’, turned from one of Japan’s greatest supporters to its most vocal 
detractor. Something similar happened across the Pacific. As noted in the fourth chapter, in 
California and British Columbia, white hostility against Japanese migrants, now tied to fears of 
Japan’s growing naval and military power, provoked a sharp backlash, as a wave of anti-Asian 
violence swept across the Pacific coast in the autumn of 1907. The sudden outbreak of the 
‘immigration crisis’ confronted Ottawa, Washington, and London with the spectre of a new form 
of global politics, structured along racial, rather than national lines. As chapter five shows, such 
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ideas were already gaining widespread traction in Australia and New Zealand, where local 
politicians enlisted fears of Japan in a drive to reinforce the imperial ramparts in the Pacific.  
 Under this multi-pronged assault, the British government was forced to rethink its own 
relationship with Japan, a process analysed in chapter six. When Britain initiated a renewal of the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1911, it did so under very different conditions, and guided by a set of 
very different considerations. Increasingly, the alliance was construed – and presented to 
sceptical audiences in the dominions – both as an instrument to check the ambitions of its 
Japanese ally, and to contain potential racial conflict. Chapter seven, finally, examines the period 
between renewal and the outbreak of the First World War, when racial politics, in the form of a 
new immigration crisis in California, combined with a deepening controversy over naval security 
in the Pacific, again intruded forcefully on the Anglo-Japanese relationship. Yet these same 
disputes also demonstrated the risks of allowing the ‘colour line’ to shut Japan out of the equal 





A War for Civilisation, 1904-5 
 
   
 In the night of 8 February 1904, three Japanese torpedo boat flotillas under the 
command of Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō launched a surprise attack on the Russian squadron 
anchored in Port Arthur, marking the outbreak of a war that would last for nineteen months and 
remake the political order in East Asia. By the time the two belligerents signed their peace treaty 
in September 1905, Russia had been humbled, and its hold over northeast Asia all but broken. 
Although a decisive military breakthrough – a ‘Sedan’ – had eluded Japan, it had emerged 
victorious out of every major engagement with the Russian army: at the crossing of the Yalu in 
May 1904; at Liaoyang in September; and at Mukden in February 1905, where over half a million 
combatants fought a month-long battle in midst of the Manchurian winter. The fortress at Port 
Arthur, the linchpin of Russia’s Far Eastern sphere, fell to a Japanese assault in January 1905. 
Some speculated Vladivostok might be next.1 The war at sea, culminating in Japan’s dramatic 
victory at Tsushima, had been more decisive still. In the ultimate test of modern war, waged with 
conscript armies on densely fought, highly lethal battlefields, Russia was defeated by what many 
at the St Petersburg court had derided as a country of ‘little yellow monkeys’.2  
 Although Britain had been formally allied to Japan since 1902, the terms of its alliance 
stipulated that it was only obligated to intervene if its ally found itself at war with more than one 
power; in other words, if Russia’s ally France joined the fray. ‘We are only required to keep the 
ring,’ as Arthur Balfour, the prime minister, reminded his more jittery cabinet colleagues.3 Even 
in the absence of direct British involvement, however, the Russo-Japanese War exercised opinion 
throughout the British world. Its most sensational feature was the ‘new Japan’ itself: an Asian 
power waging war with modern methods, yet also meticulously observing the rules of ‘civilised’ 
warfare.  Its successes against Russia – for all its failings still a white, Christian, European power 
– raised profound questions over the relationship between culture, ‘civilisation’, and race. As one 
supporter of Japan, the journalist Alfred Stead, put it, the war had demonstrated ‘the fallacy of 
artificial barriers between races’. The ‘colour line’ had been washed away. ‘The world has become 
again a community of nations, not a series of unequal, water-tight compartments.’4 Others were 
not so certain. While older stereotypes of a moribund ‘Asiatic’ race were clearly unsuited to 
Japan, racial thought was flexible enough to accommodate the reality of a modern, efficient, yet 
still distinctly Asian power, and many observers continued to place it on the other side of a racial 
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barrier. ‘I believe that Japan will take its place as a great civilized power of a formidable type,’ 
Theodore Roosevelt confided to one of his English correspondents, ‘[yet] with motives and ways 
of thought which are not quite those of the powers of our race.’5 This also raised the more 
fundamental question of whether Japan could ever truly be integrated in an imperial order that 
justified itself by notions of racial and cultural hierarchy. At its most extreme, this manifested 
itself in the fear that Japan would place itself at the head of a ‘Yellow Peril’ by leading the rest of 
Asia in revolt against the West.  
 
Japan, Britain, and the coming of war 
 
 The roots of the Russo-Japanese War stretched back to the outbreak of the Sino-
Japanese War in 1894, when the two East Asian states went to war over the fortunes of Korea.6 
At the outset, most European observers had predicted a Chinese victory: as George Curzon put 
it, ‘the mighty millions of the Yellow Race would roll back the small island population into the 
sea’.7 Yet with superior organisation, and confusion and incompetence on the Chinese side, Japan 
won a string of victories. It exacted a heavy price for peace. China was to acknowledge Japanese 
primacy in Korea, and pay a hefty indemnity. Japan was to be admitted to the treaty-port system 
on the same terms as the Western powers. Most controversially, China would cede territory: the 
island of Taiwan, and the Liaodong peninsula on the southern tip of Manchuria. Japan had 
established itself as the rising force in the Far East; China, with its structural weaknesses now laid 
bare, seemed to teeter on the brink of collapse: ‘rotten to the core’ was the verdict of Lord 
Kimberley, the British foreign secretary.8 During the decade that followed, the prospect of 
China’s imminent disintegration – which seemed again perilously close during the Boxer Rising 
of 1900-01 – turned East Asia into the storm-centre of international politics. The new ‘Chinese 
question’, commented Lord Rosebery, the prime minister (1894-95) seemed ‘pregnant with 
possibilities of a disastrous kind; and it might result in an Armageddon between the European 
Powers struggling for the ruins of the Chinese Empire.’9  
 The opening salvo of that struggle was sounded in April 1895, when a European cabal 
composed of France, Germany, and Russia intervened in the peace negotiations and forced Japan 
to surrender its claim to Liaodong. The following years saw an escalating ‘scramble’ for naval 
bases and railway concessions, as each of the three members of the Dreibund went on to extort 
quasi-territorial rights from a friendless, capital-starved China. Of the challengers, by far the most 
formidable was Russia, whose Siberian empire bordered directly on the Qing’s northern 
borderlands. In 1896, in exchange for promises of support against Japan, Russia acquired a 
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railway lease to build a southern branch of its new trans-Siberian railway across Chinese territory 
in Manchuria. Two years later, responding to the German seizure of the port of Qingdao, it 
demanded the lease of Port Arthur, the naval base on the Liaodong peninsula, as well as the right 
to link the port to the trans-Siberian line. Already in this skeletal form, the Russian sphere 
possessed the makings of a quasi-colonial realm, from which it could establish a dominating 
position in northeast Asia. ‘Given our enormous frontier line with China and our exceptionally 
favourable situation,’ predicted Sergei Witte, the Russian finance minister, ‘the absorption by 
Russia of a considerable portion of the Chinese Empire is only a question of time.’10 Conquest 
‘by bank and railway,’ would allow Russia to detach Manchuria’s economy and politics from 
Beijing, and turn the region into an appendage of Siberia. The Boxer Rising provided the 
opportunity to accelerate the process, and the entirety of Manchuria was now placed under 
military occupation. Despite promises to evacuate, it was clear that it had little intention of 
abandoning control of its new sphere. The formation of a ‘Viceroyalty of the Far East,’ 
headquartered at Port Arthur, in August 1903, signalled both the direction and the scale of the 
Russian intentions. Unless its expansion was checked, warned Ernest Satow, the British envoy in 
Beijing, Russia would become ‘the dominant Power in this part of the world, and will swallow up 
at least all northern China’.11  
 For Britain, still straining under the burdens of the South African War, such an outcome 
was deeply unpalatable. Russia entrenched in northern China would exercise a commanding 
influence on Beijing, and with France and Germany acting as jackals to the Russian bear, a 
general partition might become inevitable. To keep its share of the gâteau chinois, Britain might 
have to fall back on its own sphere in the Yangzi valley. Worse, the concentration of Russian sea 
power at Port Arthur would open up a new naval front on Britain’s exposed Pacific flank, which 
might threaten Hong Kong, Singapore, and even Australia. In Japan, meanwhile, Russia’s move 
into Manchuria provoked even greater apprehension. That the Russians would stay on the far 
side of the Yalu, which separated Manchuria from Korea – the proverbial ‘dagger’ aimed at the 
Japanese home islands – seemed unlikely. From April 1903, a timber company sponsored by the 
Russian state had begun to acquire strategically placed concessions on the southern bank of the 
Yalu, backed up by a military infrastructure of barracks and telegraph lines.12 Unless its expansion 
was checked, Japan’s influence in continental Asia – and by extension, its status as a regional 
power – would be permanently circumscribed.  
 It was possible, then, to chart the emergence of a community of strategic interests that 
drew Britain and Japan closer together. Crucially, this process was matched by a growing British 
willingness to acknowledge Japan as a ‘civilised’ state, and a potential partner in the containment 
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of a common enemy. Following the outbreak if the Sino-Japanese War in 1894, Britain effectively 
acknowledged Japan’s claim to civilised status by agreeing to replace its ‘unequal treaties’ with a 
new commercial agreement. The following year, Rosebery’s government had refused to join the 
Triple Intervention expressly to avoid alienating ‘the rising Power in the East’.13 In 1900, the two 
powers worked closely together in the suppression of the Boxers.14 Meanwhile, a number of 
prominent British commentators, including Admiral Sir Charles Beresford, and George Curzon, 
the coming man of the Conservative party, took to describing Japan as the ‘Britain of the Far 
East’: a fellow maritime empire on the edge of Eurasia, whose interests were presumably aligned 
with those of Great Britain.15 An Anglo-Japanese alliance, as the political expression of these 
commonalities, gradually became thinkable. 
 The formation of that alliance was not a foregone conclusion. A combination with Japan 
was one of a number of possible combinations contemplated by the Salisbury cabinet in the 
winter of 1901, and it prevailed over the alternatives largely because it appeared to secure 
Britain’s interests in East Asia without tying its hands in Europe. 16  Yet set against the 
background of the Russian challenge in Manchuria, the new alliance could be presented as a 
natural combination between powers with a joint interest in preventing the carve-up of China, 
and preserving an ‘Open Door’ for trade. In this broad sense, the treaty could be presented as a 
liberal pact aimed at protecting the ‘civilised’, free-trading order in East Asia: its preamble set out 
the allies’ joint commitment to ‘the independence and territorial integrity’ of China and Korea, 
and their desire to maintain ‘equal opportunities in those two countries for the commerce and 
industry of all nations’. Tellingly, this phrasing was in keeping with the ‘Open Door’ policy put 
forward by the United States during the Boxer crisis. Although it was not intimately concerned 
with the Open Door, presenting the alliance as a point of ideological as well as strategic 
convergence certainly appealed to Japan: after joining the comity of ‘civilisation’, Tokyo now 
stood with its progressive vanguard.  
 This small-l liberal interpretation also secured the new treaty a soft landing in British 
public opinion, and encouraged commentators to look for further points of historical and 
ideological convergence. For the North China Herald, the mouthpiece of British trading 
communities on the China coast, the alliance represented a coming together of ‘the Englands of 
the West and the East’, that would guarantee ‘peace and the open door for all’.17 By the same 
token, it was possible to imagine the Anglo-Japanese coalition as a link in a broader progressive 
coalition with the United States. When the new treaty was debated in Parliament, Lord 
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Cranborne, Salisbury’s eldest son, stressed that the agreement had Washington’s ‘full approval’.18 
The Liberal MP Joseph Walton similarly noted that the alliance secured ‘practically the same 
objects’ as the Open Door notes, and would enjoy ‘the moral if not the practical support’ of the 
United States.19 Indeed, many commentators appear to have thought of the new combination 
with Japan as an American alliance on the sly. ‘Implicit in the reception given by the people of 
this country to the Anglo-Japanese alliance,’ noted Sydney Brooks in Fortnightly Review, ‘there has 
lain the assumption that the United States is, in some sort, a third party to it’.20 Although Brooks 
dismissed this as wishful thinking, such optimism was not wholly without foundation: in the 
aftermath of the Boxer crisis, a number of American commentators, including the minister in 
Beijing, W.W. Rockhill, and the naval writer A.T. Mahan, flirted with the idea of a Japanese-
American partnership in China. 21  All three states were united in agreement that Russia 
constituted the greatest menace to their interests in China – a fact that the New York Times 
considered sufficient reason to write of an ‘Anglo-American-Japanese entente’.22 
 Despite such vaulting rhetoric, London’s hopes for the alliance were modest. Aligning 
itself with Japan would place a check on further Russian forward moves in northeast Asia, freeze 
the territorial status quo in China, and strengthen Britain’s bargaining position in the event of 
another Far Eastern crisis. The treaty’s primary purpose, noted Lord Lansdowne, the foreign 
secretary, was to preserve ‘the general peace in the extreme East’.23 In addition, London hoped it 
might act as a restraint on Japan, whose unpredictability as an ‘Oriental’ nation remained a matter 
of concern.24 It failed on both counts: Russia continued to stall its withdrawal from Manchuria, 
and in Japan, the alliance effectively bolstered the case for a military confrontation. Already in the 
summer of 1903, senior figures in the Japanese army were advocating war.25 Japan’s civil leaders 
opted for negotiation: throughout the summer and autumn of 1903, they attempted to commit 
St. Petersburg to a mutual recognition of spheres – Man-kan kōkan, or ‘Manchuria for Korea’ – 
that recognised Japanese primacy in the Korean peninsula. In addition, it demanded a guarantee 
of the status quo: Japan was willing to tolerate Russia’s presence in Manchuria as a fait accompli, 
but it drew the line at annexation. The negotiations were marked by frustration, confusion and 
long delays, and served to convince Tokyo that Russia lacked interest in a diplomatic solution. If 
anything, the Russian position grew more intransigent: during the final round of talks in 
December 1903, the most it was prepared to offer was a ‘neutral zone’ extending south of the 
Korean border, while Manchuria was off the table altogether. ‘The crisis of the Russo-Japanese 
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negotiations is at hand,’ Satow now predicted, ‘and everything points to war.’26 The fear that the 
completion of the Far Eastern railways, and the arrival of naval reinforcements from Europe, 
would tilt the military balance permanently in Russia’s favour settled the Japanese government on 
war. On 8 February 1904, the Japanese navy launched its surprise attack on the Russian squadron 
in Port Arthur. The Russo-Japanese War had begun.  
 
A war for civilisation 
 
  Japan did not fight Russia out of an altruistic regard for liberal principles: its reasons 
were strategic, and sprang from a determination to resist the establishment of a Russian sphere 
on its Korean doorstep. At the same time, Tokyo was keen to present the war as a principled 
stance in defence of territorial sovereignty and freedom of commerce. In the rhetoric that Tokyo 
directed at its British and American supporters, the war against Russia became a war for 
‘civilisation’ and the Open Door.27 In an interview with Sir Claude Macdonald, the British 
minister in Tokyo, shortly after the outbreak of hostilities, Japan’s foreign minister stressed Japan 
was fighting for ‘the maintenance of the integrity of China’, warning that a Russian victory would 
to turn the whole of northeast Asia into a closed-off Russian preserve. Even the Yangzi valley 
would be at risk. 28 Japan, by contrast, would restore Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria, and 
keep the Open Door ajar for foreign trade. Japan did not want Russia’s railway leases, noted Itō 
Hirobumi, one of Japan’s leading elder statesmen, but would favour their neutralisation through 
takeover by an international syndicate.29   
 Given later developments, it is too easily forgotten that such statements still represented 
the spirit of Japanese policy: not even the more expansionist elements in Tokyo contemplated an 
extension of Japan’s own sphere into Manchuria, although Korea was another matter.30 Yet 
proclaiming its championship of the Open Door also served a clear purpose: it allowed Tokyo to 
present Russia as the real aggressor, and stressing Japan’s liberal motives counteracted any 
tendency to interpret the conflict in racial terms. In a widely circulated interview with the Japan 
Daily Mail, Japan’s prime minister, Count Katsura, insisted that the war was waged across a fault 
line that separated progress from reaction, not Asia from Europe. ‘With differences over race or 
religion it has nothing to do; and it is carried on in the interests of humanity, and the commerce 
and civilisation of the world.’31 It stressed Japan’s alignment with Britain and the United States in 
a global liberal coalition that extended across racial boundaries. As Francis Brinkley, The Times’ 
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Tokyo correspondent, declared, Japan was fighting as ‘the champion of ideals which Anglo-
Saxons, all the world over, hold in reverence’. If this was the meaning of the ‘Yellow Peril’, then 
it was a consummation devoutly to be wished.32  
 The idea that the war represented a clash between Japanese ‘civilisation’ and Russian 
backwardness found eager support among pro-Japanese commentators in Britain. According to 
the journalist Henry Wilson, the leader-writer for the Daily Mail,  
 
it cannot be denied by thinking men that [Japan], rather than Russia, represents civilised 
ideas, the freedom of human thought, democratic institutions, education and 
enlightenment — in a word, all that we understand by progress. It is Russia who stands for 
barbarism and reaction…33  
 
The Times endorsed Wilson’s verdict, similarly noting that ‘in this controversy the Asiatic Power 
represents the forces of civilizing process, and the European power those of mechanical 
repression’.34 With such an interpretation came the hope that a Japanese victory would help to 
safeguard Britain’s own interests in a free-trading East Asia: Russia’s southward drive would be 
arrested; the drift towards a partition of China reversed; and spheres of influence would be 
replaced with nobler forms of commercial expansion. Under such conditions, China might finally 
enter the economic renaissance that boosters of the ‘China market’ had long anticipated. A 
Japanese victory would, according to one writer, open ‘vast new fields to the trade of all nations’. 
35 Such hopes were particularly prevalent among the China traders themselves: the North China 
Herald matched even The Times in the warmness of its support for Japan in its ‘fight for 
civilisation’. At the annual dinner of the China Association, the merchants’ lobby, William 
Keswick, the former taipan of Jardine-Matheson, waxed lyrically over the ‘gallant Japanese’: Japan, 
he declared, was not merely fighting for its own interests, but ‘for the good of the world in 
general’.  
  
If their ideal is realised, if we have the great Empire of China thrown open to commerce… 
if we have Korea thrown open… just think of the vista that opens up to us in the trade of 
the Far East.36 
 
Even a more prosaic gathering (the semi-annual board meeting of HSBC) could still hope that 
‘the searchlight of Japanese activity’ would remove ‘the dark shadow’ hanging over China.37   
 Such statements purposefully turned the ‘Yellow Peril’ on its head. Rather than lead 
China into a revolt against the West, British commentators predicted that Japan would exercise a 
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benevolent, steadying effect on Beijing. Japanese influence would forestall a revival of 
‘Boxerism’, and might even act as a conduit for the entry of Western modernity into China. For 
one writer, Japan was ‘the energising force, moral and practical, which is to awaken China out of 
the lethargy that has held her spellbound for ages’.38 Henry Dyer, a British engineer who had 
served as an advisor to the Japanese education ministry, thought Japan’s brand of centralised 
modernisation ‘the chief progressive force in the Far East’, and hoped for its extension to 
China.39 The North China Herald was similarly expressive: the ‘Japanising of China,’ it declared, 
‘means the uplifting of this Empire by the spread of Western enlightenment and civilisation’.40 
Even as seasoned a China hand as Sir Robert Hart, the head of the Imperial Maritime Customs, 
was confident that ‘the pluck of Japan’ would ‘electrify’ China: ‘the psychological moment seems 
to have at last come: I expect progress will now take root and the strength of the Empire be 
developed.’41 By extension, a number of commentators argued that the danger of China being 
turned against the West was more likely to come from ‘semi-Oriental’ Russia than from ‘civilised’ 
Japan. ‘Indeed,’ one contributor to the Nineteenth Century argued, ‘Russia is in race, customs, art, 
thought, and general culture more yellow than white, more Asiatic than European.’42 It, rather 
than Japan, might be true the ‘Yellow Peril’: as Cecil Spring-Rice, the viscerally anti-Russian 
diplomat curiously out of place at the St Petersburg embassy, wrote to Theodore Roosevelt, 
Russia had relied on ‘Asiatic’ manpower since the days of Ivan the Terrible. ‘Why should not 
Russia use Mongolian or Chinese troops as she has used her Tartars – to coerce the Teutons & 
Europeans?’43 
 Casting the Russo-Japanese War as a ‘war for civilisation’ also allowed commentators to 
dodge the thorny issue of religion. During the past half-century, Japan’s indigenous religions – 
local Buddhism and Shintō – had remained stubbornly resistant to the efforts of Christian 
missionaries, and more than once, Japanese ‘heathenism’ had formed an obstacle to its 
integration in international society.44 During the Russo-Japanese War, however, a number of 
missionaries added their voices to the chorus of ‘civilising’ rhetoric.45 Its constitutional guarantee 
of religious freedom stood in stark contrast to the bloody wave of pogroms sweeping across 
Russia. Clerical observers cited the bravery, self-sacrifice, and Spartan lifestyle of the Japanese 
soldiers as evidence that Japan possessed ‘the instinct of the Gospel’ to a greater degree than 
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nominally Christian Russia.46 Religion also blended with geopolitics, as an East Asia stabilised 
and guided by Japan promised a revival of evangelical prospects: Bishop William Awdry, the head 
of the Anglican mission in South Tokyo, was already planning a new missionary drive into 
Manchuria, which he proposed to bring under the remit of the missionary hierarchy of Japan. 
The gospel, he hoped, would enter northern China ‘through Japanese influence’.47 Some even 
hoped that Japan itself might be on the edge of conversion, with one Australian bishop declaring 
that Japan had already adopted a ‘practical Christianity’, and that its formal conversion would 
inevitably follow.48  
 Race was another marker of difference that could be mitigated through ‘civilising’ 
rhetoric. Rotem Kowner has noted a marked tendency among British observers to project 
Japan’s new image onto the bodies of its soldiers, who seemed to become ‘taller, stronger, and 
better nourished’ in the process.49 Confronted with a modernised Japan, racial thinking could 
adapt by ‘whitening’ its people. Thus, according to the writer Henry Dyer, the Japanese 
possessed a healthy dose of ‘Anglo-Saxon virility’, while Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett, war 
correspondent for the Standard, considered them ‘undoubtedly the finest race physically that 
exists… To see a Japanese jump is a revelation.’50 Some of his colleagues pointedly referred to 
the Japanese soldiers as ‘Tommies’, while their commanders were frequently equated with their 
British counterparts: Tōgō, in particular, was hailed as ‘Japan’s Nelson’.51 General Ian Hamilton, 
the Indian Army’s senior observer in Manchuria, professed to prefer the Japanese soldier to the 
‘City-bred Dollar hunters’ that he believed had diluted Britain’s own racial stock: ‘In the whole of 
Tokio I have not seen a single soldier who is flat-footed, narrow-chested or slouching.’52 Asked 
for his views on the ‘Yellow Peril’, the journalist and traveller Stafford Ransome came closest of 
all to hauling Japan across the colour line: 
 
 if you were to place side by side a Japanese soldier and a Siberian Russian, and ask yourself 
which was the whiter of the two, you would unquestionably choose the Japanese... As 
regards their international dealings, the Japanese have already proved themselves “whiter” 
than many of the nations who profess a higher civilisation.53  
 
 To be sure, this ‘whitening’ of the Japanese remained a very partial process. Praise often 
contained a note of condescension: Hamilton compared the Japanese soldiers to the Gurkhas he 
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had commanded in India, another ‘martial race’ untainted by the softness of civilised life.54 
Others rejected it altogether. J.O.P. Bland, the Shanghai correspondent for The Times, found the 
Japanese ‘ridiculous’ in appearance: ‘I respect and admire them immensely except when one of 
them is in my office to remind me of the descent of man.’55 The writer Thomas Crosland, author 
of the splenetic pamphlet The Truth About Japan, was harsher still: ‘A stunted, lymphatic, yellow-
faced heathen, with a mouthful of teeth three sizes too big for him, bulging slits where his eyes 
ought to be, blacking-brush hair, a foolish giggle, a cruel heart, and the conceit of the devil’.56 
Such naysayers notwithstanding, the general thrust was clear: in the eyes of most British 
observers, the war dispelled whatever doubts still lingered over Japan’s status as a ‘civilised’ 
power. In turn, stressing Japan’s championing of a liberal, progressive order in East Asia, or even 
of ‘Christian civilisation’, allowed British commentators to sidestep the inconvenience of their 
ally’s Asian heritage: Japan was winning precisely because it was more civilised, more modern, 
and even ‘whiter’ than its Russian opponent.  
 
The ‘Cult’ of Japan 
   
 Running in parallel with the ‘civilising’ narrative was the belief that Japan’s successes 
owed as much to a distinct ‘national spirit’ as to its ability to master the tools of Western 
modernity. For the Fabian thinker Beatrice Webb, the Japanese way became an object of 
enduring fascination, as she confided to her diary by the end of 1904: 
 
I watch in myself and others a growing national shamefacedness at the superiority of the 
Japanese over “our noble selves” in capacity, courage, self-control… They have suddenly 
raised the standard of international efficiency – in exactly those departments of life that 
we Western nations imagined ourselves supremely superior to the Eastern races.57  
 
To Webb, Japan stood out as an alternative model of modernity: a society organised on collective 
principles, capable of acting as a single unit, and forged together by a deep sense of patriotism. 
Her comments exemplified what later historians have dubbed the ‘cult of Japan’: a brief, but 
intense flowering of Japanophilia that took hold among a section of the British elite at the time 
of the Russo-Japanese War.58 The young Leo Amery, then a journalist involved in several 
movements for imperial and national reform, later confessed how he had felt powerfully drawn 
to ‘the legend of a people inspired by a more than medieval sense of knightly chivalry and by a 
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superhuman contempt of death’.59 Lord Rosebery penned the foreword for a book presenting 
Japan as a paragon of ‘national efficiency’.60 H.G. Wells named his guardians of the ‘World State’ 
in A Modern Utopia (serialised from October 1904) after the samurai. Even Curzon was caught up 
in the admiring mood: ‘[W]e could not have done what the Japs [sic] have done,’ he wrote, ‘for as 
a nation we are growing stale, flaccid, and nerveless.’61  
 In the praise they lavished on Japan, British commentators bought into a mythology the 
Japanese state was weaving around itself. In the late nineteenth century, as the Meiji state came to 
exercise more direct control over civil and military education, it reinvented elements of its own 
martial past. As Oleg Benesch has noted, by the 1890s the samurai (pensioned off in 1873), along 
with their chivalric code of bushidō, could be safely rehabilitated as cultural symbols, and were 
tied into a nationalist ethos that stressed patriotic service to the country and the emperor.62 
Naoko Shimazu has similarly argued that Japan’s mythologised patriotism was a contingent 
response to the social strains imposed by mass mobilisation in what remained an agrarian, pre-
industrial society.63 Japan’s martial zeal, therefore, was not the ancient cultural habit many 
Western observers assumed it to be, and several old Far Eastern hands were frankly dismissive of 
the ‘fetich [sic] worship of Bushido’ now en vogue in London society.64 One British resident in 
Japan perceptively noted that despite the ‘fearful lot of gush and nonsense’ written about the 
patriotic fervour of Japanese recruits, ‘all who have lived among the people of the land know 
only too well that this joy is too often very much put on’.65 Towards the end of the war, Bishop 
Awdry similarly felt compelled to write to The Times to puncture his countrymen’s over-
romanticised view of the Japanese. Disillusion would inevitably set in, he warned, ‘if at this stage 
English enthusiasm credits them with virtues which they have not yet attained’.66 That the old 
Japan hands shook their head at the sudden outburst of ‘Japan-worship’ was not surprising: it 
was Japan’s very unfamiliarity that allowed it to be reinvented as a paragon of national virtue.  
   In truth, the ‘Cult’ was always more concerned with condemning what it saw as the 
deficiencies in British society than accounting for the qualities of the Japanese. The sudden 
popularity of Japan as a model of national reform was a response – one among many – to a 
perceived sense of national decline that arose out of the widespread dissatisfaction with the 
deficiencies of the British military system exposed by the South African War.67 In a larger sense, 
declinist anxieties reflected the emergence of a more competitive global politics, in which 
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Britain’s pre-eminent position appeared increasingly threatened by more ‘efficient’ rivals. 68  High 
on the indictment were an out-dated adherence to laissez-faire; a reluctance to exercise the power 
of the state as a constructive force; a preference for amateurism over ‘scientific’ methods of 
government; a political system that enshrined social divisions and favoured party loyalty above 
the ‘national interest’; and the absence of institutions to engender imperial cohesion. Many 
connected this to a deeper diagnosis of national malaise, in which the spread of capitalism, 
urbanisation, and material, ‘sensual’ culture – together with the more recent menaces of foreign 
immigration, socialism and feminism – combined to produce a state of decadence and racial 
degeneration.69 Against this picture of decline, Japan could appear as a shining example of martial 
prowess, ‘scientific’ organisation, and social harmony. One writer made the point explicitly: The 
Decline and Fall of the British Empire, published anonymously in 1905, purported to be a history of 
the ‘sudden Fall of our great Western Ally’, written in the year 2005 by a Japanese historian. 
Analysing Britain’s decline under a series of headings – including ‘The Growth and Refinement 
of Luxury’, and the ‘Decline of the Health and Physique of the English People’ – it ended with 
an exhortation to the Japanese not to repeat the mistakes of their fallen ally.70 Baden-Powell 
made it required reading for aspiring Boy Scouts.71 
 Two elements of the ‘Cult’ stood out. The first was the ascetic, self-sacrificing ethos that 
British commentators used to explain Japan’s successes against Russia. Much of this myth-
making began at the front, among the war correspondents and military observers that watched 
the Japanese army at war. General Ian Hamilton, the Indian army’s senior observer in Manchuria, 
was not untypical in his assessment of the Japanese soldier, whom he thought ‘the fighting man 
of the future’, exemplary in his ‘intense patriotism & fearlessness of death… I never saw such 
discipline’.72 As the war progressed, such admiration crossed over into hagiography: the assault 
on Port Arthur, in particular, produced a stream of accounts that explained the victory as a feat 
of ‘splendid, unflinching courage’, feeding the belief that the Japanese army consisted, as one 
account of the siege put it, of ‘human bullets’ propelled by love of country.73 It also sparked an 
interest in the supposed origins of the Japanese martial ethos, and particularly in bushidō, which 
became shorthand for the ‘national spirit’ that had supposedly animated Japan’s performance in 
the field. Thus Robert Baden-Powell instructed aspiring Scouts that the study of bushidō would 
strengthen ‘the moral tone of our race’, while Lord Meath professed the hope that his campaign 
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for a national ‘Empire Day’ would instil ‘qualities of a virile nature’ just as bushidō had done in 
Japan.74 
  This willingness to invoke Japan as a direct model illustrates that Edwardian 
Japanophilia was not a straightforward exercise in Orientalism: rather, Japan was held to have 
retained the qualities that Britain had possessed in its own pre-industrial past. Historical analogies 
abounded: according to Claude Macdonald, Japan was experiencing its ‘Elizabethan’ age, while 
Ashmead-Bartlett compared the Japanese army to that of the British in the Peninsular War, ‘our 
zenith as a fighting race’.75 Curzon reached for yet another simile: ‘In point of national ardour 
and power of self-sacrifice the Japs [sic] stand about where we did at Agincourt.’76 Particularly to 
commentators of a conservative, militarist bend, the Japanese model seemed to offer modernity 
without the degenerative ‘materialism’ that many commentators blamed for the decline of pre-
modern values in British society. ‘How unfavourable to ourselves is the comparison between 
England and Japan,’ Ashmead-Bartlett lamented. ‘It almost seems as if England had reached the 
point where her civilisation means the decay of the primitive virtues possessed by man, and that 
she bids fair to descend the reverse slope day by day.’77 Hamilton drew a similar conclusion: 
while the Japanese were ‘as civilised as us’, they had not yet developed ‘the luxury, sensuality and 
nerves which, with us, have insensibly grown up pari passu with the refinements and mechanical 
facilities of life’.78 Indeed, what drew British commentators to bushidō was how well adapted 
Japan’s ‘ancient martial ethos’ seemed to be to the demands of modern industrialised warfare: 
through conscription and mass education, the Japanese state had apparently succeeded in 
transforming an elite ethos into a genuinely national ideology.79  
 This was the second component of the ‘Cult’: the belief that modern Japan was the 
product of conscious dirigisme as much as of the inheritance of its pre-modern past. For the 
diverse set of campaigners for ‘efficiency’, it seemed to exemplify the requirements for survival in 
a more competitive age of global politics: a disciplined population; an ethos of unity and national 
service; and a government capable of ‘organising’ the nation and directing it to a single purpose. 
Rather than a ‘collection of individuals,’ claimed the journalist Alfred Stead, Japan was ‘a living 
and sentient reality, throbbing with all the life and vigour of the millions of human beings within 
its island shores, all striving in one common direction’.80 For Lord Rosebery, who penned a 
preface to Stead’s book, modern Japan similarly illustrated the virtues of ‘a directing and 
                                                      
74 R. Baden-Powell, Scouting for Boys: The Original 1908 Edition, (Oxford, 2005), pp. 44, 237; Lord Meath, “The Soul of a 
Nation’ and Empire Day’, The Times, 20 Oct 1904; for the introduction of the concept to the British public see ‘The 
Soul of a Nation,’ The Times, 4 Oct 1904; also Holmes and Ion, “Bushido and the Samurai”. 
75 Macdonald to Lansdowne, 21 July 1904, NA, FO 46/578, No. 220; Ashmead-Bartlett, Port Arthur, p. 481.  
76 Curzon to Godley, 23 March 1905, BL, Curzon Papers, MSS Eur F111/164.  
77 Ashmead-Bartlett, Port Arthur, p. 488. 
78 Hamilton, Staff-Officer’s Scrap-Book, p. 16. 
79 Charles á Court Repington, The War in the Far East, (New York, 1905), pp. 374-85. 
80 Alfred Stead, Great Japan: A Study in National Efficiency, (London, 1906), pp. 1-2. 
 43 
vitalizing Government’. 81 The tariff reformer J.L. Garvin agreed that Japanese society was 
‘entirely the creation, not certainly of laissez-faire, but of Government action’.82  
 As G.R. Searle has noted, there was a distinct authoritarian streak in such admiring 
appraisals of Japanese society as a collective entity, with an obedient population marching to the 
tune of a masterful government. 83  Beatrice Webb admitted as much in her diary: Japan’s 
successes, she noted, appeared to tell ‘in favour of organisation, collective regulation, scientific 
education, physical and mental training – but on the whole not in favour of Democracy’.84 This 
did not trouble Webb, but others were less enamoured of the ruthlessness and the sacrifice of 
individuality that the Japanese ‘model’ seemed to require. In a different light, the Japan imagined 
by the efficiency campaigners bore an eerie resemblance to the ‘Yellow Peril’. In the hands of less 
sympathetic observers, it was easy to recast the myth of the ‘human bullets’ into a caricature of 
‘Oriental’ zealotry, with the Japanese appearing ‘like so many mad dervishes’.85 One notable 
doubter was Frederick McKenzie, the war correspondent for the Daily Mail, who felt ill at ease 
with the ‘fanatic’ chauvinism he encountered in Tokyo.86 Writing under a pseudonym in the 
Fortnightly Review, Garvin similarly criticised Japan’s ‘Oriental’ way of war, which he believed over-
relied on frontal assaults, was indifferent to casualties, and made up for its lack of tactical 
innovation only through its willingness ‘to spill blood like flowing water’.87 Even Hamilton, 
whose published account painted a highly sympathetic picture of the Japanese army, had his 
reservations. ‘It don’t [sic] cost a Jap [sic] much to die,’ he noted in his private diary. ‘He does not 
care enough about life to make it much of a sacrifice… Pity, love, as we understand them are not 
in their repertoire.’88 Looking on the Russian dead after one engagement, he could not help but 
feel a pang of anxiety: ‘How silent; how ghastly; how lonely seemed this charnel house where I, a 
solitary European, beheld rank upon rank of brave Russians mown down by the embattled ranks 




 Hamilton was not alone in voicing unease over the war’s racial implications. Some 
commentators professed their sympathy with Russia as a fellow European nation; others warned 
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that its defeat would threaten the established racial order, with dire consequences for British rule 
in Asia. At its most extreme, this anxiety manifested itself as a belief in the ‘Yellow Peril’, a geo-
racial prophesy which predicted that white supremacy would be challenged by the ‘Mongolian 
races’ at some point in the coming century. The precise origins of the ‘Peril’ remain somewhat 
convoluted: it drew on a range of Sinophobic tropes, blending stereotyped images of the Chinese 
developed since the opium wars with the grassroots hostility to Chinese immigration that had its 
roots in the white settler societies of the Pacific Rim. Notably, it was an Anglo-Australian 
historian, Charles Pearson, who first articulated the notion of a white world under pressure from 
the ‘black and yellow races’ in his 1893 work National Life and Character: A Forecast. Unable to 
thrive in tropical climates, Pearson predicted, whites had reached the outer limit of their capacity 
for expansion. The future would see their fortunes reversed, as the expansive power of Asia 
would throw the white world on the defensive:  
We shall wake to find ourselves elbowed and hustled, and perhaps even thrust aside by 
peoples whom we looked down upon as servile and thought of as bound always to 




 It was China, rather than Japan, whose sheer size and power haunted Pearson; indeed his 
failure to account for China’s weakness, dramatically exposed in the Sino-Japanese War, was one 
of the grounds on which Curzon subsequently criticised the book.91 Yet Pearson’s racial reading 
of global politics resonated widely. One of his most prominent readers was the German emperor, 
Wilhelm II, who would popularise Pearson’s thesis as ‘die Gelbe Gefahr’, or ‘the Yellow Peril’, at 
the time of the Triple Intervention.92 The Kaiser returned to his theme of race war during the 
Russo-Japanese War, repeatedly professing his sympathy with Russia as the ‘vanguard of 
Europe’, holding back the tide of a rising Asia. The British courtier Frederick Ponsonby, who 
met him at Kiel in March 1904, found the emperor ‘filled with fear of the Yellow Peril’.93 
Wilhelm’s preoccupation with the subject fitted with contemporary caricatures of the Kaiser as 
an eccentric, even unhinged ruler, and while Ponsonby found it merely ‘amusing’, other British 
read the Kaiser’s embrace of the ‘Yellow bogey’ as a crass attempt to curry favour with Russia. ‘I 
believe the “Yellow Peril” is being made chiefly by Germany for German purposes,’ Chirol 
concluded.94  
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 Yet the ‘Yellow Peril’ could not simply be dismissed as an idiosyncrasy of the Kaiser. 
During the Russo-Japanese War, racial mistrust of Japan had far wider resonance, and was 
credited with real political significance throughout continental Europe. According to the British 
ambassador in St Petersburg, dread of seeing its ‘Oriental neighbour’ armed with ‘Occidental 
ideas’ had featured prominently in the tsar’s decision to resort to war. 95  In France, the 
conservative press kept up a steady stream of racial rhetoric throughout the war. ‘The Yellow 
Peril is the order of the day here,’ Sir Francis Bertie, the British ambassador, reported from 
Paris.96 Even the Dutch authorities in Batavia, a visiting admiral observed, lived in trepidation ‘of 
the Japs [sic] swooping down on their colonies’. 97  Nowhere was opinion on the subject 
monolithic, and many continental liberals and socialists relished seeing tsarist autocracy 
chastened; yet everywhere perceptions of racial difference exercised a structural influence on 
attitudes towards the war.  
 This was true even of Britain, where attitudes towards Japan were more sympathetic and 
more deeply influenced by civilisational rhetoric. On the whole, the British elite regarded the 
‘Yellow Peril’, framed as a confrontation between Europe and Asia, as a paranoid fantasy: ‘a 
racial Frankenstein’.98 Balfour was ‘completely sceptical’ about the idea: ‘The idea of Japan 
heading an Eastern crusade on Western civilisation seems to me altogether chimerical.’ 99 
Lansdowne similarly dismissed the notion as ‘absurd’.100 Yet this did not mean that racial views 
were absent: set against those commentators that stressed Japan’s accession to civilisation, an 
equally vocal section of British opinion insisted that for all its achievements, Japan remained 
essentially ‘Asiatic’. ‘[S]he has donned a veneer of Western civilization,’ argued the old Japan 
hand Algernon Mitford at the time of the Boxer War. ‘But how deep does it go? Can the leopard 
change its spots so quickly?’ Beneath the ill-fitting European uniform, Mitford believed, still 
smouldered the ‘spirit of old Japan,’ whose ultimate ambition was to expel the European 
presence from Asia at the head of ‘a vast Manchu-Chinese-Japanese league’.101 A number of 
prominent papers aligned with the Liberal party, including the Spectator, Westminster Gazette, and 
Manchester Guardian, had opposed the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1902 on 
similar grounds: as an Asian country only recently or partially ‘civilised’, Japan was not a suitable 
ally for the world’s leading power.102 The Economist went further; denouncing denounced the 
treaty as a betrayal of white solidarity with potentially dire consequences: 
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Great Britain has quit decidedly… that unwritten alliance between all white races against 
all coloured races, through which alone the supremacy of Europe over Asia and Africa 
can finally be established.103 
 
 As the Russo-Japanese War broke out, a number of commentators again touted a 
racialist line that echoed the ‘Yellow Perilism’ circulating in continental Europe. Early on in the 
war, one writer in the Nineteenth Century restated the ‘Asianness’ of the Japanese, whom he 
believed were ‘an intensely secretive, astute, and self-contained race, very difficult to understand, 
because of the ineradicable racial difference between them and ourselves’.104 Others went further, 
and predicted that Japan would use its victory over Russia as a launching pad for a wider anti-
European crusade. According to the Spectator, whose editor, John St Loe Strachey, was a leading 
sceptic of the alliance, it was Japan’s ‘natural ambition to lead the yellow race, and to show the 
world that she is capable of regenerating Asia’.105 Strachey warned that if Japan were freed from 
European constraints, it would emerge as ‘a new Empire… which must dominate the North 
Pacific’, and diminish ‘the safety of every white Power… which has grave interests or broad 
territories on the Asiatic Continent’.106 The veteran journalist Frederick Greenwood, another 
prominent voice in the racial chorus, warned that Japan would lead China in a ‘general rising’ of 
the ‘races of the Far East’, to establish ‘a triumphing Mongol Empire on the ruin of European 
prestige’.107 This would leave Britain with a fateful choice, which Greenwood mechanically 
hammered home from the columns of the Westminster Gazette: ‘to break away from her political 
arrangements with Japan or stand with that nation and its Asiatic congeners against Europe’.108 
 Even among those who did not suspect Japan of harbouring pan-Asianist ambitions, 
some still warned that the overturning of the racial order in East Asia was bound to have 
ramifications for the British Empire. Imperial expansion, even in the more aggressive incarnation 
that had emerged in the 1880s, was a collaborative as well as a competitive exercise. This was 
especially true in East Asia, where as recently as 1900, the European powers, together with Japan 
and the United States, had acted jointly to defend the treaty-port regime during the Boxer crisis. 
By encouraging the rise of a power from outside the European cabal, some observers argued, 
Britain was playing fast and loose with this unwritten pact. Russia was a formidable rival, yet it 
was still European, Christian, and white; a Japanese victory would challenge Britain’s position in 
Asia on a much more fundamental level. ‘When we back Japan we virtually endorse the cry, “Asia 
for the Asiatics,”’ declared the Daily News, a Liberal newspaper. 109  There were wider 
repercussions to consider: already, nationalist elites in Britain’s own colonies were pointing out 
                                                      
103 ‘The Treaty with Japan,’ The Economist, 15 Feb 1902. 
104 C.A.W. Pownall, ‘Russia, Japan, and Ourselves,’ Nineteenth Century, March 1904. 
105 ‘The War,’ Spectator, 13 Feb 1904. 
106 ‘The Battle on the Yalu,’ Spectator, 7 May 1904. 
107 Frederick Greenwood, ‘East and West,’ Westminster Gazette, 5 May 1904.  
108 Frederick Greenwood, ‘The Orientation of England,’ Westminster Gazette, 22 Sept 1904.  
109 Cited in Iikura, “The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Question of Race,” p. 227.  
 47 
the implications of the blows that Japan had dealt to Europe’s collective prestige. In May 1904, 
the acting viceroy of India, Lord Amphtill, reported that the war was having a profound effect on 
the ‘Asiatic mind’:   
 
All the vernacular and Indian-owned newspapers are writing on the subject and pointing 
the moral in a very marked manner. The political diaries from our various Agents show 
that there is the keenest interest in the war in the bazaars of Afghanistan and Persia.110 
 
In light of this, warned the Spectator, Britain might yet have cause to regret its collusion in the 
collapse of Russian power in Asia: ‘Britain will stand in lonely isolation, the only white Christian 
power among nine-hundred millions of brown, non-Christian men’.111 The prominent courtier 
Lord Esher similarly hoped that the war would not result in the total collapse of Russian prestige. 
It would be better, as he noted to a friend, if ‘the West is not hopelessly beaten by the East. It 
would not be a good thing for us, in the long run, if that were so.’112 
 Another strain of hostile sentiment seeped into British opinion from the war 
correspondents stationed in Japan. At the outbreak of the war, Tokyo was already awash in 
foreign correspondents, hoping to secure an assignment with the Japanese army. Japan’s military 
leadership thought differently: it imposed strict controls on the movements of foreign journalists, 
leaving many to kick their heels in Japan for several months before being allowed to go to the 
front. Already in April, the image of the marooned war correspondent had become something of 
a trope: the Westminster Gazette ran a sketch of one journalist trying to smuggle himself to the 
front in his own luggage.113 Inevitably, the souring mood affected the tone of press coverage. 
The correspondents, according to one observer, were ‘penned up like sheep’, growing more 
restless with each passing day.114 Macdonald too, noted widespread resentment among the 
foreign press corps, and reported that his legation was beset by a torrent of complaints over the 
‘pedantic strictness of the censorate’.115 Lionel James, the special correspondent for The Times, 
who also found himself marooned in Japan, offers one particularly striking instance. James had 
come to Tokyo hoping that The Times’ past support for Japan would translate into preferential 
treatment: he hoped to employ a steamer carrying a wireless radio to relay his dispatches back to 
London ahead of those of the other papers. The scheme stumbled on Japanese concerns over 
military secrecy. By mid-May, James was still stuck in Tokyo, fuming against what he perceived as 
Japan’s duplicity: ‘As it is with The Times so it is with the Nation. We shall one day pay heavily for 
this Alliance of ours. Already the cloven foot is appearing.’116  
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‘We can lead her still nearer to the West’ 
 
 Set against the background of the more explicit ‘Yellow Peril’ rhetoric in Europe, the 
circulation of these views in the British public sphere gave pause to Japan’s supporters. From 
Manchuria, Ian Hamilton railed against the racialist flirtations of the Spectator and the Westminster 
Gazette as his prime culprits. Britain’s ‘enemies in Japan’, Hamilton wrote to Leo Amery, then on 
the staff of The Times, were making sure that ‘all the pro-Russian & Yellow Peril rubbish of the 
Stracheys & Greenwoods’ was circulated in the Japanese papers.117 Britain’s neutrality made it all 
the more necessary to maintain a sympathetic tone in the press, Hamilton warned, or Japan 
might well wonder how committed London truly was to the alliance. From St Petersburg, Spring-
Rice reported that such an opinion was certainly forming in Russia: ‘It is openly said that 
England is getting sick of Japan.’118 Nor did the racial ostinato go unnoticed in official circles. In 
January 1905, following the capture of Port Arthur, Sir George Clarke, the secretary of the CID, 
observed that Britain might consider advising Japan to make an early peace to prevent its public 
support from eroding. ‘Further Japanese successes on a large scale,’ he warned, ‘would probably 
tend to produce an exaggeration of the ‘Yellow Peril’ alarms from which we are not wholly 
exempt in this country.’119 
 Several forces worked to contain the racial bogey. One was the Japanese government 
itself, which was at pains to demonstrate that it was not motivated by pan-Asian or anti-
European motives.120 Already in the run-up to the war, Japan had decided not to court Chinese 
support, worrying this might stoke European fears of a ‘Yellow’ bloc.121 Japan also sought to 
influence Western opinion more directly: in January 1904, Tokyo charged two diplomats, 
Suematsu Kenchō and Kaneko Kentarō (educated at Cambridge and Harvard, respectively) with 
directing a public diplomacy campaign aimed at deflating the ‘Yellow Peril’ in Europe and the 
United States. By all accounts, Suematsu, who spent most of the war in London, was an effective 
and prolific spokesman for the Japanese cause, and his efforts were significantly aided by a 
coterie of influential pro-Japanese journalists.122 These included H.W. Wilson of the Daily Mail, 
Edward Dicey, who provided the foreign affairs sections of the Empire Review and the Nineteenth 
Century, and Alfred Stead, the son of the Review of Reviews editor W.T. Stead. Japan’s most 
formidable ally was The Times, and particularly its influential foreign editor, Valentine Chirol.123 
Touring the region in the 1890s, Chirol had personally engaged the paper’s network of East 
Asian correspondents, and by 1904 The Times could still boast the most extensive Asian coverage 
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of any British newspaper.124  All four of its permanent correspondents – Francis Brinkley in 
Tokyo, J.O.P. Bland in Shanghai, Dr G.E. Morrison in Beijing, and Murray Stewart at Hong 
Kong – favoured Japan, most of all Brinkley, who had lived there for nearly forty years, had 
married a Japanese woman, and enjoyed close connections to official circles in Tokyo. Morrison, 
Bland, and Stewart also approved of the growing closeness of Britain’s ties to Japan, in the hope 
that it might stiffen the spine of British policy in China. By 1904, Morrison in particular had 
become so closely identified with the Japanese cause that more than one of his correspondents 
complemented him personally when ‘his war’ finally broke out. ‘I am unfeignedly glad that war 
has come,’ Morrison wrote to Chirol. ‘I have no fear of the result. Japan will astonish Europe.’125 
Throughout the Russo-Japanese War, The Times acted as the self-appointed champion of the 
Japanese cause – so much so that the British ambassador in St Petersburg, Sir Charles Hardinge, 
asked Chirol to tone down the paper’s anti-Russian rhetoric. The foreign editor refused, declaring 
that ‘our interests & those of Russia are fundamentally antagonistic, whilst those of Japan & ours 
are fundamentally identic.’126  
 Under Chirol’s editorial regime, The Times made it deliberate policy to act as a 
counterweight to the racialism that poured out of from other quarters of the press, and which 
Chirol believed reflected a deliberate attempt to erode British sympathy for Japan. ‘There is a 
very clever press campaign going on here,’ he noted to Spring-Rice in St. Petersburg, ‘to create 
the necessary prejudice against the yellow pagan.’ 127 If unchallenged, it might exercise an osmotic 
effect on the British public, and particularly on the Liberal opposition, whose support for the 
alliance had always been cooler. If the Balfour government should fall, ‘it is not at all improbable 
that we shall betray our allies in the name of Christianity & civilisation.’  A few days later, he 
reiterated these concerns to Satow in Beijing: Russia was waging a ‘vigorous propaganda’ in the 
British press, carefully tailored to appeal to different sections of the British public. ‘I am afraid all 
this is producing some effect, & I am not quite sure that it is not receiving a certain measure of 
encouragement in high quarters.’128  
 The airing of such racialism, Chirol believed, carried a still greater danger: it risked giving 
Japan the impression, just as it was about to complete its integration in the international system, 
that its claim to equality would never truly be recognised. The result would be to permanently 
alienate it to from the West. Writing to Strachey, Chirol thus implored him to soften the 
Spectator’s tone, arguing that the only ‘Yellow Peril’ the West had to fear would be one it created 
for itself:  
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[Japan] stands at the present moment midway between the East & the West. We can 
drive her back upon the East by telling her that, because of her yellow skin, she can never 
have part or lot with the West. We can lead her, I believe, still nearer to the West by 
telling her that she shall be dealt with according not to her skin but to her deeds.129 
 
By way of reply, Strachey retorted in an editorial that Japan would not fit into the international 
system as easily as Chirol believed: the rise of the first Asian great power would, by its 
geopolitical position alone, fundamentally reorder the politics of East Asia. To speak of a ‘Yellow 
Peril’ was simply to acknowledge the ‘enormous mass of force’ that East Asia, under the right 
conditions, would be able to exercise.  It was not intended as a racial smear: ‘There is nothing in 
whiteness that we know of which constitutes inherent superiority.’ 130  Nonetheless, the 
intervention appeared to have had some effect: in August, Chirol noted to Amery that Strachey 
had moderated his stance.131 
 Chirol took much the same line when it came to anti-Japanese noises from his own 
correspondents, particularly the increasingly truculent Lionel James. Following the latter’s 
denunciations of Japanese official secrecy, Chirol commented that James had ‘entirely lost his 
head’, and was now writing  ‘the most foolish things about the treachery of the Japs [sic] … the 
Yellow Peril etc. etc.’ His editorial department blocked the publication of such ‘rot’, ‘so it doesn't 
do any harm’. 132 When James attempted to evade the Japanese censors, he was officially 
recalled.133 For Chirol, the controversy over war correspondents again came down to the issue of 
equality: James and his colleagues needed to understand that Japan was perfectly entitled to place 
its own interests over those of the foreign press corps, even the correspondent of the venerable 
Times. ‘We have no claim upon the ‘gratitude’ of the Japs [sic].’134 Even within Printing House 
Square, however this line was not universally accepted, and Chirol’s heavy-handed use of the 
editorial scissors drew criticism from his own staff. Even G.E. Morrison, who was no less 
supportive of the Japanese cause, found Chirol’s editing of his telegrams grating: ‘[I] wonder 
what good end is served by such unrestrained adulation of the Japanese.’135 His colleague at Shanghai 
agreed that there was ‘something fulsome’ in the paper’s editorial stance: ‘However brave and 
successful our allies, a white race has nothing to gain by truckling to Orientals and can only lose 
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 As the first occasion on which an Asian state defeated a white European power in a 
modern war, the Russo-Japanese War marked a decisive turning point in global history. It 
reordered the political order of East Asia, while casting wider doubts over the validity of 
assumptions of racial hierarchy, and the legitimacy of an international order that took these for 
granted. In Britain, Japan’s European ally, it intensified existing debates on Japan’s identity, and 
started new ones on the wider implications of the rise of an Asian power for Britain’s own 
imperial system. Two aspects stood out. The first was the sheer diversity of responses to the 
spectacle unfolding in East Asia. Britain received the Russo-Japanese War neither in a spirit of 
unqualified admiration nor one of racialist panic – the same was true, as noted below, of the 
wider British world. Rather British commentators attempted to reconcile the fact of a modern, 
‘efficient’, but still recognisably Asian power with their own assumptions on culture and race. 
This inevitably required a degree of mental flexibility:  Japan’s ‘civilisational’ achievements could 
be used to marginalise the persistence of religious, cultural, or racial differences, to the extent that 
some commentators were able to imagine it as a society about to convert itself to Christianity and 
bread-eating.  
 Those who continued to subscribe to a racialist view of Japan, on the other hand, were 
still confronted with a nation that seemed to defy conventional notions of hierarchy, and which 
on some scores even seemed better equipped for the challenges of the modern era. Following 
Charles Pearson, therefore, racialist interpretations often struck a defensive, pessimistic tone: for 
commentators like Strachey or Greenwood, Japan’s victory, and the broader ‘rise of Asia’ it 
seemed to portend, posed an existential danger to a colonial order that implicitly assumed 
European superiority. The second feature of these debates is the extent to which British 
commentators engaged with the political implications of where they placed the ‘new Japan’ in the 
international order. Its supporters understood that rejecting Japan’s application to the club of 
‘civilised nations’, by imposing new barriers of race, would be understood as an act of hypocrisy, 
and might permanently alienate Japan from the West. This was to become a salient argument as 
the backlash against Japan’s entry began to take shape in the years that followed: the surest way 
to turn the ‘colour line’ into a political reality was to start behaving as if it already was. During the 
Russo-Japanese War, such worries were mitigated by the chorus of praise heaped on Japan’s 




Making Equals, 1905-06 
 
 The Russo-Japanese War ended on 5 September 1905, in an assuming office building 
spruced up with furniture carted in from the White House, where Sergei Witte and Komura 
Jutarō, under the smiling auspices of Theodore Roosevelt, put their signatures to the peace treaty. 
Japan had emerged from the greatest trial in its modern history with its rival humbled, its prestige 
enhanced, and the scope of its power significantly widened. The peace of Portsmouth 
acknowledged Japanese primacy in Korea, over which it declared a protectorate a few months 
later. It further strengthened its position on the Asian mainland by taking over the lease of the 
Russian naval base at Port Arthur, along with the southern half of Russia’s Manchurian railway. 
Its status as a great power seemed secure. The Anglo-Japanese alliance, whose renewal was 
announced shortly after Portsmouth, was converted into a ‘full’ bilateral alliance, under which 
Japan pledged its assistance to the defence of Britain’s Indian empire. In the following months, 
the Japanese navy effectively took charge of the defence of Britain’s Pacific possessions. In other 
ways too, Japan’s regional presence grew stronger and more visible. Although it continued to lag 
behind in investment, it soon came to rival Britain as China’s largest trading partner. Its shipping 
tonnage doubled between 1903 and 1908.1 Japanese emigration in all directions, towards Korea, 
Manchuria, the China coast, Hawaii and North America, increased sharply. As Akira Iriye has 
argued, Japan’s post-war expansion occurred simultaneously ‘in all directions, westward as well as 
eastward, in reality and in imagination’.2  
 Victory against Russia redefined Japan’s international status in a way that presented the 
other powers with an implicit claim to equality. It was clear that the ‘new Japan’ would expect to 
be treated on an equal basis with the Europeans. Nor would it allow new barriers to be raised 
along racial lines: its activist campaign against the ‘Yellow Peril’ had made that clear. To some of 
its supporters, such as the journalist H.W. Wilson, Japan’s victory had proven that ‘when tried by 
the sternest of all tests, the Asiatic is not inferior to the Caucasian’:  
 
The line of demarcation between Europe and Asia has been broken down…. The era of 
inequality between the races is over. Henceforth white and yellow man must meet on an 
equal footing. Yet one thing is certain – that the victory of civilisation is assured.3 
 
The Spectator was more grudging, but even Strachey found it impossible to deny ‘that a new and 
immense Power has established its claim to a new and heavy vote in the international Council of 
mankind’. 4 
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 The implications for Britain, and the wider British world, were considerable, as both 
London and its settler colonies were forced to develop new strategies for engaging with this 
more powerful, assertive Japan. Over the course of 1905, this led London to redefine its strategic 
partnership with Tokyo: the new Anglo-Japanese alliance, now stretching across a vast swath of 
Asia, was far more ambitious than the limited regional instrument of 1902. Meanwhile, for the 
string of British communities on the Pacific, from Shanghai to Melbourne and Vancouver, Japan 
now loomed larger and closer, and its rise provoked wide-ranging discussions as to how the ‘new 
Japan’ could be incorporated into external, commercial, and defence policy. The question of 
Japanese migration to the British settler colonies – which now stood out more starkly as an 
expression of systemic inequality – thrust itself back onto the political agenda. The results were 
mixed: while a number of smaller and larger inequities were ironed out to reflect its new power 
and status, it was already becoming clear that Japan’s ‘war for civilisation’ had failed to convince 
everyone that its truly belonged to the West – doubts that only increased as the effects of Japan’s 
‘push’ into the international order were felt more keenly. These, in short, were the new politics of 
equality.  
 
Redefining the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 
 
 It was a good thing, Chirol observed to Curzon, that Britain had initiated a renewal of 
the Anglo-Japanese alliance before Tsushima, or it ‘would have looked rather cheap’.5 The new 
treaty, signed on 12 August 1905, and published in early September, differed from its predecessor 
in several respects.6 The most important change was the removal of the old treaty’s cumbersome 
casus foederis, which was activated only if one of the allies became embroiled with two powers 
simultaneously; the new alliance was a more straightforward bilateral agreement to come to each 
other’s assistance in wartime. Other changes brought the treaty in line with the region’s new 
territorial order, by recognising that Japan now possessed the right to take on the ‘guidance, 
control and protection’ of Korea, by which London conferred its blessing on a Japanese 
protectorate. More controversially, its geographical scope was widened: no longer limited to East 
Asia, the alliance was extended to cover the Indian frontier, the Achilles’ heel of the British 
Empire. In the process, the new treaty also acknowledged Japan’s new status as a great power, 
presenting the two allies’ ‘special interests’ in the ‘regions of East Asia and India’ as equivalent to 
each other. From a purely regional pact in which Japan clearly played a subordinate role, the 
alliance was elevated into a bilateral partnership that proclaimed to keep the peace across a vast 
swath of Asia. 
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 The British government first began to contemplate an extension of the Japanese alliance 
in January 1905, after the fall of Port Arthur removed any lingering uncertainty over the war’s 
ultimate outcome. In light of Japan’s expected victory, urged Lord Percy, the junior minister at 
the Foreign Office, Britain’s relationship with its Asian ally would have to reflect its elevated 
status. 7 The minister in Tokyo should be raised to ambassadorial rank – a symbolic marker 
traditionally reserved for the great powers. Percy also stipulated that the Meiji emperor should 
receive the Garter, a matter of diplomatic courtesy long overdue. After being browbeaten into 
bestowing the Garter on the Shah of Persia, the King had refused to grant the order to any 
further ‘non-Christian princes’, but Percy, joined by Lansdowne, insisted that an exception 
should be made for the Japanese. 8 Most importantly, the alliance itself would have to be 
renewed, both in recognition of Japan’s position and to demonstrate that the relationship had not 
been weakened over the course of the war. Percy identified two immediate dangers: firstly, there 
was the possibility that the Liberals, their likely successors – Percy felt ‘doubtful of the prolonged 
existence of the present Government’ – might fail to renew the alliance once its five-year term 
was up. The treaty had never been popular in the Liberal Party: the radicals opposed it on 
principle, and many of the liberal imperialists would have preferred an accommodation with 
Russia. More troublingly still, Percy warned that the Liberal Russophiles might prove susceptible 
to the ‘Yellow Peril’ rhetoric emanating from the continent. In this, he was not alone: at much 
the same time The Times was demanding that the Liberal leadership end its agnosticism on the 
alliance.9 Curzon, too, feared ‘some weakening in the Anglo-Japanese alliance’ by a Liberal 
government eager to come to terms with Russia.10  
 Further doubts existed about Japan’s own commitment to the alliance, as Britain’s 
aloofness during the Russo-Japanese War was thought to have eroded the reserve of Anglophilia 
built up since 1902. The terms of the treaty had allowed Britain to stand aside, and since any 
assistance to Japan would be met by an equivalent effort by France towards Russia, the British 
government had meticulously upheld its neutrality. It had declined to loan money to its ally, or to 
underwrite its bond issues on the London market. Its arms manufacturers were banned from 
dealing with either party. 11  While this strict interpretation of neutrality kept the conflict 
contained, it stood out in marked contrast to assistance that France or even Germany (whose 
colliers had supplied the Baltic Fleet on its eastward journey) provided to Russia. ‘I am personally 
very doubtful about the popular sentiment in Japan towards this country,’ Percy noted. 12 
Disillusionment with Britain, in turn might strengthen the argument for a settlement with Russia. 
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In April, when Britain’s proposals to extend the alliance met with an unexpectedly long delay, 
Selborne noted to Lansdowne that he was anxious Japan was keeping its hands free for a Russian 
rapprochement: ‘the contemplation of such a development fills me with foreboding. It would 
indeed create a serious situation for us, militarily in India, commercially in China.’13  
 These arguments failed to persuade Balfour, who had never been wholly converted to 
the Japanese alliance; in 1901, he had favoured an alternative alignment with the Triple Alliance. 
On that occasion, Balfour had argued that a purely regional pact with Japan alone was 
dangerously unbalanced: it left Britain with an open-ended commitment to Japan’s security, while 
failing to protect more important British interests in the Near East and on the Indian frontier. As 
a result, Britain might face a global confrontation with France and Russia ‘over some obscure 
Russian-Japanese quarrel in Corea’.14 When such a quarrel did arise two years later, Balfour, now 
prime minister, had been willing to accept a Japanese defeat, effectively terminating its usefulness 
as an ally, on the grounds that it would leave Russia bogged down in northeast Asia.15 Although 
subsequent events had raised Japan’s profile in Balfour’s estimation – he had thought the 
Japanese army incapable of mounting a ground offensive against Russia – the prime minister still 
refused to renew an agreement whose logic he had doubted from the beginning.  
 Ironically, it was Balfour’s refusal to countenance a simple extension that drove the 
alliance’s elevation to a more wide-ranging partnership. An early renewal, Balfour insisted, could 
only be justified if it widened the alliance’s scope; this in turn offered an opportunity to revise the 
treaty’s strategic ‘imbalance’ by committing Japan to a much broader range of British interests in 
Asia. Balfour’s particular idée fixe was India.16 Since the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, 
London had remained fearful that Russia would deflect its defeats in Manchuria by exercising 
pressure on India’s northwest frontier, ‘the weakest spot in our Imperial armour’.17 ‘Sooner or 
later,’ a gloomy Curzon predicted, ‘whether it be from the lust of victory, or from the anger of 
defeat, Russia will probably feel tempted to exert greater pressure on every side of India.’18 Fears 
of a Russian feint towards the Hindu Kush were nothing new, but in the early months of 1905, 
they were compounded by several other concerns. Between London’s failure to rein in Francis 
Younghusband’s advance into Tibet, the strained relationship with Afghanistan, and a deepening 
row between Curzon and Lord Kitchener, the commander-in-chief of the Indian Army, India’s 
frontier policy remained in a state of flux.19 It was in this context that Balfour and the Committee 
of Imperial Defence (CID) contemplated the extension of the Anglo-Japanese alliance to cover 
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India’s inner Asian frontier. In late March, Lansdowne sounded Tokyo on whether, in return for 
‘adequate concessions,’ it would be willing to accept a commitment to India.20 Sir George Clarke, 
the secretary to the CID, contemplated an additional corollary under which Japan would deploy a 
force of 150,000 men – or the equivalent of the entire Anglo-Indian army – on the Indian 
frontier in the event of war with Russia. In addition, he believed, the extended alliance should 
aim to cover Britain’s possessions across Southeast Asia, and the integrity of the Dutch East 
Indies.21 Adding to the pile, Balfour even proposed bringing eastern Persia within the scope of 
the new treaty.22 
 This meant that the new alliance, as it was taking shape in the spring of 1905, would be a 
far more expansive undertaking than the regional pact concluded in 1902. It attested both to 
London’s continuing fixation on the rivalry with Russia, and to its elevated estimation of Japan’s 
military capacity. That Balfour and Clarke should have wished the Japanese army to mount the 
battlements of India is not surprising. What is more puzzling is why they should have thought 
that Tokyo would be willing to take on such a burden at all: the preservation of the status quo in 
Central Asia was hardly a core Japanese interest. What Britain could offer, according to Clarke, 
was an elevation of Japan’s international status: 
 
Japan would, I conclude, welcome a direct Alliance as placing her at once in the position 
of a Great Power - a position which has been fairly won by the striking patriotism of her 
people, & the extraordinary efficiency of her fighting forces.23 
 
In addition, Japan would welcome the chance to demonstrate that its relationship with Britain 
remained uninfected by the ‘Yellow Peril’; an effect that would no doubt be magnified if the 
other powers were to raise ‘sentimental objections to an alliance between a European & a 
coloured power’.24 In all probability, Clarke warned Balfour, once the new treaty was announced, 
‘the ‘Yellow Peril’ bogey’ would be ‘held up to arouse the fears of Europe’.25 Yet such concerns 
could be overruled: as Britain itself was an ‘Asiatic Power’, it could not afford to hamper itself by 
conducting its diplomacy on one side of the colour line: ‘the alliance is – for us – a perfectly 
natural one,’ part of a long-standing British tradition to ally with ‘Oriental’ states to maintain its 
position in Asia.26 There would be no question of bringing ‘an Asiatic people’ into a ‘white man’s 
war’.27 
 Yet such ‘sentimental’ objections to the extension of the alliance, and its new Indian 
corollary, proved more trenchant than Clarke had anticipated. The government of India, which 
                                                      
20 Lansdowne to Macdonald, 24 March 1905, BL, Lansdowne Papers, Add MS 88906/22/26. 
21 Memorandum by Clarke, 20 April 1905, BL, Lansdowne Papers, Add MS 88906/22/26,  
22 Memorandum by Balfour, 27 May 1905, NA, CAB 1/5/27. 
23 Clarke to Esher, 20 April 1905, CCAC, Esher Papers, 10/35. 
24 Ibid.  
25 Clarke to Balfour, 27 May 1905, BL, Balfour Papers, Add MS 49701. 
26 Clarke to Esher, 20 April 1905, CCAC, Esher Papers, 10/35. 
27 Clarke to Esher, 20 April 1905, CCAC, Esher Papers, 10/35. 
 57 
had not been consulted, recoiled at the implication that Britain might have to rely on Japan, an 
Asian power, to defend its most important imperial possession. Lord Minto, Curzon’s successor 
as viceroy, believed even the sight of Japanese troops being transported to the front would 
‘convey a sense of weakness on our part to the Indian population’.28 Similar concerns came from 
the War Office: in a memorandum to the Cabinet, H.O. Arnold-Forster stressed ‘the extreme 
importance of not allowing the defence of India to depend upon Japan.’ Any benefit London 
hoped to derive from Japanese military assistance, he warned, would be offset by a 
commensurate effect on British racial prestige, the foundation on which the Raj ultimately rested. 
29 The General Staff also weighed in: the deployment of Japanese troops on the Indian frontier 
would be interpreted as proof of Britain’s ‘national decadence’, and ‘would be highly detrimental, 
if not absolutely fatal, to our prestige throughout the Asian continent’.30 There were also practical 
objections to consider: for one thing, although Japan had accepted the geographical extension of 
the alliance, this did not mean that it agreed to despatch an expeditionary force to India. Staff 
talks between the British and Japanese, held after much delay in May 1907, led to the conclusion 
that close cooperation between the two armies in the same theatre was out of the question: in the 
event of war with Russia, the Japanese army would fight in Manchuria, not Afghanistan.31  
 The bickering over India distracted from the quieter, but ultimately more significant 
strategic recasting taking place in the naval sphere, where the Japanese alliance came to underpin 
the Royal Navy’s progressive concentration in European waters. Selborne, working with the new 
First Sea Lord, Admiral John ‘Jacky’ Fisher, had already proposed a sweeping redistribution of 
the fleet in December 1904, as part of a comprehensive overhaul of the navy.32  Selborne 
proposed the merging of several smaller naval commands, the wholesale abolition of others, 
including the South Atlantic and West Indies squadrons. The naval bases at Halifax and 
Esquimalt were turned over to Canada. Most significantly, the five battleships on the China 
Station, the largest concentration of capital ships outside Europe, were to be redeployed once the 
Russo-Japanese War had ended. The cumulative effect was a pivot of naval strength to European 
waters, at the expense of the Western hemisphere and East Asia. In the west, Britain conceded 
that it could not hope to out-build the United States. In the east, naval security would be left to 
Japan. Already before Tsushima, the Director of Naval Intelligence, Captain Charles Ottley, 
noted that in view of the empire’s current strategic requirements, maintaining a ‘great fleet of 
British battleships in the China Seas’ was ‘an entire waste of force’.33 The destruction of Russian 
naval power sealed the argument: as Selborne now noted to Fisher, to now maintain the present 
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strength of the China station would be ‘an unpardonable strategic blunder’.34 This redistribution 
was not yet aimed at any one power; Fisher and Selborne carried it out in the context of a general 
efficiency drive to expand the striking power and bring down the cost of the Royal Navy. In 
subsequent months, the Moroccan crisis, and the passing of a new naval law by the Reichstag in 
the spring of 1906, narrowed the strategic focus to Germany.  In the process, Japan came to 
serve an increasingly crucial role as in Britain’s system of imperial defence, not as a supplement 
for the Indian Army, but as the empire’s eastern naval bulwark. 
  Britain had renewed and extended its strategic partnership with Japan. The spirit of the 
new treaty was encapsulated by one of the Unionist posters for the January 1906 election, which 
featured John Bull shaking hands with a Japanese sailor in front of their respective flags, in an 
image of perfect equality, and the slogan: ‘Vote for the Conservatives, who gave you the alliance.’ 
In the wake of Tsushima, Japan’s integration into the international order seemed complete. By 
implication, the conclusion of the new alliance demonstrated that the British government 
considered itself unaffected by the ‘Yellow Peril’ rhetoric that had accompanied the Russo-
Japanese War. The reality was not quite as rosy. The prospect of Britain and Japan mounting a 
joint defence of British India, in particular, was held to be scarcely compatible with the 
maintenance British rule over the Raj itself; this was the implicit argument behind the concerns 
over ‘prestige’ raised by India’s civil and military authorities. Such reservations notwithstanding, 
however, the new Anglo-Japanese alliance sent a clear message that London intended to 
recognise its ally’s claim to true international respectability. 
 
‘The only tolerated subject of conversation’: Japan’s rise and Australia  
  
 Tsushima took on a very different colour for the Anglophone settler communities on 
the Pacific, who were now forced to confront the sudden emergence of a new great power in 
their oceanic neighbourhood. Geopolitical change became interwoven with older anxieties over 
Asian immigration: it was all too easy to imagine an expanding Asia, armed and organised with 
modern methods, casting envious glances towards the ‘empty spaces’ of northern Australia or the 
Pacific slope. This ‘georacialism’, a tendency to read global politics as a confrontation between 
distinct racial blocs (and which fixated on the ‘teeming millions’ of Asia), was to exercise a 
powerful influence on the way the dominions imagined their own national futures, and their 
position in the international landscape. According to Neville Meaney, in the wake of the Russo-
Japanese War, ‘Australians not only came almost without dissent to accept the reality and pre-
eminence of the Japanese menace, but their fears also attained an intensity without precedent in 
the nation’s history.’35 In Australia, New Zealand, and to a lesser extent, British Columbia, fear of 
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Japan became the primary external justification for a nation-building project that expressed itself 
in defensive, even militarist terms.  
 At the same time, to characterise Greater Britain’s response to Tsushima solely as one of 
racial panic is to underestimate both the diversity of perspectives on Japan, and the range of 
interactions that existed, or could be imagine, across the Pacific. The strands that sustained pro-
Japanese opinion in Britain – hostility to Russia, admiration for Japanese ‘efficiency’, and Japan’s 
claim to fight for ‘civilisation’ – also resonated with colonial audiences. Moreover, the notion that 
Japan’s victory would inaugurate an age of commercial expansion in East Asia held particular 
appeal in colonial commercial circles, and the end of the war saw a new push by both Australia 
and Canada into the Japanese market. Opportunity loomed, as well as danger. Even on the vexed 
question of immigration, many now recognised that Japan’s elevated status demanded new, less 
controversial ways of regulating the exclusion of Japanese immigrants.  
 This was even the case in Australia, the colonial society that had most explicitly 
enshrined a commitment to ‘whiteness’ at the centre of its national project. Hostility to ‘Asiatic’ 
immigration dated back to the arrival of the first Chinese immigrants during the gold rushes of 
the 1850s and 1860s, when fears that cheap labour would undercut white wages drove the 
emergence of the first anti-Chinese movements in Victoria. Economic anxieties were reinforced 
by a cluster of other prejudices, relating to hygiene, vice, and sexuality.  To an Australian society 
that was beginning to define its own ethnic and social boundaries, the Chinese were as an alien, 
inassimilable, and ever more unwelcome presence. By the late 1880s, Sinophobia acquired the 
character of a full-blown panic.36 Similar sentiments were extended to the Japanese, who first 
began to arrive in substantial numbers in the 1890s, recruited to fill the vacancies left by Chinese 
exclusion from the Queensland sugar plantations.37 In its Japanese incarnation, moreover, the 
domestic dimensions of the ‘Asiatic question’ were closely connected to shifting geopolitical 
currents. Coming on the heels of a colonial carve-up of the South Pacific, Japan’s emergence as a 
regional power in the wake of the Sino-Japanese war (1894-5) exacerbated fears that the 
traditional guarantees of Australian security – its isolation and distance from Europe – had lost 
their significance. 38  Strategic exposure, economic depression, and racial panic were fused 
together in an alarming vision of racial confrontation, in which Australia’s tropical north was 
imagined as a battleground in a global struggle between the ‘white’ and ‘yellow’ races. For the 
Labour parliamentarian William Morris Hughes, the Asian presence in Australia constituted 
nothing less than a ‘leprous curse’ 
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spreading its sway through Queensland unhampered and unhindered, and which 
threatens to make it a country no longer fit for a white man, because it will shortly be a 
country where no white man can compete with our cheap, industrious and virtuous, but 
undesirable Japanese and Chinese friends.39  
 
 This sense of vulnerability, as a white outpost on the edge of Asia, played a central role 
in the drive towards the federation of the Australian colonies during the 1890s, as survival in an 
age of geo-racial competition seemed to demand a unified policy on defence, immigration, and 
external affairs. ‘The sudden rise of Japan to the position of a naval and military power of the 
first magnitude,’ concluded the commander of the military forces of New South Wales in 1895, 
‘has placed the importance of the defence of the Australian continent by mutual agreement… in 
the light of necessity’.40 Japan, again, was the spectre at the feast of the Intercolonial Conference 
of 1896, when the Australian colonies – with the notable exception of sugar-growing Queensland 
– agreed to extend their Chinese exclusion laws to ‘all persons belonging to any coloured race’.41 
In a broader sense, the preservation of a ‘White Australia’ provided a common touchstone for 
divergent interpretations of Australia’s national future; it promised a democratic, egalitarian 
society in which racial solidarity would overcome divisions between labour and capital, town and 
country. 
 Through the introduction of a new, national, immigration law, this vision was enshrined 
at the heart of the young federation. In June 1901, brandishing his copy of Pearson’s National Life 
and Character, Edmund Barton, Australia’s first prime minister, introduced the Immigration 
Restriction Act as one of his government’s first substantive pieces of legislation.42 The act 
proposed to restrict entry into the Commonwealth through a literacy test, a practice already 
adopted in West Australia, Tasmania, and New South Wales. The test, pioneered by the South 
African colony of Natal, had been endorsed by the colonial secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, at the 
1897 Colonial Conference, as an ‘objective’ methods of exclusion, preferable to the colour bar. 
The colonies desired to exclude a certain type of emigrant, Chamberlain had declared, ‘not 
because a man is of a different colour from ourselves’, but ‘because he is dirty, or he is immoral, 
or he is a pauper or he has some other objection which can be defined in an Act of Parliament.’ 43 
As a compromise, it yielded very little to the notion of racial equality, while effectively allowing a 
colonial government to exclude at its own discretion: an undesired immigrant could be barred 
simply by being put to the in Finnish, Hungarian, or Portuguese. As Alfred Deakin, Barton’s 
lieutenant, pointed out, the test was never intended to be anything more than a legal subterfuge: 
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the government intended to implement White Australia ‘with unqualified and inflexible firmness’. 
‘The unity of Australia is nothing,’ he declared, ‘if that does not imply a united race.’44  
 Much of the debate on the immigration bill revolved around Japan, whose standing as a 
civilised nation – and a rising regional power – complicated the exclusion of its nationals from 
the new Commonwealth. Deakin, who introduced the bill as attorney-general, professed that 
Australia had no desire to offend the Japanese, whom it recognised as superior to the 
‘uneducated races of Asia’. Yet race remained an immovable obstacle: as Deakin put it, the 
Japanese were ‘incapable of being assimilated’ and required ‘to be absolutely excluded’. Indeed, it 
was Japan’s very achievements, their ‘inexhaustible energy, their power of applying themselves to 
new tasks’, that made Japanese immigration ‘the most dangerous’ of all.45 This reasoning hardly 
made exclusion more palatable to Japan, and its diplomats lodged a succession of protests against 
the new law.  As the Japanese consul in Melbourne pointed out, the supposedly neutral character 
of the literacy test fooled nobody: Australia intended the criteria for exclusion to be ‘racial, pure 
and simple’.46  The Japanese minister in London formally raised the issue with the British 
government, complaining that the act was ‘aimed to discriminate against Japanese and others of 
different colour’.47 London deliberated on whether to withhold the royal assent, but concluded 
that this was only likely to provoke Australia into adopting more discriminatory methods: a 
sizeable parliamentary faction had denounced the test as ‘a kow-tow’ to Japan, and favoured the 
introduction of an explicit colour bar.48 The law was duly implemented, and according to Atlee 
Arthur Hunt, the ranking official at the department of external affairs, served its purpose well. 
‘We continue to eject the industrious Jap and the wily Chow [sic] with persistence,’ he reported, 
and the act had ‘not exhausted its possibilities yet’.49 
 The exclusion debates cast a long shadow over Australia’s relationship with Japan. 
‘There is a great dread here of Japanese immigration, which checks any strong pro-Japanese 
sentiment,’ observed Lord Northcote, the governor-general. ‘I think that dread is well founded – 
Japan must expand or burst.’50 Such anxieties broke the surface during the Russo-Japanese War: 
when the Australian senate was called upon to pass of vote of condemnation following the 
Dogger Bank incident, a number of prominent senators refused to vote with the government. ‘I 
confess,’ noted the Labour senator George Pearce on the occasion, ‘that my  sympathies are 
enlisted on behalf of the  European, and not the little brown Asiatic  nation’ – a point echoed by 
several of his colleagues.51 Similar noises came from the populist papers, including Truth, Worker, 
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and the Bulletin, for whom racial solidarity trumped their distaste for Russian autocracy. 52 As one 
grisly poem in Truth expressed it: 
  
Though the dog-faced hordes are sweeping from the slums of Tokio, 
Though the cursed imps are rushing for to grapple with the foe, 
Though the transports land their thousands, plunder-mad, beneath your wall, 
Though the press is screaming, Ivan, that it's time you ought to fall, 
 There you stand and grimly fight,   
 For you're Christian and you're white.53  
 
Australian fears also registered themselves in the London press. In an article for the Contemporary 
Review, Richard Crouch, a Protectionist MP, spelled out that he was anxious that a victorious 
Japan would renew its challenge to White Australia: ‘In the face of such racial injustice, what is 
clearer than that if the opportunity comes, the Jap [sic] will seize it and force an entrance?’54 
 Tsushima amplified these ripples into a wave. At a stroke, Japan emerged as the 
strongest naval power in the western Pacific, a point that was further underlined as Britain began 
to wind down its own naval presence in eastern waters. As a great power, moreover, it was 
unlikely to tolerate the continued exclusion of its nationals from Australia for much longer. To a 
wide range of Australian commentators, it was evident that the only way to head off this 
combined racial and strategic menace was to reinforce and accelerate the national project: only a 
strong, populous, and assertive nation would be able to hold the Japanese challenge at bay, and 
demonstrate to London that ‘White Australia’ was worth preserving. One immediate 
consequence was a renewed emphasis on national defence. Two weeks after Tsushima, Deakin, 
still leader of the opposition, called for the establishment of an Australian navy.55 Pearce too, 
argued that Australia could no longer be ‘solely dependent on the British Fleet’ for its own 
defences. To do so would be to deny, ‘ostrich-like’, the looming danger: ‘is there any other 
country that offers such a temptation to Japan as Australia does?’56 On 5 September – the day of 
the signing of the peace at Portsmouth – the Australian Defence League, which called for the 
introduction of universal military training, held its inaugural meeting in Sydney; Deakin, Hughes, 
and J.C. Watson, the leader of the Labour Party, were among its founding members. The 
Immigration League, founded the following month, was to organise the recruitment of new white 
migrants, with Deakin, again, among the organisers. ‘Immigration and defence,’ declared Richard 
Arthur, its first president, ‘are the two consummate national questions for the next twenty years.’ 
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Both arms and men would be needed to reinforce the white fortress, now ‘face to face with an 
awakened and militant Asia’.57  
 Historians have rightly stressed the importance of an embattled sense of ‘whiteness’ in 
the formation of identities, both in Australia and the wider British world.58 Yet the Australian 
response to Japan’s rise should not be mischaracterised as a blind retreat into the racial Laager. 
Outside the readership of the Bulletin, the conclusion of the alliance in 1902 had been well 
received: Barton, as prime minister, thought it ‘exciting news… It seems to me fraught with good 
for the Empire (including Australia), China and Japan.’ 59  George Reid, the leader of the 
opposition, went even further. ‘If the United States are behind Great Britain and Japan in this 
new development,’ he declared, ‘then we can welcome another great advance and an important 
stride towards… the ultimate fusion of the Anglo-Saxon race.’60 This was not, as Neville Meaney 
has suggested, evidence of ‘flaccid thinking’: the belief that the Anglo-Japanese combination 
formed part of a progressive ‘Open Door’ coalition with the United States constituted a 
prominent element in British responses to the alliance. The prospects of expanding Australia’ 
Asian trade, admiration for Japan’s wartime conduct, and a deeply rooted Russophobia sustained 
a stream of pro-Japanese sentiment during the Russo-Japanese War. Subscription funds to 
support the Japanese Red Cross were set up in Sydney and Brisbane. The Sydney Morning Herald 
even ran a notice from the Japanese consul stating that, despite the overwhelming number of 
applications, Japan would not be taking Australian volunteers. 61  Some responses were 
reminiscent of the Japanophile mood in Britain itself, as one from a popular New Zealand 
newspaper attested: 
 
The war… is the sole, the all-absorbing, the one necessary, the only tolerated subject of 
conversation... Cricket it has ousted completely… we are all “agin” the Russians. We are 
all – every man jack of us – for the Japs [sic]…62  
 
 Support for Japan was marred by the continuing exclusion of Japanese immigrants, but 
even here, a more conciliatory stance gathered momentum. In April 1904, at the prompting of 
commercial lobbyists, J.C. Watson’s Labour government declared it would exempt Japanese 
travellers, merchants, and students from the dictation test, provided they carried passports issued 
by the Japanese government; the arrangement was extended to India and Hong Kong the 
following year.63 After Tsushima, a number of commentators called for still wider concessions, 
insisting that ‘White Australia’ had been too sweeping and too callously dismissive of Japanese 
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sensibilities. It would be ‘utter madness’, one Free Trader senator declared, if racial myopia led 
Australia, a nation of four million people, into a permanent grievance with what was now the 
leading power in its vicinity.64 The Argus, a Melbourne newspaper, campaigned for the removal 
of the ‘slur’ on a people that had entered ‘the fraternity of civilised nations’.65 The Anglican 
bishop of Carpentaria, whose diocese included most of Australia’s tropical north, similarly 
insisted that it was Australia’s duty to ‘welcome’ Japan, ‘in a true Christian and democratic spirit’, 
into the comity of civilisation.66  Significantly, the same sentiment extended to several senior 
political figures: George Reid and Sir William Lyne, a former premier of New South Wales, each 
approached the governor-general with proposals to liberalise immigration policy ‘out of 
compliment to Japan’.67 To be sure, a wish to recognise Japan’s equality did not imply readiness 
to freely admit Japanese immigrants into Australia, which even the most sympathetic 
commentators thought neither feasible nor desirable. Rather, it expressed a recognition that 
immigration would need to be regulated through less contentious methods. In late September, 
two prominent Free Traders, Edward Pulsford and Arthur Bruce Smith, lodged proposals in 
both chambers of parliament to regulate migration through a direct bilateral agreement that 
would spare the Japanese the indignity of being subjected to a sham dictation test.68  
 The case for extending an olive branch to Japan could base itself on a broader vision of 
Australia’s relationship with Asia. If Australian nationality was to develop, both Pulsford and 
Smith argued, it could only do so through steady economic growth and under conditions of 
geopolitical security. Both required a more positive engagement with Japan and the rest of Asia. 
Racial isolationism was ultimately self-defeating: only a prosperous, commercially vibrant 
Australia could attract enough migrants to make ‘White Australia’ a reality.69 At less than four per 
cent of total exports, trade with Asia remained trifling, but seemed to offer phenomenal 
prospects for expansion. Already exports to Japan had quadrupled since the outbreak of the 
Russo-Japanese War. 70 E.B. Suttor, the commercial agent for New South Wales in Japan, 
declared to a gathering of Sydney merchants that Asia would soon become ‘the commercial hub 
of the world’.71 Not wanting to be left behind, Queensland and Victoria appointed their own 
representatives in Japan in 1904 and 1905 respectively. Expanding Australia’s trade in turn 
required a more flexible attitude on immigration; the ongoing boycott of American goods in 
China – in protest to increasingly stringent application of the Chinese Exclusion Act – showed 
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that excessive stringency carried a commercial price.72 Defence provided another consideration, 
as the shifting naval balance in Asia placed a premium on Japanese goodwill. Such arguments 
resonated even beyond the narrow group of liberals who had opposed exclusion from the outset: 
no less a full-throated supporter of ‘White Australia’ than the Sydney Morning Herald admitted that 
it was in Australia’s own interest to treat with Japan ‘in the broadest possible spirit’.73 At the same 
time, any concession to Japan was sure to be bitterly resisted by racialist hard-liners, for whom 
any tampering with ‘White Australia’ was tantamount to treason: Pearce sneered that Pulsford’s 
views on the subject warranted impeachment.74 Nor were the representatives of the Labour Party 
necessarily persuaded of the need for trade with Asia. ‘They can erect a wall 15,000 feet high 
around Japan for all I care’, one member declared.75 
 Alfred Deakin, prime minister since July 1905, was no less committed to racial purity 
than his Labour coalition partners, yet he also understood that under present conditions, ‘White 
Australia’ remained a hostage to geopolitical fortune. The campaign for national Bildung, of which 
Deakin was a leading exponent, implicitly acknowledged that it would be the work of decades to 
defend Australia by its own strength alone. In the meantime, it would continue to shelter under 
the imperial umbrella. Yet in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War, and the renewal of the 
alliance, it remained an open question whether Britain would acknowledge an obligation to 
uphold ‘White Australia’, at least in its current absolutist form, in the face of Japanese objections. 
The signs were not encouraging. During the war, pro-Japanese journalists had repeatedly called 
for the abrogation of exclusion – ‘a monstrosity of narrow-minded legislation’, according to 
Alfred Stead.76  From his correspondents in London, Deakin received various hints that a 
Japanese challenge to ‘White Australia’ was forthcoming. As Bernhard Wise, a veteran of the 
federation movement reported, ‘there is no doubt but that the Japs [sic] intend to make a 
demonstration against Australia once the war is ended.’77 Lord Tennyson, a former governor-
general, similarly intimated that British opinion would side with Japan: ‘We are hoping that 
Australia will admit the Japanese at once as our allies – freely at once.’78 
  More troublingly, these views also resonated in certain corners of Whitehall. George 
Clarke – who had previously served as governor of the Australian colony of Victoria – was 
particularly adamant that when the Anglo-Japanese alliance was renewed, Japan’s new status 
would have to be recognised throughout the empire: 
 
If such a Treaty as this comes into existence, our Colonies, Australia especially, will have 
to put Japanese on precisely the same footing as Frenchmen or Germans. Discrimination 
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against the Japanese, as a coloured people, would not be possible. It might be necessary 
to speak plainly to Australia; but Australians are not without sense, & their position is 
one of peculiar weakness except for our support, so that they would find it necessary to 
swallow this race prejudice as regards the Japanese.79 
 
The British government, Clarke concluded, would not have its foreign policy dictated ‘by the 
Trade Halls of Melbourne and Sydney’.80  Balfour was not unsympathetic, and agreed there were 
‘obvious difficulties – not to say absurdities – in allowing Australia and our other Colonies to 
treat our Japanese allies as belonging to an inferior race,’ yet he conceded that London could not 
coerce its colonies.81 Neither did Japan raise the issue, although Viscount Hayashi, the Japanese 
minister in London, hoped that in the long term, the British alliance might lead the dominions to 
treat Japanese migrants more leniently.82 London’s silence on the question did little to reassure 
the colonists. As the editor of the Wellington Herald pointed out to Deakin, the Balfour 
government’s introduction of Chinese indentured labour in South Africa was sufficient evidence 
that London cared little for its settlers’ aspiration to ‘whiteness’: ‘It seems to me that in light of 
the Transvaal iniquity we need not expect any protection from the Old Country against the 
victorious Jap [sic].’83  
 Uncertain of both Japan’s intentions and London’s backing, Deakin chose pre-emption: 
if ‘White Australia’ were to survive, it would have to be maintained through diplomacy, not 
defiance. Starting on 11 August, unbeknown to the Colonial Office, Deakin began sounding 
Iwasaki, the Japanese consul in Melbourne, on the possibility of a new arrangement on 
immigration, under which Japanese might be exempted from the dictation test. Iwasaki was at 
pains to reassure Deakin that Japan had little practical stake in the question: its concern was with 
the odium that the current law placed on Japan’s international status. ‘Our claim, as you know, is 
for recognition of our equal status with European nations in the numerous things which are 
compressed in the term “civilization.”’84 By November, the two had arrived at a tentative 
compromise. The Immigration Restriction Act would be amended: Australia would no longer 
require prospective immigrants to take the dictation test in a ‘European language’, a categorical 
discrimination against which Japan had previously objected. In addition to this mostly symbolic 
concession, the new law would provide for ‘friendly arrangements’ under which any country 
might be exempted from the dictation test altogether. After obtaining parliamentary sanction, the 
way would then be clear for a direct agreement whereby Japanese students and merchants, 
provided with passports from Tokyo, would be allowed to enter and reside in the 
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Commonwealth on a semi-permanent basis.85 Exclusion would be practically maintained behind 
the fiction that it was class distinctions, rather than the colour line, that formed the criterion of 
entry. The journalist Richard Jebb, who visited Australia in January 1906, found Deakin sanguine 
that the arrangement would work:  
 
His policy is to have absolute reciprocity with Japan in matters of immigration… Proposed 
that each Govt. shld agree to admit tourists & other respected visitors without any fuss at 
all, but to exclude permanent settlers of all kinds… No doubt this is the right policy.86 
 
 The parliamentary response to these proposals is revealing. Although many Labour 
members – particularly those from Queensland districts – remained dead set against any 
modification of ‘White Australia’, a majority of parliamentarians agreed that Japan’s status needed 
to be recognised in a modification of the law. Several prominent members eulogised its accession 
to the comity of ‘civilisation’. Joseph Cook, the leader of the Free Trader opposition, heartily 
endorsed the attempt ‘to remove a cause of offence to that great eastern nation’, which had made 
‘mighty strides in civilisation’.87 Robert Knox, another Free Trader, agreed that the Japanese had 
made great efforts ‘to adapt themselves to the conditions of Western civilisation’. It was 
‘ludicrous’, he declared, to continue to belittle ‘a people who, by sheer force of their virtues, have 
attained an exalted position among the nations’.88 More surprisingly, perhaps, revision also won 
the support of several Labour members, including William Maloney, who had recently returned 
from a tour of East Asia. Deeply suspicious of Japan, Maloney embodied Labour’s hard-line 
racialism, and delivered a rambling speech in which, among other things, he accused Japanese 
spies of surveying landing sites on the Australian coastline. Yet the same anxiety led him to 
favour symbolic changes in the law: the sheer fact of Japanese power made the removal of 
‘offending’ parts of the legislation all the more desirable. Any concession would have to be a 
formality, however: if Japan should actually attempt to force the entry of its nationals, ‘it will be 
our duty to force them away by every means in our power’.89 
  Japan’s ascent sent Australia veering uncertainly between strategies of retrenchment and 
appeasement. Neither offered a ready solution to its core problem: the weakness of a White 
Australia that, not least when judged by the standard of its own vaulting ambitions, remained 
vulnerable and incomplete. Yet the same racial paranoia also limited the political space for a 
diplomatic settlement. The mostly symbolic concessions that Deakin was prepared to offer fell 
far short of any settlement that would have given Japan, fresh from victory, the equal status it 
claimed. Thus when Australia applied to adhere to the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty in the 
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spring of 1906, under the condition that immigration would be subject to a separate agreement, 
the Colonial Office thought this unduly optimistic. ‘I have considerable doubt whether Australia 
is wise in raising this question’, one official noted. ‘It is true that the Jap. Gov’t. have let the 
question sleep for some years: but they may not be disposed to let it sleep any longer, if Australia 
asks them for concessions.’ 90 Indeed, when Macdonald raised the matter in Tokyo, he found that 
the Japanese government was likely to ask for wider rights of entry than Deakin’s government 
would accept.91   
 
‘A wheat-consuming people’: ‘Pacific Canada’ and Japanese trade 
 
 Australia’s convulsive response contrasted markedly with that of Canada, which instead 
embraced a liberal, commercial vision of engagement with the ‘new Japan’. Initially more 
‘strangers than neighbours’, by the turn of the twentieth century Canada was beginning to 
explore the prospects of deepening its commercial ties with Asia, appointing its first commercial 
agent to Japan in 1897. Tentative at first, the interest in trans-Pacific trade grew markedly after a 
Canadian delegation to a commercial exhibition in Osaka in March 1903 met with unexpected 
success.92 The popularity of Canadian produce (particularly baked goods) led the minister of 
agriculture, Sydney Fisher, to conclude that ‘a most magnificent trade’ awaited Canada in Japan. 
It did not take long for the ‘myth of the Japan market’ to infect the upper echelons of the Liberal 
government. The prime minister, Wilfrid Laurier, was converted, as was Lord Grey, the 
governor-general appointed in 1904, who kept an extensive file of newspaper cuttings and trade 
statistics on the potential of Canadian trade with East Asia.93 Ottawa made an increasingly 
concerted effort to promote its produce in Japan, sending $25,000 worth of Manitoba flour 
(helpfully stamped ‘Product of Canada’) as food relief after the failure of the Japanese rice crop 
in 1906. 94 Grey explained to King Edward VII, who received one of the sacks, that he was 
‘continually pressing’ on Canadian businessmen the need ‘to secure a future demand’ for 
Canadian products. To that end, Grey even proposed establishing a government-sponsored chain 
of Canadian bakeries in all Japanese cities, attached to which ‘there should be tea rooms where 
Canadian bread, butter and cheese, jams and jellies can be served.’95 In more ways than one, such 
bread-boosting formed a dietary counterpart to the ‘civilising’ rhetoric that reached its crescendo 
during the Russo-Japanese War. Like the missionaries waiting for its imminent embrace of 
Christianity, Canadian ministers expected Japan to abandon its rice-eating habits (associated with 
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bent backs and poor nutrition) in favour of supposedly healthier, more vigorous Western 
foodstuffs. Grey did not lack for confidence. ‘The substitution of bread for rice & fish as the 
regular National Diet of Japan,’ he told Lord Lansdowne, ‘is only a question of time.’96  
 These predictions found fertile soil among an elite riding the crest of an economic and 
demographic boom. Driven by the take-off of the western prairies, and supercharged through 
fervent efforts to recruit new immigrants, Canada’s population grew from just over five million 
in 1900 to nearly eight million in 1914. Wheat exports between 1904 and 1913 increased more 
than seven-fold.97 The Japanese market offered a tantalising vision of prosperity for the rapidly 
developing west, as wheat from the prairies would be shipped out from Vancouver to millions of 
eager customers on the other side of the Pacific98 Trade with Asia would anchor the Canadian 
economy in both the Pacific and the Atlantic, and transform the Dominion into what the Toronto 
Globe described as ‘the highway between two worlds, the granary for the East and the West’. 99 
This was a heady combination of boosterism and geopolitics, spurred on further by the ‘Open 
Door’ rhetoric that accompanied the Russo-Japanese War. According to George Parkin, a leading 
voice among Canadian imperialists, the war had given ‘added significance’ to Canada’s position 
on the Pacific, placing her ‘almost as closely in touch with Asia as with Europe’:  
 
The ports of Canada on the Pacific coast are only ten days’ steaming distance from those 
of Japan. Across her prairies and through her ports the Far West merges for the 
Englishman into the Far East, and by a shorter route than the East has hitherto been 
reached. 100 
 
If Canada were to embrace its ‘Pacific future’, Parkin concluded, the possibilities for commercial 
expansion were boundless:  
 
 Should the Chinese and Japanese people ever become a wheat-consuming people instead 
of a rice-consuming people – and nothing is more likely with increasing prosperity – the 
prairies of Canada would have an Eastern market as important as that which Europe now 
offers.101 
 
Like the British merchants on the China coast, Canadians were encouraged to imagine that a 
Japanese victory would usher in a future of free trade and commercial transformation. As Grey 
told a cheering audience in Toronto – the engine-room of Canada’s expansion across the prairies 
– through the joint efforts of Britain, Japan and the United States, ‘the peace of the Pacific is 
assured and there will be a free and undisturbed pathway for the commerce of Canada into the 
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ports of Asia’. The dominion would become ‘a natural route between England and Japan’, and its 
Pacific trade, Grey concluded, might soon eclipse that across the Atlantic.102  
 The great obstacle to this vision of a Pacific Canada was British Columbia. Since joining 
the Canadian confederation in 1871, the far western province had been something of an oddity. 
Separated from Canada’s eastern heartlands by the Rocky Mountains and long stretches of thinly 
populated prairie, British Columbia remained physically and psychologically detached from the 
Dominion until well after the completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway. In the absence of an 
Anglo-French divide, its politics were notably out of step with those of eastern Canada. As J.F. 
Bosher has suggested, until the turn of the twentieth century, British Columbia is perhaps better 
understood as an outpost of a British Pacific rather than as Canada’s westernmost extension. 103 
In the ‘Asiatic question’, certainly, British Columbians took their cue from Australia and 
California rather than Ottawa.104 The arrival of the first Chinese immigrants from the 1870s 
onward – recruited to fill labour shortages in the province’s extractive industries, such as logging, 
salmon fishing, and mining – spurred the growth of British Columbia’s labour movement, which 
vocally campaigned to restrict Asian immigration. In 1886, the federal government agreed to levy 
a head tax on Chinese immigrants, which it raised in increments to a supposedly prohibitive $500 
in 1903. An interconnected set of racial, economic, and moral objections drove the anti-Chinese 
impulse as they did elsewhere in the British world. As a Royal Commission on immigration 
appointed in 1902 expressed it, Chinese immigrants ‘are not and will not ever become citizens in 
any sense of the term as we understand it. They are so nearly allied to a servile class that they are 
obnoxious to a free community and dangerous to the state.’105  
 As in Australia, the issue of Japanese immigration, which began to make its mark in the 
early 1890s, raised additional complications. Growing restrictions on Chinese labour favoured the 
Japanese, and by the turn of the century, Japanese workers were a regular feature in the 
provincial economy, particularly in the fishing and canning industries. White opinion objected to 
Japanese immigration much as it had to the earlier influx from China: the same Royal 
Commission considered the Japanese ‘quite as serious a menace as the Chinese’. If anything, they 
were ‘keener competitors against the working man, and as they have more energy, push and 
independence, more dangerous in this regard than the Chinese’.106 Yet Japan’s status also made 
restricting immigration a thornier issue: to require Japanese immigrants to pay the head tax, as 
British Columbia’s representatives in the federal parliament demanded, was sure to provoke 
opposition from Tokyo as well as London. By 1899, Laurier had put his foot down, and declared 
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that his government would exercise a federal veto against any provincial law that explicitly 
discriminated against the Japanese. Nor would it implement a version of the ‘Natal act’ that 
Chamberlain had recommended, choosing instead to rely on the assurances of the Japanese 
government that it would voluntarily restrict emigration to Canada – a policy subsequently 
endorsed by the Royal Commission.107  
 Laurier’s refusal to accept any restriction on Japanese immigration reflected both his 
own liberal proclivities, and the marginal influence British Columbia was able to exercise on 
Canada’s central politics: the province delivered only seven MPs (out of a total of 214) in the 
1904 election. By then, Canada’s ‘discovery’ of the Japanese market had taken root, and Ottawa 
was becoming progressively less tolerant of British Columbian objections. When in April 1905 
the provincial assembly at Victoria passed another restriction law modelled on the ‘Natal Act’, 
Laurier overruled it immediately. As he later wrote to the leader of British Columbia’s Liberal 
party, the province would have to adjust its ‘violent language’ towards Japan, and begin to treat it 
with the respect due a civilised power: ‘I will ask you to remember that Japan is now the ally of 
Great Britain and that we cannot treat her people as we used to treat them formerly and as we 
still treat the Chinese.’108 Lord Grey, for his part, was openly contemptuous of the exclusionary 
impulse. Finding himself ‘so annoyed with B.C. for wishing to give a black eye to Japan’, he 
cancelled his scheduled tour of the province.109 When he did visit British Columbia the following 
year, the governor-general used his tour to promote ‘the future possibilities qua Oriental trade’, 
and warned British Columbians to abstain ‘from any action which might strengthen the argument 
of the party in Japan which favours the closing of the open door’.110 As he wrote to a prominent 
Toronto financier, eventually the benefits of Japanese trade would produce ‘a growing political 
force in favour of importing labour, thus securing us from future international difficulties in the 
Orient’. 111 It was left to Lord Elgin, the colonial secretary, to point out that Asian migrant labour 
in British Columbia remained a ‘very thorny question’, and that Grey might be too sanguine in 
his belief that the benefits of trade might overcome local racialism.112 
 Such warnings went unheeded: as Laurier’s government pursued its vision of a Pacific 
Canada, it brushed British Columbian objections aside. In December 1905, Ottawa made a 
formal request to adhere to the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty. Ottawa had previously 
considered adhesion in 1903, but abandoned the idea after Japan had made it clear that it would 
not accept an explicit reservation on immigration. In 1905, with Japan’s prestige at an all-time 
high, and the Japanese market more tantalising than ever, these hesitations mattered less. Sydney 
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Fisher, who had headed the delegation to the Osaka exhibition, assured Laurier that there was 
now ‘less danger of Japanese immigration into Canada than for many years past’, as Japan had 
acquired new outlets in Korea, Manchuria, and Sakhalin, and insisted it would be ‘very bad 
policy’ to allow the issue to stand in the way of closer trading relations.113 In addition, adherence 
to the treaty would allow the government to automatically overrule any other anti-Japanese laws 
that the British Columbian legislature might dream up, absolving Laurier from the responsibility 
of disallowance, an overbearing use of federal power he considered ‘repugnant’.114  As Fisher 
pointed out, the treaty would ‘put an end to the necessity on our part of disallowing British 
Columbia provincial laws… and I am sure the public generally in this country would support us 
completely in admitting the Japanese to all the rights of civilized nations.’115 As for the question 
of immigration, the Japanese consul-general, Nossé Tatsumoro, reassured Laurier that Tokyo 
would continue to voluntarily restrict emigration to Canada. Publicly, Canada would adhere to 
the treaty unconditionally. Neither the governor-general nor the Colonial Office was made aware 
of the corollary on immigration.116  
 In its own way, Canada’s dash for the Japanese market was as striking a response to 
Japan’s post-war expansion as the racialist spasm it triggered among many Australians. Both 
dominions incorporated the reality of a rising Japan into their own visions of the future. Yet 
whereas in Australia, Japan appeared to many as a latent menace, Canada’s bread-boosters were 
unable to resist the vision of a ‘Pacific Canada’, feeding the hungry millions of Asia and spurring 
the dominion to a golden future of prosperity. British Columbia’s objections were impatiently 
waved aside. In the process, Ottawa fully embraced the ‘civilising’ view of Japan’s rise, and 
Laurier’s parliamentary speech on the new commercial treaty provided one of the most striking 
recognitions of Japan’s new status articulated anywhere in the British world. Challenged by one 
Conservative MP that the treaty’s provisions for free movement would allow Japan to ‘pour her 
surplus population into British Columbia’, Laurier acknowledged that there was ‘quite an 
aversion to any kind of Asiatic labour’ in British Columbia, as any other English-speaking 
community. Yet he insisted Japan was a special case: 
 
Japan has undergone a revolution, it is no longer a country of Asiatic tendencies or 
Asiatic civilization, it is fast becoming a European country and we have a growing trade 
with Japan, a trade which must be improved, and which will assume … in the near future, 
very large proportions. We cannot afford to treat the Japanese population with anything 
like contempt.117 
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 In the months following the Russo-Japanese War, Britain and its Pacific dominions were 
forced to come to terms with what the American admiral A.T. Mahan once described as Japan’s 
‘somewhat sudden nearness’.118 The rise of Japan was widely expected to have a transformative 
effect on the regional order, but its precise effects were still uncertain. Would Japanese dynamism 
be a stabilising factor in East Asia, paving the way for the triumph of commerce and 
‘civilisation’? Or did its emergence portend a new geo-racial struggle in the Pacific, that would see 
local whites, as Charles Pearson had predicted, ‘elbowed and hustled, and perhaps even thrust 
aside’?119 The one thing that was beyond dispute, to those parts of the British world that looked 
out to the Pacific, was that Japan would play an important, and possibly a decisive role, in the 
future of their societies – and that its claim to international equality needed to taken seriously, 
whether for reasons of fear or profit. This was already evident in the British government’s 
decision to extend the Anglo-Japanese alliance, a move conceived, at least in part, as a 
demonstration that London recognised Japan’s claim to be included among the great powers.  
 This proved a thornier question in the dominions, where the issue of Japan’s 
international standing was inextricably tied up with the continued exclusion of Japanese 
immigrants. Neither the Canadian nor the Australian government were inclined to abandon their 
commitment to racial exclusivity. But it was clear the diplomatic, commercial, and possibly the 
strategic costs of exclusion were rising. Both governments attempted to offset this in new 
attempts to recognise Japan’s elevated status in the form, if not the substance, of their 
immigration policies – although such efforts were pursued much further, and with greater 
determination, in Canada. In the months after the war then, there seemed scope for optimism, 
shared to different degrees in Melbourne, Ottawa, and London, that even the vexed issue of 
immigration might be managed, its toxicity removed. As Balfour put it to his cabinet colleagues, 
immigration was a difficulty best ignored, ‘in the hope that, during the currency of the Treaty, it 
may not arise in an acute form’.120 
 Yet Japan’s racial status continued to be an obstacle in this ‘equalising’ process. Many of 
the objections levied against the Indian extension of the Anglo-Japanese alliance grew out of the 
concern that Japan’s victories had eroded European, including British, prestige in Asia, and even 
advocates of the Indian extension shirked from the prospect of calling on Japanese troops in a 
‘white man’s war’. More troublingly, the war opened up new veins of racialist discourse in the 
British Pacific, as many now argued that the Japan’s rise demanded the reinforcement, not the 
reduction, of the ‘Great White Walls’. Deakin’s half-hearted attempts at reconciliation did not 
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obscure the extent to which many Australians – including Deakin himself – had heralded Japan’s 
victory as the beginning of a new phase of strategic, and even racial rivalry. Much the same was 
true of British Columbia, although Ottawa’s overtures to Japan momentarily marginalised the 
objections of its westernmost province. In the buoyant post-war mood, it was possible to regard 
this as an irritation of little political consequence. The following years would show just how 




‘The merry game of dollar-grinding’: China, 1905-1911 
 
 On Monday, 18 December 1905, rioting broke out in the International Settlement of 
Shanghai, the largest of the foreign ‘concessions’ on the China coast. The immediate cause was a 
jurisdictional dispute on policing between the Municipal Council, which governed the Settlement, 
and the Chinese authorities: following the forcible removal of a Chinese woman to a newly built 
western gaol, a cluster of Chinese merchants’ associations had called for a general strike. Crowds 
of rioters proceeded to attack shops that had dared to open on Monday morning. The mob, now 
numbering in the thousands, went on to set fire to the Western police station. Marines from a 
visiting British naval squadron were called in to restore order.1 When the day was over, fifteen 
Chinese had lost their lives in the largest incident of mass violence since the creation of the 
International Settlement. To shocked foreign residents, the riots were a symptom of the growing 
assertiveness of Chinese nationalist politics since the Russo-Japanese War. ‘The temper of the 
Chinese is very different from what it was a year or two ago,’ Ernest Satow, the British minister 
at Beijing, had warned a few days before the riot. ‘The example of Japan has shown them what 
an Eastern nation may achieve in the way of resisting European encroachments.’2 J.O.P. Bland, 
forced to resign from his position as secretary to the Municipal Council, pointed to the ‘moral 
effect caused throughout the country by the defeat of the great Western Power by Japan’.3 More 
worryingly, there were rumours of direct involvement: two days after the events in Shanghai, 
Bland complained to the Japanese consul of ‘well-substantiated cases’ where Japanese nationals 
had participated in the rioting. The Times also called on the Japanese government to ‘control its 
subjects’.4  
 The Shanghai riots were an early sign that the regional order in East Asia was shifting. 
The Russo-Japanese War terminated the ‘China question’ as it had preoccupied the European 
powers since 1895: with Russia chastened and Japan standing guard, there was now little prospect 
of a Chinese ‘scramble’ directed from Europe.5 Yet where the chancelleries of Europe might look 
elsewhere, there was little sign that the region’s politics were stabilising. Instead, the ‘China 
question’ now came to hinge on two new previously unknown factors in the international 
equation: the expanding influence of Japan, and the growing dynamism of Chinese nationalism. 
For British settlers in the treaty-ports, it marked the beginning of a new period of political 
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uncertainty.6 One upshot of this was a stark reconsideration of local views of Japan and its place 
in the regional order: ‘Anglo-China’ had been a staunchly pro-Japanese constituency during the 
Russo-Japanese War; now it became a source of some of its fiercest critiques. Many of Japan’s 
erstwhile supporters, including Bland and G.E. Morrison, the two Times correspondents in China, 
came to denounce its actions on the Asian continent. These views exercised an osmotic effect on 
British opinion: by 1911, few commentators could still maintain that the Anglo-Japanese alliance 
benefited British trade in China, or that Japan was a progressive ‘Britain of the East’. Already by 
January 1908, Bland believed the Japanese alliance was now fundamentally at odds with British 
interests – political, economic, and racial – in East Asia: ‘I cannot believe that we white men will 
be able to keep up much longer the farce of an alliance with these fiercely Asiatic Asiatics.’7 
 
Brushing shoulders: Japan and Britain in the treaty-port system 
 
 Japan had been a member of China’s ‘treaty-port system’ since 1895, when the Treaty of 
Shimonoseki formally placed it on par with the Western powers as a most-favoured-nation.8 Yet 
with its trade relatively small, its investment negligible, and its political attention focused on 
Korea, Japan remained in many respects a second-tier member of the foreign cabal. That 
changed with the Russo-Japanese War, which prompted a sharp expansion of its footprint on the 
Asian mainland. In the decade that followed, the value of Sino-Japanese trade doubled, from 
¥74m in 1897-1906 to ¥159m in 1907-1916, wile Japan’s share of China’s total imports grew 
from 9% in 1902-6 to 17% in 1907-11, and finally mushrooming to 28% in 1912-16, as the 
outbreak of the First World War interrupted European trade.9 Its commercial ties to the Chinese 
economy, moreover, were formed on a more intimate level than those of the Europeans, and 
tended to involve smaller enterprises selling directly to Chinese customers. Beatrice Webb, who 
visited Hong Kong in 1911, reflected on the ‘deliberative purposefulness’ of the Japanese trading 
houses, many of which had dispensed with the services of local middlemen and insisted that their 
personnel, ‘from the Manager himself down to the youngest clerk’, learn Chinese. By 1914, over 
1,200 Japanese firms operated in China, making up just under half of all foreign companies.10  
 By extension, Sino-Japanese trade also involved far larger numbers of people. This was 
most evident in Manchuria, which by 1909 was home to over 65,000 Japanese, by far the largest 
foreign community enjoying extra-territorial rights in China.11 Yet its expansion was also felt 
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further south: in 1905, the Japanese population of Shanghai stood at 4,400, already outnumbering 
the British; a decade later, it had grown to 11,700 people. 12 Substantial Japanese communities 
also settled in Xiamen, Tianjin, and Hankou, where Japan acquired a separate concession in 1907. 
In the same year, the Japanese foreign ministry bolstered its oversight of the Japanese expatriate 
communities by establishing formal residents’ associations in the larger treaty-ports. 13 E.G. 
Hillier, HSBC’s agent in Beijing, recounted the rapid spread of the Japanese presence even in the 
Yangzi valley, Britain’s own commercial preserve: 
 
Of the forces which are working to shape the future of Hankow and of the upper Yang-
tsze at the present moment none is more conspicuous or more striking than the growing 
influence of the Japanese… their flag is to be seen everywhere on the river… They have 
great ambitions in the Yang-tzse valley, there can be no manner of doubt, and their 
object seems to be to conquer much by a process of absorption by numbers as by the 
ordinary competition of trade.14  
 
In other ways too, Japan came to participate more fully in the treaty-port system. Its gunboats 
joined in anti-piracy operations on the Yangzi. The Imperial Maritime Customs, whose 
recruitment practices scrupulously reflected the cosmopolitan nature of the treaty-port regime, 
employed its first Japanese official in 1899, and took on forty-two Japanese nationals in 1907 
alone, to staff its resumed operations in the Manchurian ports.15 Although the number of 
Japanese Buddhist missionaries in China was negligible (a mere thirty-five in 1908), the Japanese 
government sought access to potential converts on the same terms as Christian missions. 
 The effect of Japan’s growing presence in continental Asia was amplified by its perceived 
influence on China’s politics. Following its humiliation during the Boxer war, the Qing court had 
tentatively embarked on a programme of reforms to the central administration, the army, and the 
education system. 16 This was mirrored by the emergence of an outward-facing nationalist 
consciousness among provincial elites, particularly in the larger treaty-ports. The Russo-Japanese 
War catalysed these developments, as humiliation over the impotence of its own neutrality, 
inspiration by the Japanese model, and anxiety over Japanese encroachment spurred the Court 
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into accelerating the pace of reform.17 In September 1905, China abolished the centuries-old 
Confucian examination system in favour of a Western-oriented curriculum. That same month, a 
commission of enquiry left Beijing to study administrative practice and constitutional 
arrangements in Europe, the United States, and Japan – a conscious imitation of Japan’s own 
Iwakura embassy of 1871. It also forged ahead with military reform, particularly in the Beiyang 
army under Yuan Shikai, the governor of Zhili. Satow, who attended its autumn manoeuvres in 
October 1905, was impressed: Yuan’s new force was ‘able-bodied, well-trained, perfectly 
disciplined; no disorder of any kind’.18 The most dramatic example of Beijing’s reforming spirit 
came in November 1906, when the Chinese government announced a ban on the domestic 
production of opium.19  Returning to China in December 1905, George Morrison found the 
country transformed. ‘That there is a development going on in China of a national spirit almost 
as strong as that which took place in Japan in the years following 1860, seems certain… I think 
the spirit should be encouraged.’20 Not all foreign observers were as sanguine, and others noted 
that the new nationalism was already asserting itself against the Western presence. Starting in 
Shanghai in the summer of 1905, Chinese merchants of Shanghai began a boycott of American 
goods, in protest against the exclusion of Chinese from the United States. It subsequently spread 
to several other treaty-ports. 21  The Shanghai riots added further to the atmosphere of 
uncertainty. ‘China is as India was in 1857,’ one agitated Shanghai resident telegraphed to the 
Foreign Office.22 
 The Japanese element in China’s reforming turn was evident. To the Chinese, Japan 
offered a model of resisting foreign pressure through modernising reform within the framework 
of constitutional government. Many took advantage of the opportunity of studying its methods 
up close: the number of Chinese students leaving for Japan ballooned from 1,300 in 1904, to 
8,000 in 1905, and may have reached a total as high as twenty thousand in 1906.23 The new 
emphasis on non-traditional learning for official preferment – which goes some way to 
explaining the exodus of students to Japan – also produced an immediate demand for Japanese 
teachers in China itself.24 Chinese cadets – including the young Chiang Kai-shek – enrolled in 
Japanese military academies, while Japanese military advisers were engaged in the Beiyang army. 
As Satow reported to Grey, the Japanese had ‘enormously increased their influence’ over the 
course of the Russo-Japanese War:  
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They have become the teachers of the military and all other arts to the Chinese… They 
have thrown open their military colleges and other educational establishments to Chinese 
students, who have flocked to Japan in thousands. There young Chinese have seen with 
their own eyes what an Oriental nation can do to thrust back the advancing tide of 
European influence, and strengthen themselves against all forms of aggression, and the 
lesson has not been thrown away upon them.25 
 
 For Britain, Russia’s defeat and the apparent revival of China’s political fortunes offered 
grounds for cautious optimism. Even Satow, whose service in China had been shaped by the 
aftermath of the Boxer crisis, and who had once thought the Qing ‘thoroughly rotten’, now took 
a more sanguine view.26 With the prospect of a territorial scramble vanishing beyond the political 
horizon, Satow argued there was no longer a need to fence in British commercial and financial 
interests with political safeguards, as had been the practice during the scramble years. Nor was it 
necessary to maintain a cordon of British owned-railways around Britain’s commercial preserve 
in the Yangzi valley. ‘[T]he policies of “pacific penetration,” “partition,” “spheres of influence,” 
and “spheres of interest” are dead,’ he concluded. Any further railway projects would have to be 
‘as purely commercial undertakings, without any political character, and be assisted accordingly’.27 
Such a policy would reduce the scope for friction with other powers, strengthen the authority of 
the central government, and put Britain on the right side of China’s budding nationalist 
movement. On his return to London, Satow privately met with Sir Edward Grey, the new foreign 
secretary, to make the case for abandoning the ‘big stick’, and return to a policy of ‘trade, not 
territory’. Ultimately, Satow argued, it was in Britain’s best interests to accommodate China’s self-
strengthening aspirations: ‘I contrasted the treatment we had meted out to Japan & China during 
the last 30 years, and the relatively satisfactory state of our relations with the former.’28 Grey was 
receptive, and instructed Satow’s successor, Sir John Jordan, hitherto minister in Seoul, that 
British policy would have to adapt ‘to the new departure which China is apparently anxious to 
make’.29 
 Effectively, Britain would return to the familiar ground of the Open Door, and abandon 
its flirtation with a protectorate in the Yangzi. This turn was given practical form by the 
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC), the Foreign Office’s unofficial financial 
partner in China, which happily seized on the chance to disassociate the Bank from unprofitable 
‘political’ railways. Its new London manager, Charles Addis favoured swimming with the 
nationalist tide. ‘It has all along been China's weakness, not her strength, that has been the root 
of her troubles and ours,’ he wrote in his diary. ‘And now China is moving at last. I feel more 
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hopeful of her future than ever.’30 Led by Addis, the Bank recognised that allowing new railways 
to be built under Chinese, rather than foreign, ownership made them politically less contentious 
and commercially more viable. Financing the lines jointly by the Western powers would further 
reduce scope for political friction. The formation of an international banking consortium, which 
came to include British, French, German, and American banking groups, ensured that railway 
lines would no longer be controlled by any single power. By 1910, the railway had been 
effectively disarmed as a tool of quasi-colonial conquest, and the frenzied territorialism of the 
scramble years had given way to a cosmopolitan bankers’ diplomacy.31 The Foreign Office 
looked on approvingly. ‘From the point of view of British commerce and of the British trading 
communities in China it makes little difference who constructs the railways so long as they are 
built,’ noted Jordan. ‘With the awaking spirit amongst the Chinese it is very unlikely that railways 
will in the future be utilized as instruments of conquest by any Power.’32 
 South of the Great Wall, therefore, the treaty-port regime emerged from the Russo-
Japanese War with its cosmopolitan character considerably strengthened. The problem was 
Manchuria, where Qing authority was weaker, the scope for a ‘colonial’ refashioning greater, and 
the challengers to the Open Door more formidable. Although it was never the empty frontier of 
the Western imagination, China’s three eastern provinces constituted a borderland where the 
limits of Beijing’s authority were less clearly defined than in the south. In an effort to preserve 
the dynasty’s nomadic traditions, the Qing had long treated their ancestral homeland as a separate 
administrative entity: its officials was drawn from the ranks of the Manchu bannermen, and as 
late as the 1860s, Beijing imposed strict controls on the entry of Han settlers. By the turn of the 
twentieth century, Manchuria, China’s ‘wild north’, still resembled a frontier environment: 
communications were limited outside the settled area around Mukden, the regional capital, and 
the exercise of central control often relied on the cooperation of local tribal leaders. Crucially, the 
region lacked the sophisticated local commercial networks that could channel – and constrain – 
foreign trade in central China; instead, it was the Russian and later Japanese railway companies 
that came to provide the logistic, commercial and financial services required to develop their 
Manchurian spheres.33  
 After it took over Russia’s concessions in southern Manchuria, strategic and economic 
logic drove Japan further down the tracks of its predecessor. At the outset of the Russo-Japanese 
War, Tokyo had shown little interest in acquiring a sphere in Manchuria, and as late as October 
1905, it had actively considered an American proposal buy out the Russian railway lines on 
China’s behalf.34 Yet by the end of the year, the threat of Russian revanchism had set Tokyo on 
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an increasingly forward policy. The core problem was that Manchuria was simply too valuable to 
surrender: it provided a reserve of strategic resources; shielded Korea from external pressures; 
and formed a forward base from which Japan could strike at Harbin and cut the Russian railways 
in the event of another war. Once China had formally signed over the Russian concession to 
Japan in December 1905, this logic pointed inexorably to the region’s conversion into a tightly 
integrated Japanese preserve. The task of developing it was given to the South Manchurian 
Railway Company (SMR), formed as a joint stock company in July 1906. Like its Russian 
predecessor, the SMR acted as a semi-official arm of the Japanese government: it operated 
operating the railway, it built hotels, schools, and canteens, ran the territory’s main commercial 
harbour, and provided access to credit, building materials, and fuel.35 Yet the combined strategic 
and economic demands heaped on the Japanese sphere also made it expensive to run: by 1914, 
Manchuria accounted for only 20 per cent of Japan’s exports to China, but soaked up 70 per cent 
of its investment.36  
 To British merchants, this new departure came as an unpleasant surprise.  The ‘Open 
Door’ rhetoric touted during the Russo-Japanese War had caused commercial hopes for 
Manchuria to run high. ‘In England they were confidently expecting a big commercial 
development and the end of all obstruction as the result of the Japanese victories,’ reflected 
Bland. ‘The City would not hear of any doubts on the subject.’37 To their dismay, they now found 
that Japan’s pledges did not translate into unhindered access to the areas under its control, and 
complaints of wilful obstruction by the Japanese military authorities went on to fill several hefty 
volumes in the Foreign Office archives.38 Japan was alleged to be stalling the re-establishment of 
the Chinese customs; it manipulated railway rates in favour of Japanese firms; it refused to allow 
foreign ships to anchor or offload their goods; and buildings commandeered by the army were 
occupied by Japanese settlers (reported to include large numbers of prostitutes) rather than 
returned to their original owners. Although a mission of enquiry from the Shanghai chapter of 
the China Association failed to find clear evidence of wrongdoing, it was nonetheless convinced 
that Japan was using its military occupation to secure commercial benefits. ‘The Japanese are far 
too clever to allow definite cases to arise in which clear evidence can be quoted against them,’ its 
chairman concluded.39 Japan’s profession that it would, in due course, open all of Manchuria to 
foreign commerce did little to allay British suspicions. As an anonymous ‘Merchant’ opined in 
the North China Herald: 
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True, the door of Newchwang is open, as the wily Japanese will smilingly point out to 
you… But how much further can we get than the threshold of this open door? … How 
long will the British merchants and the British government allow themselves to be so 
deceived and treated at the hands of their Allies, whose sailors they are banqueting with 
so much zest in England to-day?40 
 
  Complaints over Japan’s reneging on its wartime promises continued after the end of 
military occupation. Foreign visitors frequently noted that far from restoring free trade, Japan 
appeared set on turning its Manchurian sphere into an exclusive economic preserve. ‘Manchuria 
is more Japanese now than ever it was Russian’, noted Morrison.41 Equally worrying, Japan’s 
policies closely resembled those it pursued in its Korean protectorate. Following a tour of 
Manchuria, Alexander Hosie, the British commercial attaché in Beijing, concluded that Japan was 
playing ‘the game which has proved so successful in Corea…  her object being to establish 
paramount interests and influence in these three provinces’. 42  Jordan came to the same 
conclusion: ‘I am afraid the shadow of Corea is spreading over Manchuria, and there is certainly a 
striking resemblance in the methods employed.’43  
 
‘Hated with a fervour you can hardly imagine:’ Japan in the ‘Shanghai Mind’ 
 
 As far as the British position in China was concerned, therefore, the Russo-Japanese War 
left a mixed legacy. On the one hand, it had appeared to settle the ‘China question’ in Britain’s 
favour, as railway competition lost its territorial edge, and the continental challenge that had 
seemed so threatening after 1895 fizzled out. The financial partnership that emerged in its place 
proved a remarkably durable tool for managing international competition: even the collapse of 
the Qing in the revolution of 1911 did not trigger another quasi-territorial ‘railway scramble’ in 
central China. Yet this was only half the story: at the same time, the British communities in the 
treaty-ports felt increasingly under pressure from a more assertive Chinese nationalism that 
demanded the recovery of its legal rights; and from a Japan whose strategic and commercial 
interests on the Asian mainland appeared to be diverging from those of its British ally. Their 
worries were not eased by the Foreign Office’s political withdrawal, which Bland denouced as 
little-Englander ‘parish-pump politics’. 44  His antipathy was heartily reciprocated. To Satow, 
emancipating the legation from the influence of the ‘Shanghai crowd’ – ‘whose sole idea is to 
wave the British flag in the faces of other nations’ – had been a key reason for pushing for a 
policy of disengagement in the first place.45  
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 The withdrawal of official support added to an atmosphere of political uncertainty, 
which in turn bled into a sharp change in attitudes towards Japan. Before the Russo-Japanese 
War, noted Francis Lindley, a junior diplomat with the Tokyo embassy, opinion in the treaty-
ports had been divided broadly on national lines, with continental Europeans favouring Russia, 
and the British and Americans backing Japan. By 1908, that had changed: ‘At the present 
moment the latter are, if possible, more anti-Japanese than the former.’46 Other observers also 
noted the sharp anti-Japanese turn in the ports. Arnold Robertson, a young diplomat freshly 
arrived at the Beijing legation, was surprised to find ‘how much our pigmy allies are hated & 
feared out here in the East by natives & Europeans alike’.47 The Liberal MP Malcolm Kincaid-
Smith, who visited East Asia in 1908, could not help but notice ‘the intense antagonism displayed 
by Europeans and Americans, almost without exception, towards Japan and all things Japanese, 
noticeable at Singapore and Penang, and gradually increasing in strength as one gets nearer to 
Japan’.48 William Mackenzie King, a Canadian official who made his way up the China coast in 
the spring of 1909 to attend the international opium conference in Shanghai, also noted the 
ubiquity of anti-Japanese sentiment: since leaving England, he had not met ‘a single person who 
has spoken well of the Japanese’.49 Anti-Japanese views gained currency among local journalists, 
missionaries, British officials in the Chinese customs, and made inroads among the staff of the 
British legation. Claude Macdonald grew concerned that the anti-Japanese mood was even 
beginning to infect the officers of the China squadron at Hong Kong, whose outlook had 
become ‘highly coloured by those of their commercial friends’.50 At Weihaiwei too, Morrison 
noted, ‘All our naval men distrust the Japanese’.51 
 Some chalked up the hostility to resentment of Japanese competition; ‘they are one too 
many for them at the merry game of dollar grinding,’ as Macdonald put it.52 Indeed, resentment 
at supposedly unfair Japanese competition, both in Manchuria and central China, topped the 
litany of grievances. ‘Everyone I meet tells me the same story of Japanese crookedness and 
conceit,’ Morrison wrote to Chirol. ‘No Japanese can exist as a trader alongside a Chinese unless 
he have recourse to force and fraud. That seems to be the general impression.’53 Robertson 
considered the Japanese ‘entirely unscrupulous,’ even by the admittedly low standard of 
commercial integrity that prevailed among the China traders.54 Tokyo’s backsliding on its Open 
Door pledges, and its perceived obstruction of British trade in Manchuria, were quickly slotted 
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into well-established stereotypes of the supposed dishonesty of Japanese traders.55 ‘In Manchuria 
the Japanese are hated with a fervour you can hardly imagine,’ Morrison wrote to Chirol, ‘our 
merchants have the most undisguised disgust of the Japanese intentions.’56 Bland, too, believed 
that Britain risked being elbowed out by Japan’s sharp trading practices.  ‘It will be difficult,’ he 
noted,  ‘in the present fetich [sic] worship of Bushido at home, to persuade the sheep crowd that 
Japan is also human… but the thing has got to be done somehow.’57 
 Yet while some dismissed this as commercial jealousy, the anti-Japanese turn drew on 
deeper founts of political and racial insecurity. Even in their own concessions, Europeans 
constituted a tiny minority: after the 1880s, British nationals never made up more than one per 
cent of the population of Shanghai’s International Settlement. The communal identity of ‘Anglo-
China’, as such, came to revolve to a significant degree around upholding the solidarity of white 
Britishness, and maintaining the integrity of the local colour line.58 Japan muddied the waters: as 
a treaty-port power, it formally enjoyed the same status as Britain, although in practice, it proved 
impossible for most British settlers to fully except the Japanese as equals. Lindley observed this 
while touring the ports:  
 
[It] must be remembered that the Japanese now claim absolute equality with the 
European and the American, both nationally and individually; these claims are admitted 
readily enough in theory, but when it comes to dealing with individual Japanese on such a 
basis, the average Englishman or American is physically incapable of accepting the 
situation, and, quite unintentionally, he resents in a Japanese many things he would 
tolerate in a European. Every Englishman in China prefers a Chinese to a Japanese, but 
one cannot help wondering how long this preference would last if the Chinese were in a 
position to claim absolute equality with the European.59 
 
 The aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War had transformed the China coast into a zone 
of contact, where the Japanese challenge to notions of racial hierarchy became explicit, and often 
personal. British travellers found the Japanese they encountered unwilling to perform the ritual 
obsequiousness they considered, as Macdonald put it, ‘the inalienable right of the white man in 
the Far East’. 60  As the expected deference was not forthcoming, the result was surprise, 
irritation, and sometimes revulsion. Robertson thought the Japanese he encountered in Korea 
‘officious, insolent and tiresome in every way’. 61  Frederick McKenzie, the East Asia 
correspondent for the Daily Mail, scoffed that ‘the very coolie goes out with the air of a 
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conqueror… blustering, grasping and arrogant.’62 During her visit to China in 1911, Beatrice 
Webb recorded how Mrs Willis, the wife of the local British consul in Mukden – ‘a pleasant but 
commonplace woman’ – complained of the rudeness of a Japanese clerk at a local hotel: ‘to sum 
up her objection, the Japanese did not know their place as an inferior race.’ ‘The success of the 
Japanese comes as an unpleasant shock to the dignity, or the self-conceit of the Englishman,’ she 
concluded.63  
 Some compromises were struck. In Shanghai, under new regulations proclaimed in 1908, 
Japanese residents were now allowed to use the municipal park, from which Chinese were 
banned, provided they wore either European clothing or the garb of the Japanese upper class.64 
The directive reflected the subtleties of status, race and class to which treaty-port society, which 
imported many of its social cues from British India, was so expertly attuned. Yet the bulk of the 
Japanese community, composed of small merchants and their families, fell short of this exacting 
standard.65 Due to its early origins – women outnumbered men until 1890 – the Japanese quarter 
in Shanghai retained a reputation for vice and crime, and the expansion of the Japanese presence 
in the city after 1905 brought little change: ‘the Japanese resident in China did not generally 
participate in the social life of the European’, as one study has noted.66 Even at the very top, 
acceptance, if it was given at all, only came grudgingly. The Saturday Review reported that Japanese 
officials ‘of exceptional ability, culture, and good manners,’ were still refused membership of the 
Shanghai Club, the social pinnacle of treaty-port society.67 Even by the early 1930s, when the 
Japanese community in the city exceeded 25,000, the Club counted only two Japanese members, 
one of whom was the Japanese consul.  
 If Anglo-China turned up its collective nose at the Japanese in the treaty-ports, visitors 
to the Japanese sphere in Manchuria displayed an even greater capacity for snobbery. The 
Japanese settlers consisted, according to Morrison, of ‘gamblers, swindling peddlers, roughs and 
braves and prostitutes’ – the latter numbering, according to the commercial attaché in Beijing, no 
fewer than 20.000.68 While this number was almost certainly inflated, the prevalence of Japanese 
prostitutes became a well-established trope, sparking comments veering between vulgarity and 
moral indignation. Morrison believed there were over a thousand ‘female goods’ in Mukden 
alone: ‘Manchuria swarms with Japanese prostitutes who are found even over the Mongolian 
border.’69 Bland denounced the Japanese sphere as a ‘gigantic brothel’, quipping that ‘in fact 
                                                      
62 Frederick Arthur McKenzie, The Unveiled East, (New York: E.P. Dutton and Company, 1907). 
63 Webb Diary, 28 Oct and 1 Nov 1911, LSE, Passfield Papers, 1. 
64 Robert Bickers and Jeffrey Wasserstrom, “Shanghai’s ‘Dogs and Chinese Not Admitted’ Sign: Legend, History and 
Contemporary Symbol,” China Quarterly 142, no. 2 (1995): 444–66. 
65 For the social makeup of the Japanese community in Shanghai, see Henriot, “‘Little Japan’ in Shanghai: an Insulated 
Community, 1875-1945 .” 
66 Peattie, “Japanese Treaty-port Settlements in China, 1895-1937.” 
67 ‘Black and White,’ Saturday Review, 3 Nov 1906, pp. 536-7. 
68 Morrison to Chirol, 31 July 1906, CGEM, pp. 369-71; Jordan to Grey, 11 January 1908, FO 371/415/No. 1036. 
Jordan quoted the total number of Japanese residents in Manchuria at 34,000. FO 371/475/No. 10962. 
69 Morrison to Chirol, 31 July 1906, CGEM, pp. 369-71. 
 86 
Womanchuria might be a good name for the province – the joke is copyright, but no doubt they 
will infringe my rights.’70 British missionaries were particularly ruffled by the prevalence of 
prostitution, gambling, and opium in the settlements along the Japanese railway. Lindley noted 
that whereas most missionaries had supported Japan during the war, ‘the subsequent enormous 
influx of Japanese prostitutes’ had ‘completely alienated their sympathies’.71 Charles Scott, the 
bishop of North China, whose diocese covered the missions in Manchuria, cited the 
‘overwhelming flood of evil characters, especially Japanese women’ as his chief grievance against 
Japan.72  
 In the hands of hostile commentators, the sex trade and opium traffic became 
metaphors for the Japanese presence in China: seductive, corrosive, and driven by material self-
interest. One account scathingly denounced prostitution as the rotten core of the Japanese 
colonisation project, a form of ‘propaganda’ analogous to the efforts of Western missionaries.73 
Bland similarly believed prostitution illustrated Japan’s campaign to undercut Britain’s 
commercial position: ‘the tariff, for Chinese, in the low class places is 40 cents – how can the 
West compete with these people?’74 Even the staunchly pro-Japanese Chirol felt the need to write 
to Count Komura on the need to clamp down on ‘houses of ill-repute, gambling shops and 
opium dens’ in the Japanese settlements.75 Underlying these charges was the conviction that such 
vices disproved Japan’s claim to moral equality with the West, or even with the Chinese and 
Koreans on whom it was supposed to be exercising a civilising influence. As the Daily Mail 
correspondent F.A. McKenzie paraphrased the ‘respectable Chinese’ he encountered in 
Manchuria: ‘What are we to think of a nation that will shamelessly sell its daughters to other 
people?' … The Japanese profess to come to teach us reform and a higher civilisation. And then 
they bring us that!’76  
 As Akira Iriye has noted, the anti-Japanese rhetoric of the treaty-ports paralleled that 
which emanated from the white settler societies across the Pacific: both blended older prejudices 
with new fears of Japanese power, and both fed, to different degrees, on a sense of racial 
vulnerability. In China, such anxieties were compounded by a wider atmosphere of political 
uncertainty. Some British residents remained sanguine about China’s capacity for reform and 
self-improvement, yet while the memory of the Boxers remained fresh, most harboured an 
instinctive distrust of anything that resembled Chinese nationalism. Such fears increased as the 
Qing appeared to be losing control of the reform movement. The deaths, within one day of each 
other, of both the emperor and the dowager empress in November 1908, followed by the 
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dismissal of Yuan Shihkai, the dynasty’s military strongman the following January, left a vacuum 
at the centre.77 Instead, Chinese politics seemed increasingly beholden to a volatile political 
undercurrent in the provinces, where local ‘rights recovery’ movements churned out a steady 
stream of anti-foreign and anti-Qing demonstrations.78  
 Such volatility, the China coasters feared, would inevitably favour Japan. ‘There is an 
economical, financial and political crisis ahead of us in this country’, Bland believed, ‘and our Jap 
friends [sic] are well aware of it. Only the ostrich Anglo-Saxon, who has most to lose by it, blinks 
the fact.’ 79  Several others saw Tokyo’s hand in the growing militancy of the nationalist 
movement. Morrison noted as early as 1906 that many of the most virulently anti-foreign 
Chinese papers were run by Japanese proprietors, while Bland privately accused Japanese 
nationals of instigating the Shanghai riots. The Ningpo-born journalist ‘Putnam Weale’ [Betram 
Lennox-Simpson] also suspected Japan of ‘promoting an anti-foreign propaganda’, to further its 
own commercial and political interests.80 ‘There is a feeling among many that Japan is fermenting 
this trouble for her own ends,’ E.S. Little, a local missionary, reported to the Foreign Office in 
1910. ‘A strong united China would in time mean the extinction of Japan, and to prevent this 
being accomplished is the object of Japanese statesmen.’81  
 
‘Kicked out through the Open Door’: Railway diplomacy, 1907-1911 
 
 The consequences of the anti-Japanese turn on the China coast were twofold. First, it 
contributed to the decline of Japan’s standing from the heights it had enjoyed during the Russo-
Japanese War, as the poison from the treaty-ports fed into the bloodstream of British public 
opinion. Second, this was not simply a process of osmosis, as some among the British 
communities actively tried to steer public opinion against Japan, or twist London’s arm into 
taking a firmer stance on its ally’s activities. These strands converged on the pivotal issue of 
railways. The tone for an Anglo-Japanese confrontation was set in May 1907, when a contract for 
a prospective railway in the Yangzi valley fell through, amid Japanese demands to be included as 
partners. Bland, who had led the negotiations on behalf of the British and Chinese Corporation 
(established in 1898 as a joint venture of Jardine Matheson and HSBC), was deeply rankled, and 
accused the Japanese government of sabotaging the deal. ‘As the allies of Japan,’ he noted to 
Addis, ‘we might expect to be able to combine with them for the advancement of our mutual 
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interest. Actually… we find them blocking our path.’82 As things stood, ‘every day confirms in 
me the certainty that we are going to pay a big price for the alliance and that the Japs’ [sic] 
ambitions in China are practically unlimited.’83  
 By way of retaliation, Bland conspired to probe Japan’s own Manchurian sphere. In 
September 1907, he travelled north to meet with the newly appointed Chinese viceroy, Tang 
Shaoyi, a modernising reformer determined to loosen Japan’s hold on the region. Working with 
Pauling & Co., a British railway firm keen to stake out new business in China, Bland secured a 
contract to extend the Chinese Northern Railway – the only line wholly owned and operated by 
China – fifty miles north into Manchuria. The project was deliberately kept to modest 
dimensions: as Bland noted to Chirol, Tokyo could hardly block the scheme ‘without admitting 
the open door is a myth’.84  This was a smokescreen: the contract contained a secret clause for 
further extension, eventually connecting the railway to the Russian lines in northern Manchuria.85 
Once completed, this line would allow uninterrupted travel from Beijing to St Petersburg, 
bypassing the Japanese lines entirely. Willard Straight, the American consul in Mukden, who 
helped broker the deal, candidly acknowledged the new railway’s potential to hem in the Japanese 
sphere: 
 
The Hsinmintun-Fakumen line… will very seriously compete with the South Manchurian 
Railway, will not only tap a rich and rapidly developing country… but will almost 
certainly attract all the through European traffic as well as secure all the mails. More than 
that even, it will threaten the Japanese strategic position and place a splendid line of 
communication along the Japanese flank and within easy reach of the Russians…86 
 
If Tokyo vetoed the line, on the other hand, it would effectively claim Manchuria as its exclusive 
commercial preserve, in open contradiction of its earlier pledges to uphold the Open Door. In 
that event, Tang and Bland hoped the Foreign Office would back up the interests of a British 
firm. Encouraging noises came from the Legation, where Jordan had grown increasingly 
suspicious of Japan’s motives in the north. ‘All this boasted talk about the open door is 
meaningless if is to be closed against us in railway construction,’ he wrote to London. ‘The 
Japanese do not respect our Yangtze preserve so scrupulously as to justify an exclusive claim to 
the industrial exploitation of Manchuria.’87  
 The controversy broke in December 1907, when Japan duly objected to the contract. 
Tokyo pointed out that when China had signed over the Russian leases at the end of the Russo-
Japanese War, it had also pledged not to construct any new railway lines in their vicinity. None 
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other than Tang Shaoyi had signed the agreement on China’s behalf.88 When Pauling’s appealed 
to London, the Foreign Office upheld Japan’s objections, concluding that it would be needlessly 
provocative to push a British concession into its ally’s Manchurian backyard.89  Bland was 
confirmed in his suspicions. Clearly, Japan intended to preserve southern Manchuria as an 
exclusive sphere, hold it against all comers, and browbeat the Chinese into accepting its primacy. 
Bland recognised – indeed, admired – the ruthlessness of its logic. London’s response, however, 
struck him as abdicating its position in northern China to the ‘Bandar-log’ – Bland’s private insult 
for the Japanese.90 For both political and racial reasons, such a policy spelled disaster. ‘[The] 
whole value of the alliance,’ Bland wrote to Chirol, ‘depends on our behaving towards our Asiatic 
ally with dignity and by our showing energy and intelligence in some degree approximating theirs. 
If they learn to despise us, the alliance is doomed.’91  
 On the China coast, the railway controversy lit a fire under the power keg of anti-
Japanese resentment, as Bland and his allies conducted a frenzied campaign against Tokyo’s 
actions in Manchuria, and London’s ‘invertebrate interpretation’ the Anglo-Japanese alliance.92 
He leaned on the China Association ‘to protest volubly’ against Japan’s backsliding on the Open 
Door, while the directors of Pauling’s and Jardine Matheson lodged their own complaints with 
the Foreign Office.93 When the North China Herald published a defence of the Japanese position, 
Bland complained with its editor of the ‘evil wrought to the Raj by the dissemination of Japanese 
‘news’ through the columns of the leading British paper in the Far East,’ and demanded the 
paper’s Japanese correspondent be fired.94 Together with Morrison, he petitioned Chirol to steer 
the The Times away from its ‘uncompromising adulation’ of Japan.95 Such agitation, in turn, 
exercised an effect on British opinion. When Macdonald went home for leave in the fall of 1907, 
he already noted the contrast between the ‘immense’ popularity of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 
Japan, British attitudes towards its ally were notably cooler.96 Chirol similarly worried that the 
accusations of the China merchants were ‘creating a strong feeling in business circles in this 
country which may ultimately impair the stability of the Anglo-Japanese alliance’. 97  
 The internal dynamics of The Times exemplified this wider trend. For some time now, 
Chirol and his China correspondents had been falling out over the paper’s editorial line on East 
Asia. Both Bland and Morrison argued for a more critical stance on Japan’s actions, which, they 
insisted, were both detrimental to British interests, and incompatible with the spirit of the 
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alliance. Chirol saw matters differently. To him, the Japanese alliance remained a vital component 
in Britain’s global strategy, which kept the peace in East Asia while allowing Britain to 
concentrate on Germany. These benefits more than balanced out Japanese transgressions in 
Manchuria, for which ‘the great British public does not care a hang’.98 To view the alliance only 
in relation to Britain’s position in China, he wrote to Morrison, was to risk losing a sense of 
perspective:  
 
Now in the opinion, I believe, of all responsible people in this country, our alliance with 
Japan is and will be for many more years to come as important for British world-policy as 
it ever has been in the past, and to jeopardize its maintenance for the sake of some 
obscure questions in Manchuria would be the height of madness.99 
 
The Times, in other words, would stick with the Japanese, despite the objections of its local 
correspondents. Bland continued to plead with Chirol, while Morrison – always the more highly 
strung – terminated his personal correspondence with his editor nearly altogether, privately 
seething against the ‘craven policy’ of ‘this damned Jew’ Chirol.100   
 In an attempt to heal the rift with his most famous foreign correspondent, Chirol  
travelled to Japan in the spring of 1909, where he arranged for Morrison to join him for 
discussions with the Japanese government.101 As he noted to Lord Northcliffe, The Times’s new 
proprietor, a personal intervention might do something to ‘stem the rot’ of the public’s 
perception of the alliance.102 The two journalists received an elaborate reception in Tokyo, 
including several meetings at the foreign ministry and an audience with the Meiji emperor, an 
unprecedented honour of for a British citizen of no official standing. 103 It was to little avail. 
Morrison was neither impressed by the explanations of the Japanese officials, nor mollified by 
their hospitality. ‘Damned dull,’ he recorded in his diary, ‘I have learned nothing and gave myself 
nausea by drinking saki [sic].’104 After returning to China, he quickly resumed his tirades against 
Japan. 
 Chirol’s editorial Realpolitik was mirrored in the exchanges between the Foreign Office 
and the legation in Beijing. By 1908, the Foreign Office was well aware that Japan was 
entrenching its position in southern Manchuria. Yet despite Jordan’s pleadings, London saw little 
reason for concern. With Russia confined to the very north, and French ambitions effectively 
checked through financial partnership – extended to Germany in May 1909 – it seemed unlikely 
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that Japan’s actions would spark a wider territorial division. Nor was London much inclined to 
credit the China merchants’ fear of Japan’s intentions, which, according to the head of the Far 
Eastern department, showed ‘a high degree of vague mistrust & fear’.105 Bland in particular was 
persona non grata, with Macdonald regarding him as ‘a Jingo of the very worst type’.106 Nor did the 
prospect of an anti-Japanese crusade appeal to HSBC, where Addis took a dim view of Bland’s 
schemes: his was precisely the kind of speculative, ‘political’ railway line the Bank had disavowed 
after 1905.107 After a year of fruitless lobbying, Bland conceded defeat: ‘I don’t expect to build 
any more railways’.108  
 Yet a new railway challenge was already in the making: in September 1908, Beijing 
granted Pauling & Co. a new contract to survey an alternative route. The intended line was 
further west from the SMR, and thus less susceptible to Japanese objections. Yet once again, the 
contract contained a clause to eventually extend the line to the Russian border. Having tried, and 
failed, to gain backing from London, Pauling’s now turned to the third member of the erstwhile 
Open Door coalition: the United States. Willard Straight, Bland’s former co-conspirator, and 
now a leader of the growing anti-Japanese cabal in the State department, arranged financial 
support from a consortium of prominent Wall Street firms.109 ‘[The] Chinese Gov’t is merely 
playing Fakumen over again,’ observed Bland, ‘with America in place of England, and America 
has no alliance to prevent her claiming the open door as interpreted by themselves.’110 
 The American intervention turned the Manchurian question into a major international 
controversy. Japan, with the tacit backing of Russia, duly objected to the new railway, again citing 
China’s promise not to build railways that threatened the commercial viability of the SMR. Yet 
Washington refused to back down, and insisted instead that Japan was acting in violation of its 
pledges under the Treaty of Portsmouth, in which it had promised to uphold the Open Door. 
London now risked being caught in the middle: while it had tacitly acknowledged Japan’s primacy 
in Manchuria, it could not openly rebuff the United States. As Jordan wrote to Grey, ‘the 
slightest move on my part here would, I fear, antagonize either the Americans or the Japanese 
with both of whom it seems desirable to maintain good relations in China.’111 The Foreign Office 
initially attempted to defuse the question by offering an international partnership, a tactic it had 
worked with success in central China: Britain would participate in the line’s financing, on 
condition that Japan was also invited. While the Foreign Office was perfectly willing to work 
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with the Americans in financing new railways in Manchuria, it would not allow itself to be 
enlisted in an attempt to outflank the Japanese.112 
 Any hopes for a British-brokered compromise were dashed in November 1909, when 
the United States doubled down on its challenge to Japan. Washington now proposed to 
terminate railway competition in Manchuria entirely, by allowing China to purchase all foreign-
owned railways through a loan jointly offered by the powers. In London, the American scheme 
went down like a lead balloon.113 Internationalisation had worked in central China, yet the 
interests involved had been financial and commercial; the Manchurian lines, by contrast, formed 
the foundation of a territorial sphere, and were built into Japanese military planning. Tokyo made 
it instantly clear that it was not prepared to internationalise ‘our own property, acquired by us at 
the cost of much treasure and many lives’.114 Russia, which had retained its railways in northern 
Manchuria, was similarly alarmed, and the immediate result of the American sortie, therefore, was 
to draw the two powers closer together, ‘an effect which the State Department apparently neither 
foresaw nor intended’.115 In June 1910, Russia and Japan announced a new convention on 
Manchuria, and resolved to jointly resist any further challenges to the status quo. The ‘fiction’ of 
the Open Door, the North China Herald remarked, had been ‘tacitly dropped’.116  
 Japan emerged from the railway disputes with its position enhanced. It had seen off the 
American challenge, and secured a partnership with Russia against any new attempt to water 
down their respective Manchurian spheres. London had made it understood, moreover, that it 
did not share the rigid interpretation of the Open Door that was now preached from 
Washington. As Chirol summed up Whitehall’s views to Morrison, ‘no British interest can be 
served by attempting to maintain a pedantic adhesion to treaties in the face of hard facts’.117 
Nevertheless, acquiescence of Japanese dominance in Manchuria had several worrying 
implications. Predictably, it met with outrage among the British communities in China, who again 
saw their local interests sacrificed on the altar of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. ‘The British 
Government’s conception of policy in China seems to be to stand as flunkey while its subjects 
are kicked out through the open door,’ fumed Lord ffrench, Pauling’s local agent.118 Bland 
concurred that Britain simply appeared to accept ‘any political felony that our allies choose to 
commit’.119 The danger, as Jordan pointed out, was that continued deference to Japan would 
further undermine Britain’s own standing in China. Already, he noted, ‘we are more identified 
with the Japanese than is altogether comfortable’.120 Indeed, as the conservative Morning Post now 
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argued, if the alliance led Britain to abdicate its responsibilities in East Asia, perhaps it would be 




 Following a tour of the Yangzi valley in the autumn of 1910, Morrison wrote one of his 
last long letters to Chirol, in which he recorded a conversation with Everard Fraser, the consul-
general in Hankou, who ‘was as pessimist as a man can be’ about China’s political outlook. Fraser 
predicted that the Qing’s latest ‘constitutional experiment’ – the recent opening of a parliament 
in Beijing – was unlikely to satisfy the reformers, and would further weaken the court’s control 
over the provinces: ‘the result is almost certain to be revolution that will make China reel.’ If that 
should happen, it was clear who stood to gain most:  
 
Japan alert, ambitious, unscrupulous, was on the spot and waiting for an opportunity. By 
bullying and cajolery, by corruption and fraud she was establishing “interests” in every 
part of China… Their only object can be to provide themselves with a plausible excuse 
for intervention when the smash comes… The dynasty would be saved from its merited 
fate by Japanese assistance, and the Japanese Minister in Peking would become a kind of 
Resident-General.122 
 
Fraser’s pessimism was borne out. In October 1911, a botched bomb plot in Wuchang, adjacent 
to his posting in Hankou, sparked a general uprising that swept the Qing from power within 
months. The collapse of central authority in China, and the subsequent withdrawal of European 
power after the outbreak of the First World War, created a power vacuum that stirred the 
imagination of Japan’s expansionists. Fraser anticipated several of the so-called Twenty-One 
Demands that Tokyo attempted to foist on China in 1915 – and which Morrison helped to 
expose.123  
 Already in the years after the Russo-Japanese War, British sentiment on the China coast 
had grown increasingly resentful of Japan’s presence. Several tributaries fed into this. After a 
decade of crisis, the China merchants had welcomed Japan’s defeat of Russia in an almost 
messianic spirit, as China, they hoped, would follow the guiding light of Japan’s influence and 
abandon its anti-foreign obstructionism.  A commercial renaissance was sure to follow, 
particularly in the open Manchurian frontier that Japan had now liberated from Russian 
domination. The reality had proved disappointing. As Tokyo tenaciously defended its own sphere 
against foreign intrusion, its earlier championship of the Open Door was quietly side-lined. In 
China proper, the war had failed to yield the expected benefits; instead of asserting British 
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interests more aggressively, as the China coasters had hoped, the Foreign Office and its financial 
partners chose to wind down the railway scramble altogether. ‘One of the most notable facts 
about British foreign policy to-day,’ Bland grumbled, ‘is the failure of the Government… to 
organise and direct the use of British capital as a weapon of offence and defence.’124 
 In this atmosphere of disappointment and frustration, many of the Shanghailanders’ 
anxieties clustered around Japan, whose push into China seemed to embody the concentrated 
ruthlessness they looked for in Britain’s own policies. This was one of the reasons that many 
experienced Japanese competition as keenly as they did. Race was another. The growth of the 
Japanese presence was thought to pose a threat not merely to British commerce, but also 
prompted more nebulous anxieties over the decline of the prestige of the ‘white man’ in China, 
particularly in light of the continued political agitation among the Chinese. As F.O. Lindley of the 
Tokyo embassy concluded, it was ‘probably an excellent thing for the friendship of the two 
countries that they are so far apart’.125 In turn, the conversion of the ‘Shanghai mind’ exercised a 
corrosive effect on the general tenor Anglo-Japanese relations. It clearly worried Japan’s 
supporters in Britain: hence Chirol’s strenuous efforts ‘to stem the rot’, and stop the bile of his 
China correspondents from seeping into British public opinion. During the First World War, the 
pro-Japanese commentator E.B. Mitford similarly complained that the China coast had become a 
‘hot-bed of anti-Japanese intrigue’ and the ‘chief seat and provenance of Yellow Perilism’.126 
Some treaty-port residents went beyond complaining, and engaged in anti-Japanese crusades of 
their own. Although his role has often been overlooked, J.O.P. Bland was able to exercise a 
particularly destructive influence as one of the originators of the Manchurian railway controversy: 
the American intervention after 1909, on which historians have focused, took up the reins of his 
earlier attempts to crack open the Japanese sphere.  
  Still, the significance of all this should be placed into context. The developments in 
China certainly helped to blunt the Japanese euphoria that had dominated British headlines in the 
wake of the Russo-Japanese War. Clearly, it was no longer possible to present the Japanese 
alliance as a liberal partnership in defence of China’s territorial integrity or the Open Door. Yet 
its direct political influence was small. To Whitehall, it seemed unclear what interest, if any, 
would be served by supporting British concessionaires in their assault on the Japanese sphere. 
Instead, for the Foreign Office as well as Japan’s supporters in the offices of The Times, the cost 
of Japan’s sphere-building in Manchuria – which seemed minimal as long as the Chinese state 
was united and reasonably resilient – now had to be balanced against the wider benefits of the 
alliance. Its naval role in particular loomed large. This policy was underpinned by the tacit 
recognition that Japan, as a rising power, had a legitimate need for its own zone of commercial 
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and demographic expansion. Manchuria was the obvious place for it. The alternatives, in any 
case, as the rising controversy over Japanese emigration made clear, were likely to prove far more 
damaging to Anglo-Japanese cordiality. 
 96 
FOUR 
‘A well-nigh impassable gulf’: The Immigration Crisis, 1907-8 
 
 The growing disillusionment with Japan on the China coast was mirrored across the 
Pacific. Among the white communities on the western coast of North America, anxieties over 
the power Japan had demonstrated at Tsushima clustered around older fears surrounding 
Japanese immigration. In the post-war years, this fed an atmosphere of panic that spread along 
the length of the Pacific coast. ‘[T]he people of the whole western coast from Mexico to Alaska 
are feeling a common concern in this problem,’ one Canadian observer noted.1 From October 
1906, an attempt by the local authorities in San Francisco to segregate Japanese from municipal 
schools gave rise to an international controversy that quickly soured relations between Japan and 
the United States. During the autumn of 1907, the combination of racial panic and international 
tension combusted into violence on several occasions, and culminated in an anti-Japanese race 
riot that struck Vancouver in September. Taken together, these events gave the impression of a 
general crisis that brought immigration, and by extension the thorny question of global race 
relations, to the forefront of international politics.       
 
‘Wickedness and folly’: the immigration dispute in California 
 
 On 23 February 1905, three days after the start of the battle of Mukden, the San Francisco 
Chronicle launched the opening volley of a campaign against what it declared ‘the problem of the 
hour’: Japanese immigration. In a ‘conservative’ estimate, the paper asserted that 100,000 ‘of the 
little brown men’ already lived in California; once the war with Russia had ended, and Japan 
turned its sights across the Pacific, the numbers were sure to increase, and ‘the brown stream of 
Japanese immigration will become a raging torrent’.2 The exclusionist crusade struck a wider 
chord in public opinion. A month later, the Californian legislature in Sacramento called on 
Congress to impose new restrictions on Japanese immigration. On 14 May – two weeks before 
Tsushima – delegates of sixty-seven civil organisations and local labour unions assembled in San 
Francisco to found the ‘Japanese and Korean Exclusion League’. Exclusionist agitation gathered 
pace, and accelerated further after the earthquake that struck San Francisco in April 1906. 
Violent attacks on Japanese began to occur. Dr Ōmori Fusakichi, a renowned seismologist, 
found himself pelted with rubble on several occasions as he investigated the damage of the 
quake.3 The Exclusion League called for a boycott of Japanese-owned businesses. Finally, in 
October, matters came to a head. Following a string of newspaper reports – which a subsequent 
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federal commission found to be wildly exaggerated – that large numbers of Japanese, including 
adults, had enrolled in San Francisco schools, the municipal authorities issued a segregation 
order: henceforth Japanese and Korean pupils were to go to a special ‘Oriental’ school, as the 
Chinese students had been forced to do since 1885.4  
 The racial panic in California – which soon spread to the other Pacific states – in part 
reflected the growth and proximity of the Japanese presence. Immigration was increasing, though 
not to the degree that the alarmists feared. The Russo-Japanese War had mobilised Japanese 
society, and after the war, many stayed mobile: in 1906 alone, 30,000 passports were issued to 
Japanese migrants bound for the sugar plantations of Hawaii.5 From here, many moved – or 
were moved – to the continental United States: 10,331 Japanese entered California in 1905, 
13,835 in 1906, and 30,226 in 1907.6 By 1907, over 60,000 overseas Japanese resided in the 
continental United States. As access to California was restricted, British Columbia experienced its 
own smaller surge: 5,571 Japanese entered British Columbia in the first six months of 1907. The 
concentration of Japanese communities in urban centres, notably San Francisco, Seattle, and 
Vancouver, and their sudden arrival, often in specially chartered ships, amplified their numbers in 
the public eye: a single vessel, the S.S. Kumeric, landed a total of 2,367 Japanese immigrants in two 
consecutive journeys from Honolulu to Vancouver in July 1907.7 Yet the increase in numbers 
alone does not explain the sheer hostility with which the white populations of the Pacific coast 
responded to these new arrivals. Japanese migration to California had been growing for several 
years before the state legislature took up the call for exclusion. Likewise, a Chinese influx into 
British Columbia between 1899 and 1904, when an average of four thousand migrants per year 
entered the province, provoked a tightening of legislation, but nothing like the violent outburst 
that shook the province in 1907.8 
 It was the events of the Russo-Japanese War that darkened the ideological lenses, and 
established new associations between immigration and Japan’s capacity and imperial ambitions. 
Increasingly, Pacific coast whites perceived the Japanese influx as a deliberate ploy to establish a 
demographic bridgehead in North America. Thus for the American historian Archibald Cary 
Coolidge, the Japanese community in California formed ‘the vanguard of an army of hundreds of 
millions who, far from retreating before the white man, thrive and multiply in competition with 
him’.9 The Vancouver correspondent for The Times agreed: ‘At the bottom of the feeling towards 
Japan is the belief… that the whites are in the presence of a civilisation more efficient than their 
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own.’ 10  Such anxieties were reinforced by pre-existing stereotypes, as notions of Japanese 
‘efficiency’ and ‘clannishness’ took on more menacing forms. One particularly stubborn belief 
was that Japanese immigrants had received military training and remained in close touch with the 
military authorities in Tokyo: one concerned militia officer reported from Vancouver that the 
‘great majority’ of Japanese possessed secret stocks of arms and ammunition, and that in the 
event of a Japanese-American war, it was ‘understood’ that ‘these men were prepared to 
concentrate on the frontier and raid U.S.A. territory’.11  
 The ‘Japanese question’ on the Pacific coast constituted one vector in a broader 
realignment of Japanese-American relations. Before the Russo-Japanese War, these had been 
broadly cordial. As the country of Commodore Perry, the United States could claim a special role 
in initiating Japan’s modernisation. A sizeable portion of the Meiji elite, including the foreign 
minister, Komura Jutarō, had studied in the United States. Japan’s opposition to Russian 
expansion, which it was careful to frame as a commitment to the Open Door, resonated with 
American as well as British audiences: when Valentine Chirol visited New York in December 
1904, he noted that public support for Japan was ‘greater even than I had expected’.12 It was a 
Jewish-American banker, Jacob Schiff, outraged by Russian anti-semitism, who mediated the first 
Japanese war loan; by the end of the war, Japan had done nearly half its foreign borrowing in 
New York.13 It was at Japan’s instigation, furthermore, that Theodore Roosevelt put himself 
forward as a mediator. Roosevelt himself professed to admire Japan, and praised the Battle of 
Tsushima to Baron Kaneko - Japanese envoy in Washington and an old Harvard classmate – as 
the ‘greatest phenomenon the world has ever seen… I grew so excited that I myself became 
almost like a Japanese’.14  
 Yet already by the spring of 1905, such cordiality began to erode, amid rising concerns 
that the growth of Japanese power would prove an obstacle the United States’ own position in 
the Pacific.15 The Philippines and Hawaii, the colonial stepping-stones it had acquired in 1898, 
were home to substantial Japanese populations, and appeared vulnerable to Japanese naval 
power. The expansion of the Japanese presence in China, which many had deemed ripe for 
American commercial expansion, provoked similar anxiety. 16  ‘The possibility of Japanese 
predominance in the Pacific is viewed with incredulous irritation’, observed Lord Bryce, who 
became ambassador to Washington in 1906. 17 The suspicion that Japan harboured designs on 
the western coast of North America could be fitted into a broader pattern of real and imagined 
rivalry. Such ideas extended all the way to the president himself: in January 1905, the British 
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ambassador in Washington, reported that Roosevelt ‘wanted Japan to beat Russia, but not too 
decisively… Otherwise he feared that Japan might get too strong, and perhaps become 
dangerous… she might turn us out of the Philippines’.18 Roosevelt was even more candid with 
his friend Cecil Spring-Rice, to whom he confided that while he admired Japan, the racial 
implications of the war made him uneasy: ‘I wish I were certain that the Japanese down at 
bottom did not lump Russians, English, Americans, Germans, all of us, simply as white devils 
inferior to themselves.’19  
 Racial assumptions complicated the crisis now unfolding in California. On the one hand, 
Washington understood the sensitivity of the issue, and was sympathetic to Japan’s objection that 
the segregation of its nationals was a smear on its international status. When Japan objected to 
the order, Roosevelt struck a conciliatory note, while fuming privately at the ‘idiots’ in California 
who continued to agitate for an exclusion law. In his annual message to Congress, he lectured the 
state on the need to show cordial respect to a friendly power: Japan’s victories against Russia, he 
insisted, stood out as a ‘marvel to mankind’, while the segregation of its nationals was nothing 
less than ‘wickedness and folly’.20 In a letter to his old acquaintance John St Loe Strachey, 
Roosevelt confided that he would deploy the full force of the federal government ‘to protect the 
Japanese if they were molested in their persons and property’.21 This stance drew a predictable 
response: the San Francisco Chronicle attacked the president for siding ‘with the Japanese coolies 
against his countrymen’.22 Public bravado notwithstanding, Roosevelt broadly shared the racial 
beliefs that were voiced more explicitly on the Pacific coast. ‘[The] great fact of difference of 
race’, he believed, made the Japanese inassimilable in American society, and the presence of a 
substantial Japanese community would inevitably lead to conflict. As he noted to Strachey, ‘if [the 
Japanese] began to come by the hundred thousand it would be a very, very bad thing indeed’.23 
Japan would be treated with the respect befitting its international standing, but large-scale 
Japanese migration would have to stop: 
 
If I can get an agreement by which Japanese business and professional men, travellers, 
students, and the like, can come in and be treated precisely like Europeans, while on the 
other hand American workmen are kept out of the Japanese possessions and the 
Japanese kept out of American possessions, it will remove what is a growing, and 
otherwise a permanent, cause of irritation.24 
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 These musings would form the basis of the ‘Gentlemen’s Agreement’ that the United 
States negotiated with Japan between December 1906 and February 1907. Following the same 
logic that Australia had pursued a few months before, Roosevelt hoped that Japan would be 
willing to voluntarily restrict emigration, provided that no racial bar would be put in place. 
Selected groups of Japanese immigrants – students, tourists, merchants, and previous residents – 
would be allowed to enter freely, while labourers would be prevented from leaving Japan in the 
first place. This proved easier said than done. From the outset, Washington suspected that the 
Japanese authorities applied these new restrictions with insufficient rigour, as arrangement failed 
to reduce the number of immigrants to the extent that would have satisfied California: in June 
1907, 1,134 Japanese were admitted to the continental United States, nearly all with certified 
passports.25 This number, moreover, did not include the Japanese entering illegally via Mexico or 
Canada, where porous borders made the system easy to circumvent.26 As tempers rose on both 
sides of the Pacific, Japanese-American relations continued their downward spiral. By the 
summer of 1907, the crisis had descended into a full-blown war scare.27 On 14 June, Roosevelt 
himself ordered the navy to draw up plans for a Japanese-American war: ‘War Plan Orange’ 
joined the series of colour-coded war plans two weeks later. Jittery intelligence reports described 
Japanese communities living in suspicious proximity to railways, bridges and other strategic sites. 
Japan was supposedly scouting out landing sites along the Pacific coast. It was colluding with 
Mexico. Some even speculated that Japan might solicit the support of Southern blacks in an all-
out war on white Anglo-Saxondom.28 
 Across the Atlantic, Britain watched the unfolding rupture with concern. Up to the 
Russo-Japanese War, Britain, the United States, and Japan had enjoyed a loose partnership in 
defence of common interests in East Asia. Their falling-out raised awkward questions about how 
this new trans-Pacific rivalry would sit with the Anglo-Japanese alliance. In February 1907, the 
American ambassador in St Petersburg called on his British counterpart to ask whether, in the 
event of a Japanese-American war, the alliance would force Britain to side with Japan.29 In the 
same month, a series of articles in the New York Sun called on Britain not to side with an ‘alien 
Power against her Daughter state’.30 Equally emotive language came from the other side, as the 
Japanese papers dubbed the segregation order a ‘national insult’. It was a matter of grave 
concern, one paper noted, when the ‘accident of complexion’ was held to be ‘a mark of our racial 
inferiority’.31 J.H. Gubbins, the long-serving secretary and interpretor at the Tokyo embassy, 
                                                      
25 Raymond Esthus, Theodore Roosevelt and Japan, (Seattle, 1966), p. 197. 
26  See Chang, “Enforcing Transnational White Solidarity”; and Eiichiro Azuma, “Japanese Immigrant Settler 
Colonialism in the U.S.-Mexican Borderlands and the U.S. Racial-Imperialist Politics of the Hemispheric ‘Yellow 
Peril’,” Pacific Historical Review 83, no. 2 (May 2014): 255–76. 
27 Masuda, “Rumors of War,” pp. 10-18. 
28 Iriye, Pacific Estrangement, pp. 157-165. 
29 Nicholson to Grey, 19 Jan 1907, TNA, FO 371/270/3755.  
30 Sanderson to Hardinge, 8 Jan 1907, TNA, FO 371/270/1920. 
31 Cited in Lake and Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line, p. 174. 
 101 
reported that issue had become one of ‘race feeling’: although it had suffered similar slights in the 
past, Japan could no longer ‘tamely acquiesce’ now that it had joined the great powers. As 
diplomatic euphemism expressed it,  ‘circumstances are no longer co-operating to establish good 
feeling between the two countries… They have now arrived at the parting of the ways.’32  
 The California crisis also established a greater consciousness of racial confrontation in 
the British press. The Times leaped to Japan’s defence. That the rise of Japan had provoked 
concern, it noted, was not surprising: after all, it had established a dynamic new force in what 
heretofore had been ‘the practical reserve of the white races’.33 Yet this was all the more reason 
to treat it with the respect due a great power, and not allow Japan to be alienated by the ‘rabble 
of San Francisco… educated in lawlessness and in hatred of the Japanese for some years’.34 For 
Chirol, the issue was a pivotal one. ‘You may think I am crazy,’ he wrote to his correspondent in 
Vienna, ‘but I believe at the present moment the exclusion of a few Japanese children from 
school at San Francisco is a potentially much bigger event than would be the death of your 
Emperor-King!’35 A number of other papers, however, came out in support for California’s 
exclusionists. The Spectator noted that the desire to remain ‘white man’s countries’ was shared as 
much in Britain’s own overseas dominions as in the United States. The ‘ideal of a white Anglo-
Saxon self-governing State,’ it argued, was fundamentally incompatible with Japanese migration, 
which would create ‘a community of mixed European and Asiatic blood, founded on a mixture 
of the social, religious, and moral ideals of two continents’. It was one thing to acknowledge 
Japan’s equality in the international sphere, but on the question of race, ‘our duty in the last 
resort is to our own flesh and blood’.36 Theodore Roosevelt read Strachey’s editorial with 
approval: ‘You said exactly what I think ought to have been said.’37 Garvin’s Observer, meanwhile 
put it more bluntly: ‘The question is a racial one; the cause is a white man’s cause.’38  
 
‘Ignorant detestation of alien people’: The Vancouver riot 
 
 The wider resonance of the issue was demonstrated over the course of 1907, when the 
crisis spilled over into Canada. Since Canada’s accession to the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty 
in January 1906, Japanese nationals, in theory, enjoyed freedom of movement; in practice, Laurier 
had accepted the treaty only on the understanding that the number of immigrants would be 
severely restricted. In January 1907, the Japanese consul in Ottawa had reiterated this promise, 
assuring Laurier that Tokyo would ‘issue no passport under any pretext whatever’ to Japanese 
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labourers.39 Just as the Americans had found, however, effective control over immigration 
proved far more difficult to enforce than anticipated. Mounting restrictions on Japanese entry 
into the United States redirected a portion of the movement to Canada, where a lively trade in 
cross-border smuggling sprang up.40  This problem was exacerbated when, in March 1907, 
Roosevelt issued an executive order that barred any immigrant attempting to enter the 
continental United States via an American insular possession, effectively preventing Japanese 
immigrants from using Hawaii as a staging post for California. In response, a number of labour 
contracting companies rerouted to British Columbia. The effects were dramatic: over 8,000 
Japanese immigrants arrived in Vancouver in the first ten months of 1907, more than doubling 
the city’s Japanese population. ‘It was an alarm at numbers,’ as a subsequent report noted, ‘and 
the cry of a white Canada was raised.’41 
 The sudden influx brought out old anxieties and created new ones. The British 
Columbian press unanimously decried the Japanese influx, warning of the ‘disastrous economic 
condition a large proportion of non-assimilable, semi-servile Asiatics will bring about in a white 
man’s country’.42 In July 1907, representatives of the Vancouver trade and labour unions founded 
an ‘Asiatic Exclusion League’ modelled on those already operating in San Francisco and Seattle. 
Some of the arguments deployed by the anti-Japanese movement were familiar: ‘unfair’ 
competition in the labour market; fear that the Japanese were monopolising certain industries, 
such as salmon fishing; and the notion that ‘Orientals’ were fundamentally unsuited to a 
democratic Anglo-Saxon society. Yet anti-Japanese sentiment also drew on fear of Japan’s 
growing power, and just as it had done in California, the influx seized British Columbia with fears 
of a wider racial conflagration. The immigration crisis, according to the Victoria Colonist, was ‘a 
struggle as history cannot parallel’; just as the Roman Empire had gone down ‘like grass before 
the scythe’, so too might Anglo-Saxon civilisation fall to the ‘advance of the Orient’.43 Robert 
Macpherson, the provincial Liberal leader, had more immediate concerns. ‘I would like very 
much to keep this country White and I would also like to keep it Liberal,’ he wrote to Laurier, 
‘but it is impossible to keep either one or of the two unless the Japs [sic] are peremptorily told 
that they must carry out their understanding with your Government.’44 
 Laurier was faced with the same problem that had faced Roosevelt the previous year: the 
rise of a racial backlash that threatened to intrude on the relationship with Japan that he had 
spent the last few years cultivating. Initially, Laurier was inclined to downplay the scale of the 
problem. As he replied to Macpherson, ‘the Jap [sic]… comes with no women and with the fixed 
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intention of going back to his native country’. Therefore ‘the spectacle of an Asiatic British 
Columbia’ was a chimera.45 More importantly, Laurier was determined that this new controversy 
would not interfere with the development of Canada’s Pacific interests. Trade with Japan 
continued to be a paramount concern. ‘Vancouver, and British Columbia behind Vancouver, 
want to have their harbours developed and large cities springing on the shores of the Pacific 
Ocean,’ he replied to one correspondent. ‘They cannot however realise these hopes unless they 
open and keep commercial intercourse with their neighbours, the peoples of the Orient.’ 46 The 
choice was clear: British Columbia could either embrace its Pacific destiny and deal with Japan as 
a ‘civilised nation’, or withdraw into isolationism and economic stagnation. Exclusion based on 
racial differentiation, was in any event, no longer feasible:  
 
The Japanese has adopted European civilisation, has shown that he can whip European 
soldiers, has a navy equal man for man to the best afloat, and will not submit to be 
kicked and treated with contempt, as his brother from China still meekly submits to.47  
 
Lord Grey echoed this line to London. ‘The British Columbians are most unreasonable on the 
Japanese question,’ he reported to Elgin. ‘By shutting the door against the Japanese they are 
shutting out the door against their chance of prosperity.’48 Once British Columbia came to enjoy 
the fruits of Asian trade, the ‘engineered apprehension’ towards Japanese immigration would 
surely fade away.  
 Such a diagnosis, however, deeply underestimated the extent of the anti-Asian agitation, 
and its capacity for violence. On 5 September, a white mob of between four and five hundred 
men hounded the local South Asian community out of Bellingham, Washington, a town just 
across the Canadian border. Two days later, the violence spread to Vancouver. On the night of 7 
September 1907, a mass meeting of the Asiatic Exclusion League at city hall drew over 20,000 
people. After the meeting, a breakaway crowd marched into the Chinese and Japanese quarters of 
the city, breaking windows and smashing up storefronts. When the mob reached Vancouver’s 
‘little Tokyo’, fights broke out when Japanese residents, armed with knives and rifles, foiled an 
attempt to set fire to the local school. It was not until the morning of 10 September that the 
police managed to restore order.49 
  The Vancouver riots were the first instance of mass violence against Asians in Canada, 
and the first such outbreak anywhere in the British Empire that had primarily targeted Japanese. 
It provoked universal condemnation. Newspapers in British Columbia, ‘out East’, and in Britain 
unanimously denounced the violence, and even the Asiatic Exclusion League itself was quick to 
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distance itself the rioters. Grey congratulated Laurier on the ‘most satisfactory’ attitude of the 
Canadian press.50 Yet beyond the initial censure, the riot concentrated minds on the scale of the 
problem. Clearly, Pacific coast whites would not subordinate the racial purity of their ‘white 
man’s country’ to the liberal realignment with Japan that Ottawa had pursued. Racial 
confrontation, rather than trade, now became the dominant issue. Speaking at Winnipeg a few 
days after the riot, Hamar Greenwood, the Canadian-born MP for York, warned of further 
conflict, proclaiming that the Pacific coast of North America had become the ‘the danger zone of 
the world’. 51 Asian migration, he declared in Parliament on his return to London, ‘threatened to 
swarm on the Pacific edge of both Americas, from Alaska to Patagonia’. As a result, the demand 
for racial exclusion had become one of ‘the strongest instincts of those white men who lived on 
the frontiers of the Empire’.52 Upon hearing of the Vancouver riot, Theodore Roosevelt made 
the same observation to Strachey: ‘the English-speaking commonwealths of the seacoasts on the 
Pacific will not submit to the unchecked immigration of Asiatics,’ and ‘ought not be asked to 
submit to it’.53 For Strachey too, the riot vindicated the need for exclusion. As he noted in the 
Spectator’s editorial on the riots: ‘East is East and West is West, and both will retain their 
distinctive characteristics… it is mere common sense for the future to keep the races apart’.54 
 It remained an open question how such demands for racial exclusivity could be 
reconciled with the Japanese claim to equal treatment. As the conservative Saturday Review 
warned, migration was now becoming a key marker of Japan’s international standing:  
 
As Japan grows in strength… her attitude in such matters will become more and more 
stiff, and she will learn to regard herself more and more clearly entitled to take rank on an 
absolute equality with other civilised nations.55  
 
The Vancouver riot drew these issues in sharper contours, and presented London with an 
intricate set of competing interests and obligations. There were no immediate signs that it had 
damaged the Anglo-Japanese relationship, as Tokyo seemed satisfied with the apologies issued 
through the Canadian high commissioner in London. Yet in a wider sense, the riot had been 
highly disturbing. A mutual recognition of equality was essential to cordial relations with Japan, 
and Whitehall had thus far assumed that the racial predilections of the dominions could be kept 
safely cordoned off from the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Now, however, such cordiality stood out 
in increasingly shrill contrast to the events on the Pacific coast. ‘Diplomacy will regret, apologise 
or explain away, and our relations with Japan will continue to be as cordial as ever,’ noted E.J. 
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Dillon, the foreign affairs commentator for the Contemporary Review. ‘But below the surface the 
fire of race hatred will continue to glimmer and glow until one day it bursts into devouring 
flame.’56 Worse, the scope for an immediate remedy was limited: London understood full well 
that to try and coerce a self-governing colony on racial questions was an act that defied both 
constitutional protocol and political sense. To dictate an ‘imperial’ policy on immigration, the 
Colonial Office had already noted in 1906, would be impossible, ‘and to urge what we know they 
will refuse will cause friction and do no good.’57  
 The issue, moreover, could not be confined to Japan alone, as questions of race and 
migration also bore directly on the status of the empire’s non-white subjects. Significantly, the 
Vancouver riots had coincided with the emergence of another racial imbroglio in South Africa, 
where Gandhi’s campaign against the discriminatory pass laws was beginning to hit its stride.58 
The two issues had already become intertwined in Canada: less than a week after the riot, the 
arrival in Vancouver of the SS Monteagle, carrying a further 900 South Asian passengers, raised the 
possibility of another riot, this time directed against British subjects. ‘My Prime Minister fears 
that an émeute against Hindoos would extend to the Japanese, who would defend themselves,’ 
Lord Grey reported back to the Colonial Office, ‘and that as the contending forces might prove 
stronger than the police much bloodshed would ensue.’59 Here was an issue, in other words, that 
presented a racial fault line that ran right through both the Anglo-Japanese alliance and the 
empire itself. For the left-leaning Nation, it exposed ‘a hidden reef in the ocean of imperialism,’ 
between the settler colonies and the empire’s non-white majority.60   
 Even within a single newspaper, The Times, these divisions provoked a debate over 
whether exclusion and empire could coexist. Chirol, who had little time for ‘Socialistic’ agitation 
against Asian immigration, set the tone, praising the ‘admirable moderation and self-restraint’ of 
the Japanese, while placing the blame for the riot on squarely white labour leaders, ‘as narrow-
minded as they are selfish’. Colonial labour movements opposed Asian immigration out of 
‘conscious self-interest as much as ignorant detestation of alien people’, and were ‘absolutely 
insensible of the complexity of the empire to which they belong’.61 Yet others took issue with the 
paper’s stern line, arguing that it insufficiently recognised the breadth of support for exclusion in 
colonial society. Leo Amery protested, as did A.W. Jose, The Times’s correspondent in Sydney, 
who bristled at the implied criticism of White Australia.62 As Jose wrote to Chirol, exclusion 
represented the democratic wish of practically all Australians, not merely the labour movement, 
and if imperial unity implied a recognition of racial equality, than this was to insist on ‘an 
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impossible Empire’.63 Chirol was unmoved. Racial exclusion, he wrote to Jose, was ‘certainly an 
anti-Imperial policy, in Australia as in other Colonies,’ he wrote, ‘for it violates the principles 
upon which our rule over India is justified… You cannot expect us to endorse such a policy with 
approval.’64  
 
‘To brand their own race as inferior in the eyes of the world’: Canada’s immigration crisis 
 
 In Canada, these questions framed the larger context within which Laurier was forced to 
confront the immigration issue: the sensitivity of racial equality for Japan; the implications for 
India; and the clamour for exclusion rising up across the white Pacific. The domestic political 
climate was no less complicated. The mood in British Columbia remained restive. Immigrants 
continued to arrive; and after a brief cessation, the Asiatic Exclusion League resumed its 
activities. According to T.R.E. McInnes, a local politician acting as an agent for the federal 
government, the League was planning another mass rally in December, and also debated whether 
to field its own candidates in the upcoming city council election. If it were to organise further 
rallies to campaign for exclusion, McInnes warned, civil disturbances were practically inevitable.65 
When the provincial assembly began its new legislative session in January 1908, its first order of 
business was to introduce another exclusion law. Meanwhile, in Ottawa, the Conservative 
opposition had a field day criticising Laurier’s immigration policies, and presenting itself as the 
true champion of ‘White Canada’. Speaking at Vancouver a few weeks after the riot, the 
Conservative leader Robert Borden committed himself to exclusion, declaring that the issue at 
stake was ‘whether or no this great Pacific Province shall be dominated by a Canadian race or by 
men of Oriental descent’. In anticipation of the upcoming election, Borden had his speeches 
reprinted as a pamphlet for general distribution.66 Laurier even faced rebellion within his own 
party, as William Templeman – MP for Victoria and the British Columbian representative in the 
cabinet – publicly called for an exclusion law: ‘I want to see Canada a homogenous race,’ he 
declared, ‘and now in our formative period it is of the first importance that only such races as will 
become good Canadians should be encouraged to live and abide with us.’67 Lord Grey offered his 
sympathies to Laurier for having ‘so silly & mischievous a colleague’.68   
 Laurier was privately dismayed that the ‘abominable outbreak’ in Vancouver was causing 
his Pacific policy to unravel. He remained sceptical that the outbreak had been warranted by the 
circumstances, writing to Grey that the prime culprits were the local politicians who had 
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encouraged the ‘absurd’ notion ‘that this present influx from Japan is a deep strategic movement 
planned and organised by the Japanese Government’.69 Grey agreed that the notion of ‘an Asiatic 
Flood which will yellow the white population of B.C.’ was a figment of popular imagination, 
stirred up by populists and American agitators.70 Responding to his critics in British Columbia, 
Laurier fell back on his familiar set of arguments: British Columbia’s economic future depended 
on its commercial relations with Japan, which in turn hinged on the question of treating its 
nationals with dignity. As he wrote to the editor of the Vancouver World, who threatened to 
withdraw support from the Liberal party: ‘Do you believe you can increase your trade with them 
if you treat these Oriental nations with contempt and kick their people whenever they come to 
our shores?’ The government would not pander to demands that Canada should withdraw from 
the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty: ‘I shall not be stampeded.’71 
 Behind this show of defiance, however, Laurier was forced to admit that his Japanese 
policy was failing. While no a dogmatic exclusionist, Laurier shared the view that East Asians 
were incapable of assimilation into Canadian society, and had ‘little hope of any good coming to 
this country from Asiatic immigration of any kind’.72 He was privately dismayed that despite the 
repeated assurances by the consul-general, Japanese immigration had risen sharply over the 
course of 1907. If the number of immigrants did not fall soon, the pressure to denounce the 
treaty and introduce an exclusion law would become irresistible. Even the survival of his 
government might be in jeopardy. ‘If it were a question tomorrow between treaty and restriction 
of immigration,’ observed William Mackenzie King, one of Laurier’s confidants, ‘it would 
become impossible for a government in this country to retain office and advocate the 
maintenance of the treaty.’73 Meanwhile, there was a real danger of further violence. Another riot 
briefly appeared in the offing in January 1908, after a scuffle in the Japanese quarter in which 
several white firemen were injured.74 McInnes’s reports painted a grim picture of inter-communal 
tensions:    
 
The Japanese are many of them trained soldiers, and they have recently assumed an 
offensively aggressive attitude towards the whites. Their Consul has very little control 
over them, and it was with the greatest difficulty that he persuaded them not to hold a 
counter parade after the recent riot. If further riots occur, and a number of whites are 
killed by these Japanese, the danger will be extreme that incendiarism and massacre will 
occur on both sides. 
 
Laurier took several steps to defuse the powder keg. The first was to appeal directly to Tokyo for 
an immediate reduction of Japanese emigration to Canada. Rodolphe Lemieux, the postmaster-
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general, was charged with negotiating the agreement. A second commission under Mackenzie 
King, the senior civil servant at the Department of Labour, was to compensate the Japanese for 
damages, and to conduct an inquiry into the causes of the riot.  
 King had initially believed, like many in Ottawa, that the riot had been triggered by a 
militant minority of labour leaders and American agitators. Yet his stay in Vancouver quickly 
convinced him that feeling against the Japanese was part of a far broader ‘race agitation’. As he 
reported to Laurier, virtually all of his interlocutors feared that further Japanese immigration 
would make ‘the proportion of those people to the white population… preponderatingly great’, 
and endanger the future of the province as a white man’s country.75 Forwarding the report to 
London, Lord Grey commented that there was ‘a genuine feeling of fear which is apparently 
seizing the whole community’.76 Significantly, King’s investigations also threw doubt on the claim 
that the Japanese influx had been beyond the control of the Japanese government, and had 
mainly consisted of labourers departing from Hawaii. Among the papers of the Nippon Supply 
Company, a labour procurement firm with ties to the Japanese consulate, King discovered that a 
substantial section of the influx had come directly from Japan on certified passports.77 Either the 
Japanese government was unable to enforce its own restrictions on emigration to Canada or it 
had wilfully encouraged the recent influx:  
 
There is a good deal, I think, to indicate that Japan is desirous of becoming a great power 
on the Pacific, and it is only natural in the working out of this policy, her statesmen 
should have an eye upon the western coast of this continent.78  
 
This view echoed a fear of Japanese expansionism that was now spreading eastward from the 
Pacific coast. Even Lord Grey, who had been one of the keenest advocates of Canada’s accession 
to the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty, was now warning of a ‘a Jap invasion’ of the 
uninhabited islands off the coast of British Columbia. 79  As he wrote to Laurier, Canada could 
no longer depend on ‘the good faith and pacific disposition of the Japs [sic]...  The inevitable 
tussle between the White and Yellow races may come before we are ready for it!’80 
 This darkening mood lay heavy on the Canadian mission, which arrived in Yokohama on 
14 November. It marked a new departure: not before had a British dominion engaged with the 
Japanese authorities on immigration, and in the case of Australia, London had actively 
discouraged direct contact.81 Lemieux’s first point of call, therefore, was the British embassy. 
Macdonald professed himself ‘much impressed’ with the merits of the Canadian case, but he also 
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pointed to the difficulties. Migration was a delicate subject, particularly since the Japanese 
government had come in for sharp criticism over its handling of the California question. It was 
now under great public pressure not to agree to any further curtailments of Japanese treaty rights. 
As he warned Grey, it was possible that a settlement with Canada might require ‘considerable 
pressure’ from London.82 Fortunately, Lemieux was sympathetic to the Japanese concerns: as he 
noted to his father-in-law, the lieutenant-governor of Quebec, at its heart the question revolved 
around the principle of racial equality. ‘Les hommes d'état japonais ne veulent pas que leurs 
nationaux soient considérés les inférieurs des autres peuples; c'est là toute la question.’83  
 This sensitivity was plainly in evidence during Lemieux’s first meeting with the Japanese 
foreign minister, Viscount Hayashi, on 25 November. Setting out his case, Lemieux reiterated 
that notwithstanding the events in Vancouver, Canada still held ‘feelings of warm admiration’ for 
Japan. Ottawa would continue to disallow any anti-Japanese statute the British Columbian 
legislature might introduce. Yet such a policy was not sustainable in the long run: if another 
violent outbreak was to be prevented, Japanese immigration would have to be reduced ‘to a 
number which can be absorbed without duly disturbing the proportion of races in that Province’. 
He hoped, therefore, that Tokyo would honour the pledges given by the Japanese consul, both 
before and after the conclusion of the commercial treaty, not to award any further passports to 
Japanese labourers, and to deliver that commitment in writing.84 Hayashi retorted that the consul 
had exceeded his brief. Japan could never agree to a modification of the treaty, or bind itself by a 
convention that invalidated ‘her status of a civilized nation amongst the great powers, a status she 
had vainly tried to secure during the last half century’.85 Here lay the crux: while Japan was willing 
to restrict emigration to Canada in practice, Hayashi stressed that it would not allow its subjects 
to be subject to a binding restriction.  ‘Nothing is clearer,’ concluded Pope, ‘than that the Jap. 
Gov’t will not allow us to restrict the immigration of their people into Canada.’86  
 The negotiations had nonetheless shown the possibility of a compromise, which was 
refined at a further meeting on 3 December, as Hayashi outlined a proposal that broadly 
followed the lines of Japan’s previous ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ with the United States. Japan 
would only grant passports to specific categories of emigrants. No restrictions would be placed 
on previous residents of British Columbia, students, and tourists. Exemption would also be given 
to those hired as agricultural labourers on Japanese farms or as domestic servants. Unskilled 
labourers would not be allowed to depart unless it was under contract explicitly sanctioned by the 
Canadian government. In turn, the treaty would be upheld, and Canada would not place any 
formal restrictions on the entry of Japanese immigrants. Lemieux was pleasantly surprised at the 
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range of concessions, as he reported to Laurier: ‘I do not think it possible to get better terms 
than these.’87 
 Yet this arrangement failed to satisfy Laurier. Rankled at finding that Tokyo disowned 
the pledges given by the consul in Ottawa, he now demanded something firmer than another set 
of informal pledges. Local opinion in British Columbia, he noted to Grey, remained preoccupied 
with the ‘the idea that this province is to be, as a result of a deep plot and design, taken 
possession of by a quiet, persistent and systematic Japanese invasion’.88 Something would have to 
be done to reassure it. Laurier doubted, in any case, whether Japan’s assurances could be taken 
on faith.89 W.D. Scott, the superintendent of immigration, warned that Canada risked being 
‘duped’.90 Grey added his voice to the chorus: ‘You cannot run any risk of allowing the Province 
of B.C. to acquire too yellow a complexion.’91 In his reply to Lemieux, Laurier insisted that the 
total number of Japanese immigrants would have to be subject to a binding quota of no more 
than 300 per year. Yet as Lemieux had realised from his conversations with Hayashi, it was 
unlikely that Japan would accept a measure that singled outs its nationals so blatantly. ‘Les 
japonais n'admettront jamais par écrit qu'ils sont inférieur, comme race, aux blancs.’92  
 The negotiations had arrived at an impasse. For the next three weeks, Lemieux vainly 
struggled to bridge the divide between Canada’s demands for firmer controls and Japan’s 
insistence on non-discrimination. After several further talks with Hayashi, Lemieux extracted a 
private assurance that the total number of passports issued to agricultural or domestic labourers 
would not exceed 400 a year, on condition that this pledge would not be published. In a lengthy 
appeal to Laurier, Lemieux urged him to accept the compromise. The agreement gave Canada all 
the assurances it had asked for, and Japan could not reasonably be asked ‘to brand their own race 
as an inferior one, in the eyes of the world’.93 The British government, meanwhile, watched the 
deadlock with growing anxiety: if Ottawa’s talk of ‘yellow provinces’ and ‘systematic invasions’ 
ever became known in Tokyo, Macdonald noted, Japanese-Canadian relations would be ‘the 
reverse of happy’.94 Privately, Lemieux was frustrated at his own inability to convince Laurier 
from across the Pacific: ‘Cinq minutes de conversation avec Sir Wilfrid régleraient la situation’.95  
 Once Lemieux returned to Ottawa, and had his five minutes with Laurier, the latter 
agreed to the new ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ with Japan. The conclusion of the Lemieux agreement 
was greeted with a sigh of relief in Whitehall, while The Times praised Canada for its ‘sense of 
dignity’, and suggested that the agreement might serve as a model for solving the Indian crisis in 
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the Transvaal.96 Yet Lemieux’s tortuous negotiations also illustrated the difficulty of the new 
migration diplomacy; even in the hands of a sympathetic negotiator, it had proved difficult to 
reconcile effective exclusion with nominal equality. By making a distinction between ‘civilised’ 
Japanese students, merchants, and tourists, who would be allowed to travel through Canada 
freely, and labourers, to whom a quota would be applied, the Lemieux agreement had fudged the 
issue by making class, rather than race, the determining factor. In effect, however, the racial 
implications of the new arrangement were crystal-clear, as Lemieux acknowledged when 
presenting the terms to parliament. ‘These Orientals belong to a civilization developed through 
the centuries, along lines totally and radically different from ours,’ he declared. ‘There is a well 
nigh impassable gulf between the two.’97  
  
‘All the white races should stand together’: the Japanese question and the United States 
 
 During the autumn and winter of 1907-08, the fallout from the Vancouver riots formed 
only one element in a wider migration crisis that embraced North America and stretched across 
the Pacific to Australia and New Zealand. The American connection was particularly close: the 
Asiatic Exclusion League’s rally on 7 September, which had precipitated the riot, had featured 
several American speakers, including the secretary of its sister organisation in Seattle. The 
Canadian government was quick to point fingers at the nefarious role played by American 
interlopers: Grey believed an investigation would show that it had not been a ‘spontaneous’ 
outbreak, but rather ‘the work of Seattle & other American organisers’.98 From Washington, 
Lord Bryce reported that the riots had been ‘greatly aggravated by American agency.’99 This 
remained a common theme: throughout the crisis, Ottawa was wary that hard-line American 
exclusionists might attempt to foment further trouble in British Columbia in an attempt to spoil 
the Anglo-Japanese relationship. ‘Nothing would please these fellows more than to spoke 
Lemieux's wheel at Tokyo by another anti-Jap outbreak in B.C.,’ Grey observed to Bryce.100 This 
transnational aspect of the anti-Japanese movement posed a persistent complication. Canada 
recognised that it shared an interest with the United States in preventing further violence on the 
Pacific coast. Both had pursued similar ‘gentlemen’s agreements’ with Japan, and Washington 
repeatedly intimated that it wished to work out a common approach on the migration issue. Yet 
Canada also recognised the risks of being identified too closely with its southern neighbour, 
which had struck a rather more bellicose tone with Japan. During his mission to Tokyo, 
Rodolphe Lemieux made considerable effort to avoid being buttonholed by the American 
ambassador. ‘J'ai toutes les peines du monde à fuir le Star Spangled Banner,’ he reported back to his 
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father-in-law, ‘qui veut à tout prix s'enlacer avec l'Union Jack.’101 His deputy Joseph Pope put it 
rather more bluntly: ‘we could not more effectively ruin our chances of success than by 
[associating] ourselves with the Americans, whom the Japs [sic] hate.’102 
 The transnational solidarities evoked by the Asian immigration question have attracted 
considerable attention from historians. As Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds have put it in their 
recent assessment, exclusion was ‘an issue capable of mobilising whole communities and creating 
new transnational ones, of changing voting behaviour and political allegiance’.103  Certainly, the 
Canadian authorities were concerned about the American entanglements of the anti-Japanese 
agitation. In Vancouver, McInnes kept a suspicious eye on the ‘dangerous fellows’ from Seattle 
and San Francisco, ‘filling the minds of the people with the fear of an Asiatic invasion.’104 Unless 
their influence was curtailed, he warned,  
 
[T]he Americans, to their own obvious advantage, may egg on and secretly increase the 
anti-Japanese feeling now becoming rampant in the Province till that feeling reaches a 
stage where the British Columbians forget that they are British, and look upon their 
highest interests as identical with those of California, Oregon, and Washington.105 
 
He was not alone in warning that white solidarity might prove a stronger focus of political 
loyalties than national borders. Mackenzie King also feared that in the event of a Japanese-
American war, British Columbians would cross the border to volunteer for the Americans. ‘If 
England endeavoured to help Japan, I am not sure that there might not be a movement started 
for the separation of British Columbia from the British Empire.’106  
 In the event, these concerns proved exaggerated. It did not take much for McInnes, who 
was well-connected in British Columbia’s political circles – his father had been lieutenant-
governor – to isolate the ‘disloyal,’ pro-American elements within the League. In January 1908, 
he reported that the Asiatic Exclusion League of Canada would not attend a joint conference 
with its American sister organisations at Seattle; the entire Canadian delegation would consist of 
dissenting members from the Vancouver chapter.107 The organisers had hoped to present the 
conference as a show of solidarity, tried to gloss over the disappointing Canadian participation by 
giving S.J. Gothard, one of the Vancouver delegates, a prominent place on the dais. In the 
keynote address, the president of the San Francisco League harped on the theme of transnational 
solidarity, declaring that ‘Western America must act as a unit’ to counteract the Japanese 
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menace.108 Yet Gothard’s subsequent promise that the Vancouver League could ‘deliver a riot’ 
backfired spectacularly; his membership was suspended, and the Vancouver League officially 
repudiated its association with the Americans. While the League continued to operate, by March 
McInnes could report that it had been purged of its disreputable elements: ‘it now stands for law 
and order and strictly constitutional methods of agitation.’109 
 While Canada strained to keep the Americans at arms’ length, the United States 
continued to try and to hug the dominion closer. Washington had received the news of the 
Vancouver riot with barely disguised relief, since it demonstrated that opposition to Japanese 
immigration was not an exclusively American prerogative. As the prominent senator Henry 
Cabot Lodge noted to Roosevelt, it would ‘make England a little less inclined to preach in a 
patronizing way about San Francisco’.110 Whitelaw Reid, the ambassador in London, similarly 
hoped that Britain would now come round to the American view on exclusion: ‘they are rubbing 
their eyes in a dazed sort of way, and discovering that they are themselves a good deal deeper in 
the mire than we are.’111 For Roosevelt, who remained dissatisfied with the informal nature of his 
‘gentlemen’s agreement’ with Tokyo, and was angling for a more permanent resolution of the 
immigration issue, it opened up the possibility for securing the support of Canada and the rest of 
the British Empire.112 Writing to Reid in March 1908, the president stressed his intention to 
‘ensure unity of action between the Republic and the Empire with a view to securing the 
exclusion of all Japanese laborers… from North America and Australia’.113  
 In early 1908, Roosevelt launched a number of feelers to Britain and Canada. On 25 
January, he invited William Mackenzie King – with whom he shared an acquaintance – to lunch 
at the White House, to discuss the latter’s investigations in Vancouver. King had angled for a 
place on the Canadian mission to Tokyo and regarded his Vancouver inquiry as something of a 
consolation prize; he now seized on the chance to play the diplomat.114 Over the cause of a long 
meeting, Roosevelt did some ‘pretty plain speaking’ on the common challenges facing to 
American and Canadian governments: both desired to maintain friendly relations with Japan, but 
were forced to appease their exclusionist hardliners. Roosevelt was adamant that the issue carried 
far-reaching consequences, as few things seemed more capable of mobilising opinion on the 
Pacific coast:  
 
I believe that if the people east of the Rockies in the United States were indifferent to the 
situation and the British were indifferent to the feelings of the people of British 
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Columbia, there would be a new republic between the mountains and the Pacific, that the 
two peoples of the two countries felt their common interest in this so strongly.115 
 
 That same common interest, Roosevelt insisted, should lead the United States and the 
British Empire to take a joint position on Japanese population pressure: ‘the Japanese must learn 
that they will have to keep their people in their own country… England's interests and ours are 
one in this matter.’ Canada should make this clear to London, possibly by sending an envoy 
familiar with the situation on the Pacific coast – the obvious candidate being Mackenzie King 
himself. In turn, a diplomatic nudge from Britain, ‘spoken in a friendly way,’ might cause Tokyo 
to climb down and agree to restrict immigration by treaty, as the Americans wanted.116 In any 
event, Roosevelt concluded, it was imperative that Washington, Ottawa, and London put up a 
joint front against Japanese immigration. King subsequently accompanied Roosevelt to the 
president’s annual speech to the Washington press corps at the Gridiron club, where he did some 
more plain speaking. As King recorded, ‘the President took up the position with characteristic 
vehemence, that the brown and the white races cannot assimilate, that they must keep to their 
respective areas, and that this is a question on which all the white races should stand together.’117 
The intensity of the president’s remarks made a profound impression on King: ‘I see this whole 
country on the very verge of war.’118  
 Roosevelt’s overtures caused considerable stir in Ottawa and London. Lord Grey 
regarded the president’s belligerent rhetoric as ‘the act of a madman’, and wondered whether he 
had not already decided on war, ‘on the ground that the tussle between the Orient and the 
Occident is inevitable’.119 When King repeated Roosevelt’s remarks to Laurier, he noted that ‘the 
Premier’s face visibly changed’.120 Addressing parliament that same afternoon, Laurier distanced 
himself as far as politely possible from Roosevelt’s bellicose line. Laurier emphasised that it had 
been Canada’s policy to conciliate Japan through diplomacy, rather than threatening it with 
exclusion laws, as the United States had done: ‘We do not wish… to submit Japan to the 
humiliation of restricting her people from coming to our shores unless we are absolutely forced 
to do so.’ 121 Grey added his own assessment. Canada’s migration diplomacy had been difficult, 
but ultimately, Japan had proved a willing partner. ‘We have obtained all that we hoped for, and 
more than we wanted by the adoption of conciliatory methods. Roosevelt's hostile methods are 
not likely, I fear, to be equally successful.’122 Mackenzie King similarly believed the speech was 
designed to ‘spike the guns of the Americans’. Laurier, he thought, was lacked interest in 
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Roosevelt’s appeals to Anglo-Saxon solidarity: ‘I find in my talks with him that he is very 
suspicious of the Americans, that he regards them as selfish, self-seeking and as caring only for 
Canada in so far as it may serve their own purpose.’123  
 In their study of the transnational construction of ‘whiteness’, Lake and Reynolds place 
considerable stress on Roosevelt’s overtures, which they interpret as a prime example of the 
power of the immigration question to reorient political loyalties. The Canadian sources tell a very 
different story: rather than tempting Ottawa into a united front, the American initiative only 
served to affirm the wisdom of Canada’s own approach – and by extension, of the necessity of 
the imperial diplomatic umbrella under which Lemieux had conducted his negotiations. It was 
not that Roosevelt’s ‘Yellow Perilist’ warnings failed to resonate: many Canadians shared his 
assessment that the immigration question was essentially a georacial one, and that the exclusion 
of Japanese was a matter of bitter necessity. Yet it was clear that the kind of amorphous ‘white 
man’s alliance’ that Roosevelt was proposing carried grave risks. It would have scuppered the 
Lemieux agreement, still in a fragile state. It would also have created a severe embarrassment for 
London, which had welcomed Ottawa’s conciliatory moves. With a calculated display of loyalism 
– his parliamentary speech was peppered with references to the British connection and the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance – Laurier wasted little time in pouring cold water on the American 
approach. Since the president’s request could not be dismissed outright, Laurier played for time, 
sending Mackenzie King on a return visit to Washington in order to ask Roosevelt to clarify his 
proposals. King, who was rather enamoured of his own role as an envoy, was growing frustrated 
with Laurier’s prevaricating tactics: ‘I felt as if Sir Wilfrid even yet hardly grasped the full 
significance of the situation. I know that any fear that he has at the moment of the so-called 
Yellow Peril is a matter of the last few months.’124 
 King returned to Washington the following week to deliver Laurier’s reply, only to find 
the president even more adamant. Roosevelt reiterated his fear that the immigration controversy 
might lead to a ‘new republic west of the Rocky Mountains’ if Britain remained insufficiently 
alive to the critical state the issue.125 He also repeated his suggestion that King might travel to 
London to impress the British authorities with the seriousness of the situation: ‘Japan must stop 
forever sending her labourers into this country – this must stop absolutely and entirely.’126 He 
then handed the startled Canadian a stack of letters of introduction to his British correspondents, 
including Arthur Balfour. It was left to Lord Bryce, the ambassador, to point out that it was 
rather ‘an unusual and irregular proceeding’ for the president of the United States to use a 
Canadian official as ‘a sort of Secret envoy’ to contact the leader of the British opposition.127 
Roosevelt was undeterred, confiding to King that Bryce was a ‘good old boy’, but failed to see 
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the urgency of the racial question. The Foreign Office needed to hear from someone actually 
familiar with the conditions on the Pacific coast. As King found when he conveyed this latest 
round of indiscretions to Ottawa, Laurier was now slowly coming around to the idea of 
despatching a commissioner to London. He still, however, equivocated on the question of 
cooperating with Washington on the Japanese question. Replying to Roosevelt, Laurier agreed 
‘that whenever on this continent… labourers of Asiatic races come into competition with 
labourers of the Caucasian races, serious troubles immediately arise’. Yet he also stressed the 
need for good relations with Japan, and reminded Roosevelt that the question of immigration 
also touched on the status of ‘fellow British subjects in India’. All of this required more intimate 
consultation with London before anything could be decided.128 King himself saw Laurier’s reply 
in rather more expansive terms: ‘It is, in fact, a virtual endorsement of the Monroe doctrine on 
the part of Canada, so far as a silent invasion of the Oriental peoples is concerned.’129  
 In London, meanwhile, Roosevelt’s appeal to Anglo-Saxon solidarity met with puzzled 
concern. Bryce, who had developed a certain immunity to Roosevelt’s rhetoric, simply noted that 
‘the President now and then talks in private in a way which frightens people’.130 With the election 
looming, Roosevelt’s bellicose language was undoubtedly meant to bolster up the candidacy of 
his preferred successor, William Howard Taft, in the Pacific states.131 There was something 
strangely farcical, Bryce noted, in this scare over a war that neither side seemed to want: ‘I don't, 
I can't believe, that the Japanese would be such fools… as to provoke serious troubles with the 
U.S.’132 The Foreign Office was similarly sceptical, and rejected Roosevelt’s appeal for a joint 
approach out of hand. As Grey noted, the Lemieux agreement had addressed the problem as 
Canada was concerned; to demand further guarantees, in the form of an immigration treaty, 
would be construed as an insult. Since its initial protest to White Australia in 1901, moreover, 
Japan had kept the immigration problem separated from the alliance – an arrangement that suited 
the Foreign Office well enough.  As one official minuted: ‘In any circumstances it is extremely 
doubtful whether a friendly commun[ication] of the nature suggested… would be well received 
by our sensitive Allies, but the present moment would appear particularly inopportune.’133 
 
‘One of the largest questions concerning the Empire’: The immigration debate in Britain 
 
 Yet as much as the Foreign Office might have preferred otherwise, the controversy over 
Japanese immigration had become increasingly difficult to ignore. The rioting on the Pacific 
coast, the Japanese-American war scare, Washington’s less than subtle hints at a joint approach 
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to Tokyo, and the arc of anti-Japanese rhetoric now stretching from Melbourne to Vancouver all 
contributed to a growing consciousness of racial confrontation. As Lord Morley, the secretary of 
state for India, described it, the migration issue was fast becoming, 
 
one of the largest questions concerning the Empire as a whole, and indeed not only the 
Empire, but all white governments against all yellow, brown, and black immigrants. It is, 
and will grow to be more and more, a World Question if there ever was one… the 
Japanese introduce an element that is both new… and extremely formidable.134 
  
Its complexity lay in the fact that it touched on a wide range of strategic, diplomatic, and imperial 
issues. The first was the Anglo-Japanese alliance: a relationship that rested implicitly on the denial 
of racial hierarchies in the international system. It was highly embarrassing to find white settlers 
in the British Empire and the United States now calling for the exclusion of the Japanese, and 
framing the migration question as a struggle over the racial destiny of their ‘white man’s 
countries’. The changing strategic dimensions of the Anglo-Japanese alliance made this all the 
more significant: to meet the German naval build-up in the North Sea, the defence of British 
interests in the Pacific now fell ever more heavily on Japan – a development which the Pacific 
dominions (as noted below) bitterly resisted. Nor could the problem be divorced from the 
question of Asian migration within the empire, as Gandhi’s campaign for Indian rights in the 
Transvaal continued to gather momentum. In effect, the compromise that Chamberlain had 
brokered with the dominions in 1897 – to allow exclusion, but only on ostensibly non-racial 
grounds – was breaking down.  
 This confronted Britain with a set of unpleasant dilemmas. The Colonial Office had 
already concluded in 1906 that it would not attempt to mitigate the immigration policies of the 
dominions through ‘Imperial Legislation’: this was sure to be decried as heavy-handed 
intervention, and risked pushing the dominions into adopting even more stringent policies.135 Yet 
neither could it ignore the political implications of settler racialism: if left unchecked, London 
would risk forfeiting the sympathies of Japan, and hand a weapon to anti-colonial nationalists in 
India. In effect, noted Sir Charles Lucas, head of the dominions desk at the Colonial Office, the 
British government was steering between a white Scylla and an Asian Charybdis: 
 
The danger of it is obvious. We may conceivably have to choose between our self-
governing Dominions and the Japanese alliance; we may conceivably have to choose at 
some future date between India and the self-governing Dominions; and the matter is 
now, and will always be, one which may give cause or pretext for complaints against us 
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by the United States, and for attempts at interference on the part of the United States in 
our relations with the Dominions.136 
 
 Thus extrapolated, the question posed a conflict between several competing visions of 
Britain’s imperial future. Some believed exclusion and empire to be compatible, even mutually 
reinforcing, as barring non-white migrants preserved the ‘bonds of race’ that kept the dominions 
tied to Britain. For the young Leo Amery, for instance, the key was to arrive at a ‘practical’ policy 
to regulate immigration throughout the empire, one that recognised the exclusion was a vital 
precondition for the survival of the settler colonies. ‘When you want to grow a certain kind of 
flower in a garden bed you clear out the weeds,’ he had written to the colonial secretary in 1904. 
‘If you want a white population… you must keep out Asiatics.’137 If British policy continued to 
be governed by liberal scruples – relics of the ‘the Exeter Hall, all-men-are-equal days’ – racial 
loyalties might then prove a powerful centrifugal force.138 As he noted to Alfred Deakin, ‘I 
believe that if Australia felt that their economic and racial position was secure and was recognised 
by the Imperial Government then there would be much less of that hatred which finds 
expression… in the Sydney Bulletin.’139 
 The relationship between race, nation and empire was most searchingly explored by the 
writer Richard Jebb, who deliverd a lecture on the ‘Imperial problem of Oriental immigration’ to 
the Royal Society in March 1908. Britain ought to recognise, Jebb argued, that the desire for 
exclusion was a foundational component of the ‘indigenous nationalism’ of the settler colonies – 
and not, as liberal sceptics claimed, a purely economic policy that only enjoyed the support of 
organised labour. In the ‘Pacific Zone’, in which Jebb included Australia, New Zealand, and the 
Pacific coast of North America, white communities had recognised that ‘building up an 
indigenous democracy of the British type’ required the exclusion of all non-white immigration. 
The alternatives were either intermarriage, which Jebb believed would produce a ‘racial and social 
type inferior to the Anglo-Saxon’, or segregation, leading to a permanent Asian ‘helot class’ – ‘for 
which no place can be found in a pure democracy’.140 The establishment of a community that 
was both racially Anglo-Saxon and operated on ‘British’ institutions, therefore, demanded that 
Asian migrants be excluded entirely. Deakin, to whom Jebb forwarded a copy of the lecture, 
replied that it was the best thing he had read on the issue since Charles Pearson’s National Life and 
Character, the foundational text of White Australia.141  
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 Such a view reflected a reading of Britain’s imperial future that explicitly privileged the 
racial tie to the dominions over the empire’s non-white majority. For the likes of Amery and 
Jebb, the key danger was that colonial nationalists might identify a conflict between the imperial 
connection and their pursuit of a democratic, racially pure society. White racialism might come to 
compete with Britishness, or even form the kernel of alternative tie of loyalty to the United 
States. For Alfred Milner, speaking to the Colonial Institute in April 1908, it was imperative, 
therefore, that Britain should not be shirk from defining the imperial connection itself in more 
explicitly racial terms, even at the cost of impairing relations with what he described as the ‘other 
empire’, in Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean. If forced to choose between an imperial federation 
between Britain and the dominions, or the retention of India, Milner declared he would 
unequivocally pick ‘the distant communities of our own blood and language’.142 Similar argument 
could be heard from a number of soi-disant ‘imperialist’ newspapers, including Fabian Ware’s 
Morning Post, Strachey’s Spectator, and Garvin’s Observer: ‘the true strength of the empire,’ the latter 
declared in an editorial on the ‘Asiatic question’, ‘resides in its white forces, and in them alone’.143  
 At the same time, the racial question also seemed to offer opportunities for further 
integration, and a number of commentators hoped that the rise of Japan would force the 
dominions to realise how deeply their external security – and by extension their ‘whiteness’ – 
depended on the British connection. ‘Outside the Empire,’ noted Lionel Curtis, a leading 
member of Milner’s South African ‘Kindergarten’, ‘Australia & South Africa are sheep for the 
shearer… so long as Germany & Japan remain great Naval Powers.’ 144  The Canadian 
government, for its part, was profoundly aware that it could not have concluded its own 
concordat with Japan without the imperial umbrella. Even in South Africa, noted its governor, 
Lord Selborne, ‘Boers as well as British… are already asking themselves what answer, other than 
the influence and strength of the Empire, they could oppose to Japan if Japan demanded 
unrestricted rights of ingress for Japanese into S.A.’145 
 Similar discussions were taking place within Whitehall. In the Colonial Office, Lucas was 
particularly preoccupied with the immigration issue; as he later told Mackenzie King, it was the 
‘largest question which has yet loomed on the horizon, and that its importance could not be 
exaggerated’.146 Setting out his views in two long memoranda, Lucas noted that the British 
government, labouring under the misapprehension that racial sentiment sprang from the political 
‘immaturity’ of colonial societies, had long adopted a policy of non-intervention in the hope that 
the exlusionist impulse would mellow with time. Yet if anything, the opposite had been true: 
‘Contrary to what might have been hoped and expected, the growth of democracy and science 
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and education has not diminished but rather increased antipathies of race and colour.’ Yet if the 
racialist impulse had grown, so had Asian resistance to it, particularly since the Russo-Japanese 
War. ‘The rise of Japan,’ Lucas noted, ‘has given the Eastern races a new status which has been 
won by force and not conceded as a matter of grace.’ The implications were clear: if left to fester, 
these two opposing forces would produce a vicious cycle of racial antagonism that would tear 
away at the fissures of the British Empire.147 Something had to be done. It was useless, Lucas 
argued, for London to hope to hold back, or modify, the exclusion policies of its settler colonies; 
indeed, he held that exclusion was ultimately ‘conducive to the interests of the Empire’ since it 
maintained ‘the purity of the race’.148 Instead, Britain should play a mediating role, by trying to 
reduce the international tensions bound up in the problem. An arrangement like the Lemieux 
agreement between Canada and Japan could, for instance, be extended into a general system for 
regulating migration within the empire, giving the appearance of reciprocity.149  
 There was as yet little enthusiasm for a more activist policy. Immigration, noted one of 
Lucas’s colleagues, was a ‘thorny question’, and probably ‘of all subjects, the least fortunate’ on 
which to initiate a pan-imperial discussion.150 More to the point, dragging the immigration 
question into the public eye, and subjecting it to ‘the oratory of Mr Deakin’ – the Colonial 
Office’s particular bête noire – only risked further aggravation:  
 
The views of Colonial Govts, which simply regard the Asiatic as a nuisance, differ, and 
always must differ, fundamentally from that of H.M.G. who are the rulers of the greatest 
Asiatic Empire in the world and in touch with all the Asiatic states great and small.151  
 
The Foreign Office responded in much the same spirit to Roosevelt’s calls for an Anglo-
American partnership on the Japanese question. As Sir Edward Grey and his leading officials saw 
it, the rumours of georacial conflict had been greatly exaggerated: Japan could be relied upon to 
see that a confrontation on the immigration question would be suicidal. It was the American 
domestic gallery, and Roosevelt’s tendency to run away with his own rhetoric while playing to it, 
that was the real problem. As Hardinge commented in March 1908, ‘the President is playing a 
very dangerous game, and it is fortunate that he has such cool-headed people as the Japanese to 
deal with’.152 The best course for London was not to encourage him.  
 The drift towards a racial realignment, moreover, was held in check by other forces just 
as formidable as the instinctive conservatism of British officialdom. Those whose imperial 
careers had been shaped by India rather than the dominions remained deeply sceptical of any 
                                                      
147  ‘The Self-Governing Dominions and Coloured Immigration,’ Memorandum by C.P. Lucas, July 1908, CO 
532/9/34812. 
148 Ibid., p. 54. 
149 ‘Suggestions as to Coloured Immigration into the Self-Governing Dominions,’ Memorandum by C.P. Lucas, July 
1908, CO 886/1/2. 
150 Minute by G. Johnson, 1 Oct 1908, CO 532/9/34812. 
151 Minute by Lambert, 11 Feb 1908, CO 532/7/4970. 
152 Minute by Hardinge, 28 March, FO 371/475/10554. 
 121 
policy that seemed to unduly privilege the position of the white colonies. If Britain really did 
possess, as Milner insisted, ‘two empires’, then it had a duty not to widen the racial fault line 
between them. During the immigration crisis, such a stance was reiterated by a number of 
prominent commentators, including Lord Curzon – who as viceroy had been critical of the 
treatment of Indians in the colonies  – and Lord Ampthill, a former governor of Madras who 
now chaired the South African British Indian committee.  It was also articulated through Chirol’s 
editorials in The Times, which called on the British government to educate its colonial kin on their 
responsibilities towards the non-white subjects and allies of the empire, and not allow ‘the 
prejudices of a small local population’ to dictate policy.153 In an editorial that could not have 
made for comfortable reading in the dominions, The Times even wondered whether the white 
nationalist project was viable at all: 'With expanding Eastern races, and white races not showing 
an equally swift rate of progress but claiming a larger part of the globe, can this exclusion, even if 
it were advisable, be maintained indefinitely?'154  
 Arranging global politics along the ‘colour line’, meanwhile, also raised troubling 
geopolitical implications. As one anonymous contributor to the Fortnightly Review pointed out, if 
the white settler states persisted in tarring all Asian migrants, including the ‘civilised’ Japanese, 
with the same brush, it would risk uniting nationalist sentiment across Asia against them. The 
‘white man’s world’ risked creating its own demon in a pan-Asia: ‘let Japan be invoked by China 
as a leader and by India as a liberator: and let the black races feel that the white man is like to be 
swept back at last: and then indeed the strangest dreams of the eclipse and extinction of Western 
civilisation might come true.’155 This was a warning that echoed those sounded during Russo-
Japanese War: the surest way to realise the ‘Yellow Peril’ was to alienate Japan by raising new 
racial barriers. It was a vision that also haunted Mackenzie King, who read the article in the 
Fortnightly shortly before departing to Britain: 
 
I was thinking… of the future when Japan would help to awaken China from her long 
slumber and remind her of the insults which other peoples had been heaping upon her, 
and of the day when Japan would do all she could to further discontent in India by 
reminding the East Indians of the manner in which the door had been slammed in their 
face as they attempted to enter British territory on this part of the globe.156 
 
 Yet even among those who worried about the political effects of exclusion, few were 
prepared to argue against it altogether. Arguments about the unassimilability of Asian 
immigrants, and the necessity of exclusion for the national development of colonial societies, 
proved difficult to answer. Few believed a multi-racial society could be either harmonious or 
democratic: according to Jebb, unrestricted immigration would turn the British Pacific, where ‘no 
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inherent obstacle to the development of a pure democracy’ existed, into a version of the 
American South, sharply divided along lines of race and class. This would be ‘criminal folly’.157 
‘Viator’ likewise argued that Britain could not force the dominions ‘to commit social suicide in 
the name of justice to Asia,’ and even The Times conceded that ‘unrestrained immigration of 
Asiatics may be fatal to our civilization and even our race’.158 The key question, therefore, both 
among advocates and critics of exclusion, was how the immigration question could be managed, 
and the racial hysteria contained, without exacerbating the fault lines running through the 
international system and the empire itself. Yet in the spring of 1908, amid the widening racial 
sores on the Pacific coast and in South Africa, it was an open question whether the centre would 
hold. As Morley concluded to the viceroy, Lord Minto: ‘If you challenge me to say what I would 
do, I can only say that I don't know. No more does anybody else.’159 
 
‘Great Britain would certainly stand behind the white peoples’: Mackenzie King in London 
 
 This then, was the state of the debate when William Mackenzie King arrived in London 
in March 1908 to discuss Canada’s immigration troubles with the British authorities. The purpose 
of King’s ‘mission’ (his term) was twofold. Publicly, he was to sound the British government on 
an arrangement to restrict Indian immigration, similar to that agreed with Japan. Privately, he was 
to take London’s temperature on the Japanese question, and its policy in the event of a Japanese-
American war, the prospect of which still made Ottawa jittery. The key question was the same as 
Jebb and Amery had identified: did Britain recognise Canada’s right to maintain itself as a ‘white 
man’s country’, and would it support the dominion if Japan should object? During his month-
long stay in London, King met with Grey, Elgin and Morley, as well as with the leading officials 
from their respective offices; he also recorded the views of a sizeable portion of Britain’s ‘upper 
ten thousand’ at numerous lunches and society dinners. He kept a meticulous record, which has 
not been kept with his general diaries, and as such, has tended to escape the attention of 
historians. 160 While it is not an unproblematic source – King had a flair for exaggeration, and his 
interlocutors presumably told him what he wanted to hear – the diary constitutes a remarkable 
compendium of the views of the British elite on the empire’s racial troubles.  
  It is significant, therefore, that the vast majority of the views King recorded supported 
the dominions’ right to ‘determine the complexion of their country’, as Alfred Milner put it. 
Conservative opinion was practically unanimous. Arthur Balfour was ‘quite emphatic’ on the 
subject, and Austen Chamberlain ‘expressed himself in the most positive way… that the peoples 
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of the Orient should be prevented from coming in large numbers to the outlying Dominions.’161 
The Canadian-born Andrew Bonar Law was ‘much interested’ in King’s account of his 
investigations in British Columbia, ‘and of the danger of allowing the United States to assume a 
kind of protectorate of the British peoples on the Pacific as against Orientals’. 162 Several 
conservative newspaper editors, including H.A. Gwynne of the Standard and Fabian Ware of the 
Morning Post, ‘agreed entirely’ with Canada’s exclusion policy.163 Exclusion was also endorsed by a 
number of conservatives who nonetheless expressed their continued support for the Anglo-
Japanese alliance, including the former War Secretary, H.O. Arnold-Forster, and Leo Maxse, the 
editor of the National Review. King noted that the latter struck him as ‘strongly pro-Japanese’ and 
that Maxse was ‘very strong on the Japanese being good allies and necessary for Great Britain for 
her protection of India’. Yet in spite of this, Maxse also agreed ‘that England would stand with 
the North American continent’ in the event of a confrontation on immigration.164 Even Lord 
Cromer, whose Egyptian experience precluded a narrowly racial definition of British imperial 
interests, thought the Anglo-Japanese alliance a ‘doubtful affair’, and told King that in the event 
of ‘differences between the Orientals and the white races… Great Britain would certainly stand 
behind the white peoples’.165  
 Several prominent Liberals were even more forthright. The MP David Erskine told King 
that Campbell-Bannerman himself had been ‘very doubtful’ about the Japanese alliance when it 
was concluded, and had repeated this remark after becoming prime minister.166 He found the 
parliamentary undersecretary at the Colonial Office, Winston Churchill, especially candid: 
 
[Churchill] was very frank… being in entire sympathy with Canada in the matter of 
keeping out Orientals and said that should there ever be any difficulty between Japan and 
the United States, Great Britain would certainly let the alliance go to the winds. He hated 
the Japanese, had never liked them, thought they were designing and crafty. He could not 
bear them.167 
 
Even Morley, who as secretary of state for India might be expected to strike a more critical tone 
on exclusion, fell in with his colleagues. He told King that had he himself lived British Columbia, 
he would certainly have joined the Asiatic Exclusion League. He also reassured him that in the 
event of a Japanese-American war, the alliance would not be invoked: ‘England would not allow 
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it.’168 Indeed, as he subsequently summed them up to Minto in India, Morley’s views betrayed an 
instinctive hostility to Japan: 
 
[The Canadians] don’t much mind the Chinese. The Jap [sic] is the enemy – 
unscrupulous, perfidious, violent. Thank heaven, I never was a Jap, and I always hated 
Lansdowne's treaty. No wonder that an exclusionist policy prevails; and I much suspect 
that if you and I were not ‘Indians’ for the moment, we should be Exclusionists.169 
 
 It is tempting to conclude that in Britain too, the immigration crisis had provoked a 
growing sense of racial antagonism. On the other hand, King’s conversations at the Foreign 
Office showed a more complex reality. During his first meeting with Grey on 18 March, King 
recounted his investigations in Vancouver, and his subsequent conversations with Roosevelt, 
only to find the foreign secretary frankly sceptical. ‘Where I think the President is mistaken,’ he 
told the Canadian, ‘is in believing that the Japanese have any desire to get their peoples on to the 
American continent, or have any desire to be involved in any struggle with the United States.’170 
Japan preferred its migrants to go to Korea and Manchuria, and resented exclusion from North 
America purely on symbolic grounds. Grey subsequently reminded King that the Japanese had 
been ‘most satisfactory Allies,’ and had not attempted to ‘strain’ the alliance by attempting to use 
it as leverage on immigration.171 King’s reports did, however, force Grey to admit he had failed 
to realise just how frenzied the anti-Japanese agitation had become. As he noted to Bryce, feeling 
on the Pacific coast was in a state of ‘high fever’, and was aggravated further by a sense of 
neglect: ‘what I fear is that a suspicion may arise among the people there that, when the pinch 
comes, we shall not support them in resisting Japanese immigration.’172 Grey was careful to 
reassure King that Britain sympathised with Canada’s desire to exclude Japanese labourers, and 
would throw its weight behind exclusion if necessary:   
 
England could never stand for a struggle of the yellow races as against the white, that 
these things could not be held by treaty or anything, if there was a race struggle, that the 
sympathy would be with the white people if there was anything in the way of aggression 
from Japan.173 
 
 This satisfied King. As he noted in his subsequent report, Canada could be sure that 
Britain would not interpose the alliance as an objection if it needed to take further measures to 
restrict Japanese migration – in other words, to introduce an exclusion law if the Lemieux 
agreement should prove unworkable174While Grey seems to have intended this as a constitutional 
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clarification, King chose to interpret it as an assurance that Britain recognised the racial security 
of the dominions as a vital imperial interest. ‘That Canada should desire to restrict immigration 
from the Orient is regarded as natural, that Canada should remain a white man's country is 
believed to be not only desirable for economic and social reasons, but highly necessary on 
political and national grounds.’175 A number of exclusionists who had awaited a commitment to 
‘whiteness’ from the Liberal government shared this conclusion: Amery forwarded copies of 
King’s report to Lionel Curtis in South Africa and Alfred Deakin in Australia. Even ‘with the 
present people in power,’ he wrote to the latter, the British government had ‘definitely recognised 
not only the right but the reasonableness of a British colony wishing to remain a white man's 
country’.176 
 At the same, time King also acknowledged that such a right came with reciprocal 
responsibilities: Canada’s had a responsibility to exercise the power of exclusion with 
‘forbearance and restraint,’ and with ‘due regard to the obligations which citizenship within the 
empire entails’.177 Ottawa understood that the immigration question was an issue of great 
sensitivity in Japan and India, and that it had an obligation to harmonise its policies with the 
larger diplomatic and imperial concerns that still fell under London’s remit. The logic was clear: 
since its membership of the imperial system had allowed Canada to strike its bargain with Japan 
in the first place, it had a duty to uphold that system– particularly if the alternative was the 
cloying embrace of the United States. King understood this well: ‘The Oriental question shows 
us our position of dependence on the strong arm of Great Britain. We will have to recognise this 
and act accordingly. Heretofore, however, I do not think any obligation of the kind has been 
apparent.’178 In practice, this meant maintaining its compromise with Japan, resisting Columbian 
calls for exclusive legislation, and keeping Theodore Roosevelt’s advances at bay. In 1914, with 
the Liberals out of power, King was still able to congratulate Laurier for his diplomatic handling 
of the immigration crisis, through which Canada had fulfilled its ‘imperial obligation’ in a way 
‘more important than [the] construction of Dreadnoughts, as it has in it all the elements that 




 By the time King returned to Ottawa, the crisis was already winding down. After a 
hesitant start, Canada’s agreement with Japan operated smoothly from the summer of 1908. 
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From the monthly emigration statistics that Tokyo now supplied to the British embassy, it was 
clear that the total number of Japanese would not exceed the quota of 400: between May and 
November 1908, only thirty-six labourers left for Canada. Even the Spectator conceded that the 
Japanese government had adopted ‘a sane and far-seeing view’ of the issue, and noted that the 
alliance had helped to solve the immigration dispute in ‘an admirable spirit of conciliation’.180 The 
Canadian government was satisfied that the agreement was working. R.L. Drury, the official 
tasked with reporting on emigration from Japan, remarked on the eve of his departure in July 
1908 that he had ‘the strongest possible conviction that the Japanese Government will faithfully 
observe their part of the agreement.’181 In British Columbia, the Asiatic Exclusion League quietly 
faded from the public view.182 Under these conditions, even the dream of a Canadian Pacific 
could experience another flickering; from Japan, Drury argued that the Japanese demand for 
Canadian exports, including wheat, lead, and pulpwood, might still offer the dominion a 
prosperous future in ‘the great expansion of Oriental trade, and the growing commerce of the 
Pacific’.183 This was mirrored by a gradual Japanese-American rapprochement: in February 1908, 
Washington and Tokyo adopted a more stringent ‘gentlemen’s agreement’, under which Japan 
pledged not to issue any further passports to labourers, and to suspend emigration to Hawaii.184  
 This easing of tensions was reinforced by a shift in Japan’s policy, which now came to 
place greater emphasis on the need for emigration to its sphere in continental Asia. Setting out 
the government’s foreign policy in the Diet in February 1909, Komura, who had returned as 
foreign minister in October 1908, announced that Japanese migrants, instead of ‘scattering 
themselves at random in distant foreign lands,’ would instead receive the government’s assistance 
to settle in Manchuria and Korea.185 While British residents in East Asia tended to dislike the 
influx of Japanese settlers, most other commentators regarded Japan’s continental turn as the 
inevitable consequence of exclusion, and as such, a trend that ought to be tolerated or even 
encouraged. According to Robert Clive, third secretary at the Tokyo embassy, the creation of a 
‘Greater Japan’ on the continent was surely preferable to attempting to secure entry for its 
nationals in North America or Australasia, where their presence was ‘barely tolerated’.186 The 
Foreign Office agreed: ‘The inevitable result of checking emigration to the Pacific Slope is to 
increase it to other countries.’187 When Lemieux visited London in November 1908, Grey 
similarly told him that he believed Japan no longer had any intention to send its migrants east 
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across the Pacific: ‘They wished very much to keep them nearer home, in order to strengthen 
their position in Korea and their trade in Manchuria.’188 
 Nevertheless, the events on the Pacific coast during the autumn of 1907 left a troubling 
legacy. The immigration crisis dealt a severe blow to the optimistic belief that Japan’s accession 
to the ‘comity of civilisation’ into the international system would overcome, or at least demote, 
the problem of race. The violence in California and British Columbia had forced Washington, 
Ottawa, and London to balance recognising Japan international status against new demands for 
racial exclusion. The compromise that emerged took the form of the ‘gentlemen’s agreements’: 
an immigration regime that claimed to recognise Japan’s sovereign equality, but which effectively 
excluded its nationals from North America. Judging this preferable to a blanket exclusion law, 
Japan complied with these arrangements voluntarily. Yet as Hayashi pointed out to Lemieux in 
Tokyo, Japan still resented the imposition of new obstacles to its participation in international 
society. Since Perry’s landing in 1853, the West had spent the last half-century preaching the 
virtues of openness to Japan, ‘telling them that the only way by which they could achieve a place 
among the nations was welcoming all races to their shores’.189 The hypocrisy clearly left a sour 
taste. 
 Nor could the spectre of racial conflict, once it had been let loose on the Pacific coast, 
be detached from Japan’s wider relationship with either the United States or the British Empire. 
The crisis had offered a window on a new kind of global politics, organised along racial fault lines 
rather than national borders, and many continued to speculate about the possibility, or even the 
inevitability, of a ‘conflict of colour’. In March 1909, Lord Grey – now wholly converted to the 
gospel of the white Pacific – warned the new Colonial Secretary, Lord Crewe, that despite the 
Lemieux agreement, the situation in British Columbia remained dangerously unsettled: ‘The 
position on the Pacific Slope is certain, in my opinion, to drift us into eventual war with the 
Orient.’190 In a similar vein, Lord Morley told Mackenzie King, who returned to London in 
December 1908, that he still regarded the Yellow Peril as ‘the greatest of all questions’.191 
According to King, Morley thought the Japanese a ‘menace’, and believed ‘that the coming 
struggle is for the mastery of the Pacific on the part of the Japanese.’192  
 Insofar as the immigration crisis suggested the possibility of a racial realignment, this 
chapter arrives at a similar conclusion to that suggested by Lake and Reynolds. Yet it makes two 
distinctions they do not. First, and most obvious, conducting policy across the ‘colour line’ was a 
prospect from which all responsible parties recoiled. Despite, or because of, the warnings that 
Grey and Mackenzie King articulated, Canada took care to resolve its immigration dispute with 
Japan in a diplomatic spirit, brokering a direct compromise with Tokyo and refusing to align its 
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policy with the more bellicose rhetoric of the United States. Second, the British world, rather the 
Anglo-Saxon front touted by Roosevelt, was the crucial context in which this process took place. 
Although it conducted its approach to Japan as an autonomous mission, with little direct 
interference from London, the Canadians had been profoundly aware they were able to do so 
only because of the insulation provided by the imperial security umbrella and the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance. In turn, the events of 1907-8 also added a new rationale to the alliance itself: it now 






The Pacific Problem, 1906-09  
 
 On the morning of 9 May 1906, the new Japan came to Australia, as the training 
squadron of the Japanese navy, on its first visit to a British colony since the war, steamed into to 
Melbourne’s Port Philip Bay. During a week’s worth of festivities, Melbourne residents had a rare 
chance to rub shoulders with their Japanese visitors, ‘the victors of Tsushima, and the valued 
allies of Great Britain’.1 The city was an obliging host, and presented its guests with a full 
programme of entertainments. At the Princess Theatre, a mixed audience of Japanese officers 
and local notables were treated to a ‘fine athletic display’, featuring demonstrations of judo, 
boxing, and ‘Japanese fencing’, and even a novelty contest that pitted a local singlestick fencer 
against a Japanese officer armed with his ceremonial sword. The result was amusing, if one-sided: 
had this been a ‘real encounter,’ the Melbourne Age commented, the Australian would ‘have been 
quartered in seconds’.2 The high point of the visit was a joint parade held on 14 May, in which 
600 Japanese sailors, together with detachments from the Royal Navy and the colonial militia, 
marched from the port to the town hall, past a cheering crowd of over 50,000 people. 
Afterwards, the Japanese were taken to visit the zoo.3 In Melbourne and Sydney, the squadron’s 
next port of call, the press oozed with praise. The Age commented on the ‘alert, keenly 
intelligent, and progressive’ spirit of the Japanese. The Sydney Mail found them ‘clean limbed and 
nattily dressed,’ and thought they ‘created an openly and warmly expressed feeling of admiration 
in the minds of many’. The Sydney Morning Herald noted that Australians welcomed the Japanese 
with ‘almost brotherly feeling’, while the Evening News could only lament the ‘lack of consistency’ 
of the crowds who cheered the Japanese sailors, but otherwise insisted on the exclusion of 
Japanese immigrants.4 To Alfred Deakin, writing as the anonymous ‘Australian correspondent’ of 
the Morning Post, the visit offered an opportunity to present a different side of Australia’s stance 
towards Japan: 
 
While the "White Australia" ideal is now accepted everywhere by a huge majority of the 
people of the Commonwealth, our Japanese allies have been fêted with unaffected 
enthusiasm wherever they have landed, have been cheered in the streets, their sailors 
patted in every public place, and their officers overwhelmed with courtesies.5 
 
 Yet the celebrations could not entirely obscure the note of racial anxiety that Australian 
commentators, Deakin prominently among them, had sounded since the Russo-Japanese War. 
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The populist press whipped itself into a fit of moral panic as it contemplated sailors ‘from the 
land of the Geisha’ mingling socially with Australian women; the Bulletin even accused the 
Japanese of distributing pornographic postcards.6 One Queensland Labour senator pointedly 
refused to attend the dinner given in honour of Admiral Shimamura, the squadron’s 
commanding officer, declaring it ‘pure hypocrisy on my part to greet you with a smile, give you a 
friendly handshake… while at the same time… I do not trust you’.7 Richard Arthur, of the 
president of the Australian Immigration League, similarly rebuked his fellow Sydneyites for 
‘fussing over the very people who are going to supplant them in this country in days to come, 
and are even now spying out the land’.8  
  This chapter examines what contemporaries referred to as the ‘Pacific problem’: how to 
contain Japan’s growing presence in an ocean where Britain’s own resources were stretched thin. 
In Australia and New Zealand, the Russo-Japanese War had been a rude awakening, and 
subsequent years provoked an anxious ‘search for security’ against the rising power to the north.9 
Here, just as it had done on the China coast or in Canada, Japanese expansion – material or 
imagined – gave rise to local fears of imminent loss and displacement, and prompted new ways 
of thinking about the nature and purpose of the imperial connection. Concerns over external 
defence had featured in the politics of the Pacific colonies – isolated from Europe and vulnerable 
to attack from the sea – since their foundation: Sydney built its first coastal fortress during the 
Crimean War, and New Zealand experienced its own Russian scare in the 1880s.10 The colonial 
carve-up of the South Pacific, which began in earnest in the late 1870s, had already caused 
colonial leaders to complain of London’s neglect of their safety. Yet on several counts, the 
strategic crisis that followed Tsushima was of a different order. Japan was a far more credible 
danger than any European power, and although Australian historians have debated the extent to 
which anti-Japanese fears were merited, there is little doubt that the events of 1905 united 
Australia’s political elite (and with a delayed reaction, New Zealand’s too) behind the idea that 
Japanese naval power constituted a dire threat to their security – if not today, then certainly 
twenty years from now.11  
 Crucially, the Japanese threat combined concerns over strategic exposure with older 
racial fears. For residents of the ‘white Pacific’, the recent upheaval in their oceanic 
neighbourhood – the Russo-Japanese War, the immigration crisis, and the rise of American-
Japanese antagonism – fitted into a broader story of racial confrontation. The ‘Pacific problem’, 
one resident of Vancouver declared to the Royal Colonial Society, was one of ‘race destiny’: ‘the 
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struggle between the white and yellow peoples for world supremacy’.12 The implications of this 
were clear: the coming century would be shaped by the strategic and demographic competition 
between Asians and Anglo-Saxons over the last remaining ‘white man’s lands’ in the Pacific 
basin. Thus Sir Joseph Ward, the New Zealand premier, declared it his greatest aim ‘to conserve 
these islands for the white race,’ in anticipation of a ‘competitive war between the Eastern and 
the white races’.13 One entry in the diary of Joseph Cook, later Australian prime minister, 
captures his fear of a looming racial Götterdämmerung:   
 
Real problem of world is racial… Relation of white with yellow & black is urgent all 
round the globe. India, Africa, China, Japan & Russia, Jap & America… Will Asiatics 
allow us permanently in Asia, if we refuse them admittance? … Japanese have proved 
beyond all doubt the immense potentialities of the Asiatic renaissance for war, industry, 
colonization, sea power & thought… Japan leading India & China wd. be a menace to 
the world.14  
 
 This anti-Japanese paranoia, rooted in a racial reading of history and geopolitics, was 
diametrically at odds with the tenor of British defence policy after 1905, which was becoming 
increasingly obsessed with the growth of German naval power. Although scholars have disputed 
whether Germany was the primary driver of the naval redistribution that London initiated in late 
1904, it is clear that after 1906 at the latest, the Anglo-German race sustained a steady 
concentration of British naval strength in the North Sea.15 Meanwhile, technological innovation, 
above all the shift to armoured ‘all-big-gun’ battleships of the Dreadnought type, drove the cost of 
the naval race relentlessly upwards. Strategically stretched and weighed down by fiscal strain, the 
British government was forced to rely on the Anglo-Japanese alliance to guard its possessions in 
distant waters. Instead of a robust imperial presence in the Pacific, the Australasian dominions 
found, to their profound dissatisfaction, that their security had been effectively entrusted to the 
power they feared most. J.T. Hornsby, a New Zealand MP, voiced these concerns with 
devastating frankness: 
 
We have been handed over to the Japs [sic]. The Pacific is deserted by the British fleet. 
We have a few tin cans floating in the Pacific which we call war-ships. There is not one 
of the first-class battleships of Japan that could not blow the whole lot of them out of 
the water in twenty minutes. You know perfectly well that is true, and I want to be 
prepared for the day, which for us will be the day of Armageddon.16 
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 This sense of racial and strategic exposure fed two distinct impulses. The first, on which 
historians have tended to concentrate, was a tendency to hedge their dependence on the British 
fleet, through the development of autonomous defence forces. Nationalist rhetoric featured 
prominently in this: no nation worthy of the name, still less a ‘British nation’, could be satisfied 
with leaving its security in the hands of Japan. A tendency to connect nationhood to civic 
militarism, growing since the 1890s, was catalysed it into an unstoppable political force. 17 Others 
looked to the United States, a fellow bastion of white Anglo-Saxondom, to offset Britain’s 
withdrawal from the Pacific.18 Yet at the same time, the Australasian dominions also made new 
demands of the imperial system: London, in their view, needed to recognise that the future of the 
‘British race’ was bound up with the defence of the settler colonies, and act accordingly. Empire 
was explicitly tied to racial solidarity: ‘white Britishers against the world,’ noted The Times’ Sydney 
correspondent, was how most Australians defined the imperial tie.19 By examining several key 
episodes in the years that followed the Russo-Japanese War – including the 1908 Pacific tour of 
the ‘Great White Fleet’, the 1909 dreadnought scare, and the imperial conference on defence – 
this chapter analyses how the ‘Pacific problem’ structured ideas of nationhood and empire, and 
in turn shaped both colonial and metropolitan views of the Anglo-Japanese relationship. 
 
 Britannic nationalism and the Japanese threat 
 
 Australia and New Zealand watched the eruption of the immigration crisis in North 
America with a sense of foreboding. Japan’s protests against the treatment of its nationals in 
California left few doubts over its growing power, and its willingness to use its new clout in 
pursuit of racial justice. ‘We are face to face with this fact,’ one Australian senator remarked, ‘that 
the Japanese can dictate to eighty-five million Americans that their children shall be treated on 
terms of equality in American schools.’ 20  Calls for a more liberal interpretation of White 
Australia, voiced in the immediate aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War, now petered out: to 
anxious Australasians, the California crisis proved that permitting even a small number of 
Japanese immigrants was a recipe for social disorder, and would open the way for intervention 
from Tokyo. George Pearce pointedly warned his parliamentary colleagues to remember the fate 
of the Transvaal before allowing ‘a colony of Japanese uitlanders’ to establish itself in northern 
Australia.21 The populist press, meanwhile, readily embraced the invasion narrative that had been 
taken up in North America: ‘The Japs [sic] grow every day more insolent’, the Sydney tabloid 
Truth commented after the Vancouver riots. ‘They marched from the ship from which they 
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landed as if they were an invading army.’22 The implication was clear: there would be no 
compromises on ‘White Australia,’ and no attempt to replicate the Canadian ‘gentlemen’s 
agreement’ with Tokyo. 
 That this claim to racial exclusivity would continue to generate friction with Japan was 
obvious. ‘We are not making [the Japanese] our friends,’ noted James Allen, the chief opposition 
spokesman on defence in the New Zealand parliament. ‘We are doing everything we can to make 
them enemies by shutting out their men from our shores, and pointing to them as an inferior 
race with which we do not want our superior race to mix.’23 W.M. Hughes similarly declared that 
Australians were living in a ‘fool’s paradise’ if they failed to recognise that ‘White Australia’ was ‘a 
policy certainly irritating… to some nations, no longer to be despised or spoken of as barbarian’. 
Sooner or later, Japan would challenge it, and Hughes insisted that during the California 
controversy only the sheer size and power of the United States had prevented Japan from 
demanding an end to racial discrimination outright. Australia, with a white population of less 
than five million, and ‘within a few days' steaming distance of countries inhabited by nearly one 
billion of coloured people,’ might not be so lucky.24  Such fears fixated on the perceived 
vulnerabilities of the Australasian national projects: their position as white outposts close to the 
‘teeming millions’ of Asia; their own small populations; and the exposure of their long coastlines 
to attack from the sea. In Australia, the greatest concern of all was the tropical north, the 
exposed strategic and racial flank of ‘White Australia’, where white Australians were desperately 
thin on the ground. Debates on whether the ‘piebald’ north could ever be turned into a true 
‘white man’s country’, or whether it would need to be developed as a plantation-style economy 
using Asian or Pacific Islander labour, persisted well into the 1930s.25  
 In turn, this sense of exposure reinforced a sense of dependence on the British 
connection: the ‘crimson thread’ of investment, white migrants, and external security. ‘There is 
little that makes Northern Australia ours but the British fleet in close proximity to our shores,’ 
declared Joseph Cook.26 The Sydney Morning Herald similarly acknowledged that the Royal Navy 
was Australia’s ‘fist line of defence… a great barrier against the envy of the nations, and [a] wall 
against Asiatic pressure.’27 There was some comfort in this. Yet there were several obvious 
reasons why sheltering under the imperial ‘umbrella’ now appeared a much less attractive answer 
to Australia’s security problems than it had in the past. First, the staged withdrawal of British 
battleships to home waters after 1905 left the Royal Navy with a much-reduced regional 
presence. In practical terms, British sea power in the Pacific now leaned heavily on the Japanese 
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alliance, an arrangement that seemed ‘almost perverse’ to many Australian eyes.28 Second, doubts 
persisted about Britain’s capacity to understand or sympathise with the Australian predicament, 
particularly in regard to ‘White Australia’. Exclusion had been the subject of tense exchanges 
between Whitehall and the Australian colonies in the past, and many believed London still 
accepted the policy only grudgingly. The new Liberal government, which blew the imperial 
trumpet less loudly than its Unionist predecessor, was particularly suspect. ‘Every intelligent 
Englishman I've met out here who has given the matter any thought agrees with us,’ the 
Australian journalist Frank Fox reported to Deakin from London, ‘but the rest of the British 
people without a doubt look upon Asiatic Exclusion as a “labor fad” & are vexedly intolerant of 
it being allowed to interfere with Jap. alliances & so on.’29  
 This certainly summed up the view of The Times in London, which continued to lecture 
the dominions on the disruptive effects of exclusion. In January 1908, with the crises in British 
Columbia and the Transvaal still unresolved, Chirol again exhorted the ‘Sister States of the 
Empire’ to remember their ‘immense responsibilities’ to the rest of the empire, and not to decide 
policy purely on the basis of ‘the prejudices of a small local population.’ The Times also added the 
unsubtle reminder that exclusion would be untenable were it not for the strategic umbrella 
provided by the British fleet. ‘The Colonies that most proudly proclaim their determination to be 
white man’s countries depend absolutely on the power of the Mother Country to remain white.’30 
In Sydney, a seething Arthur Jose regarded the article as nothing less than a ‘threat’, hinting ‘that 
the British navy may not be available to help us in a White Australia quarrel’.31 The implications 
of all this were troubling. With Japan supreme in the northern Pacific, the survival of ‘White 
Australia’ – at least in its current, totalistic form – might well hinge on the lukewarm support of 
British officialdom. Australia’s own ‘manifest destiny’ in the Pacific, or even within its own 
continent, might well be permanently circumscribed. Such a future offered only a stunted version 
of the national project begun in the 1890s, and it was abhorrent to many in a society that had 
enshrined self-reliance alongside racial purity in the national pantheon. 
  These strands of racial and strategic anxiety had deep roots in Australian nationalism, 
yet as Neville Meaney has noted, it was the growth of Japanese power that brought them 
together ‘into a systemic analysis’ of Australia’s strategic position.32 Strategic exposure, and 
dependence on the British connection – ‘colonial’ in the pejorative sense – meant that the 
national project would have to be accelerated. This development was made up of several vectors. 
One was demographic: a renewed emphasis on population growth, centred on concerns over 
Australia’s supposedly low birth rate and its failure to attract sufficient numbers of white 
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migrants. ‘Population we must have,’ Sir Walter James, a former premier of South Australia, 
wrote to Deakin, ‘and unless we get it white and quickly we shall have it yellow and surely.’ Five 
million whites, as James pointed out, could hardly claim an entire continent for their exclusive 
use. ‘If I were an Englishman and looked into Australia,’ he noted, ‘I should I fear be inclined to 
think that the Commonwealth would be a more valuable part of the world if handed over to 
Japan and China.’33 A single, national immigration strategy, like that recently implemented in 
Canada, would have to supplant that of the individual Australian states. Hughes similarly argued 
that if ‘the White Australia policy is to be a permanence in this country, there must be behind it a 
sufficient force of white Australians’. 34 Again, it was the ‘empty’ north that proved the greatest 
cause for concern: Richard Arthur, the president of the immigration league, called for a 
‘Northern Australia Commission’ to develop the territory, if need be by recruiting southern 
European or even Jewish settlers.35  
 If Australia needed more people, it also needed them fitter and stronger. Proposals to 
establish universal military training for young Australian men had been mooted since the 1890s, 
but gathered new momentum after 1905.36 Deakin’s Protectionists favoured it, as did a growing 
share of the Labour party, which officially included universal military training in its electoral 
platform in 1908. The connection with Australia’s racial security was made explicit: ‘the man who 
voted for a White Australia,’ as one Labour delegate put it, ‘should be prepared to carry his rifle 
in support of that principle’.37 Pearce similarly insisted that ‘Our White Australia legislation is so 
much waste paper unless we have rifles behind it, and are prepared to back it up by force if 
necessary.’38 Civic militarism, in other words, was meant to serve a dual purpose: it would help 
secure Australia, while simultaneously instilling the nation with an ethos of civic pride, martial 
vigour, and self-sufficiency. For Hughes, who cited the ancient Greeks and modern Swiss as 
inspiration, universal training would teach Australians to rely ‘on ourselves alone’ as their first 
line of defence.39  
 This renewed emphasis on self-reliance was also evident in the naval sphere. Australia 
paid an annual subsidy towards the upkeep of the Royal Navy, set in 1903 at £ 200,000 per year. 
Per capita, this represented a small fraction (about one-fifteenth) of the navy’s costs to the British 
taxpayer. Nevertheless, the subsidy proved increasingly controversial, less because of its cost and 
more since, as a ‘passive’ form of defence, it was held to be incompatible with cultivating a sense 
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of Australian self-sufficiency. In January 1906, therefore, Deakin’s government petitioned the 
Colonial Office to allow Australia to designate a portion of its subsidy for a local flotilla for 
coastal defence – an embryonic Australian navy. Writing in the Morning Post, Deakin argued that 
the proposal sprang from the  ‘sentiment of the duty of self-defence’ in Australia. This was a 
feeling, moreover, that ‘growing stronger the more we realise our strategically perilous position 
south of the Asian peoples’.40 In London’s view, however, the scheme was positively regressive: 
in an age of global naval competition, local ‘tin-pot navies’ of the sort Deakin was proposing 
were held to be a strategic irrelevance. According to Winston Churchill, the under-secretary at 
the Colonial Office, the arrangement would ‘never provide any ships of any serious value’. 
Worse, if Melbourne was allowed to run its own flotilla in the Pacific, it might lead Britain into all 
sorts of ‘nasty diplomatic situations’.41 Nor did London share Deakin’s assessment of Australia’s 
strategic requirements. A CID report on Australian defence, published in April 1906 – 
doubtlessly hoping to set Antipodean minds at ease – concluded that as long as the Royal Navy 
remained supreme in European waters, the Commonewalth was not at risk of invasion, and at 
most needed to fortify its harbours in anticipation of a small raid. ‘The Imperial Navy must for 
many years be your main defence,’ Sir George Clarke wrote to Deakin in an accompanying letter. 
‘Its guardianship will lose nothing of reality or of power if fewer of H.M. ships remain in your 
waters… In present naval conditions, all idea of the invasion of Australia can be dismissed.’42  
 Deakin was undeterred. In December 1907, he presented a new defence programme to 
parliament, which made provision for universal military training and for the diversion of the 
naval subsidy to a fleet unit under Australian control. Without explicitly naming Japan, Deakin 
argued that Australia could no longer remain complacent in its isolation from Europe: every 
passing year brought it in closer touch with the ‘the subjects of other peoples planted in our 
neighbourhood, and with the interests of other peoples more or less antagonistic to our own.’ 
Australia now needed to preserve its ‘national life and ideals’; White Australia first among them.43 
George Pearce offered his personal congratulations on the new policy, ‘so long, and I confess on 
my part so impatiently waited for’. He considered the announcements especially timely in view of 
the bellicose noises recently made by Count Ōkuma, a former Japanese prime minister, on the 
California dispute. ‘Above all, we must watch to the North… As an Australian who wants to 
keep Australia for the white race I say “well done.”’44 
 Sheer distance meant that the Japanese threat was trotted out less frequently in New 
Zealand – one MP predicted that a Japanese invasion would remain unlikely for ‘hundreds of 
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years’45 – but here too, an Asian spectre was invoked to justify new initiatives in the pursuit of 
nation-building. Joseph Ward, who had succeeded to the premiership after Richard Seddon’s 
death in 1906, was initially sceptical of Australia’s march down the path of local navalism: the real 
guarantee of New Zealand’s security, was ‘the great and binding tie of the interests of common 
race’ joining it to Great Britain and the protection of the British fleet.46 Others were not so 
certain. Speaking during a debate on defence policy, William Massey, the leader of the 
opposition, urged his colleagues to remember ‘the developments in the East in the last fifteen 
years’. British protection might no longer suffice: New Zealand needed to prepare itself for ‘any 
possibilities that might occur’.47 The sentiment was echoed across the house: Thomas Mackenzie, 
who would succeed Ward as prime minister in 1912, similarly noted ‘the great development that 
is taking place in the East at the present time…  the Japanese demonstrated to the world that the 
white races were not invulnerable… and they are now developing at a rate unprecedented in the 
history of the world.’ New Zealand owed its present security to ‘the sheltering arms of the 
Mother-country’, yet without that protection, ‘our helplessness would become absolutely 
pitiable’.48 Allen, too, insisted, that New Zealand was not doing ‘our duty as men with a noble 
country to defend’, and should follow the Australians in seeking to develop its own naval 
presence: ‘If the Chinese and the Japanese are to have “Dreadnoughts”… then some day we 
must have them also.’49 
 This emphasis on nation-building and emancipation from a passive ‘colonial’ mentality 
clearly harked back to a tradition of isolationism, and has led some historians to interpret 
Australasia’s embrace of civic militarism as a sign of growing ambivalence about the British 
connection. Yet the point should not be exaggerated: in rhetoric and in practice, Australasian 
nationalism continued to vocally identify itself with the British world. The exponents of civic 
militarism held instilling patriotism and martial pride to be central to the development of the 
Pacific dominions into ‘British nations’.50 Thus Allen declared that, ‘as a New Zealander and a 
Britisher,’ he hoped New Zealand would do more to shoulder the burdens of its own defence, 
and join the Australians in doing its ‘duty [to] police the Pacific ocean’.51 Deakin expressed a 
similar sentiment to the officers of the visiting American fleet in 1908: ‘Those who say that we 
should sit still are not British, and are not worthy of the name of Briton. You cannot be content 
to expect defence at any other hands than your own.’52  There were also firm practical reasons 
why national Bildung accorded a central role to the imperial connection. For one, dominion 
politicians remained profoundly aware that their territorial and racial security was tied up with 
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British sea power. Deakin never intended for his autonomous naval unit to be the sole guarantor 
of Australian security: if anything, the modest flotilla that Melbourne was proposing, composed 
of nine submarines and six torpedo boats, presupposed that it would be acting in support of a 
larger British force. Deakin’s Britannic rhetoric placed his fleet scheme squarely within a larger, 
pan-imperial purpose: as Australia came of age as a ‘British nation’, it would play an ever-larger 
share in maintaining British supremacy in its own oceanic neighbourhood. After all, as he 
declared to parliament, the ‘national instinct of the sea… lives in our section of the race as much 
as in any other’.53 Nation, race, and empire would march in step.   
 This claim placed Australasia’s concerns over its racial security at the rhetorical centre of 
the British world. The logic was clear: nation-building would transform the southern dominions 
into local bastions of British power, helping in turn to preserve the global supremacy of the 
‘British race’ in the coming century. There was nothing disloyal, therefore, about seeking to 
divert their contributions to imperial defence into national forces. By extension, preserving 
Australasia as a ‘white man’s country’, and shielding it from external aggression, were imperial as 
well as national interests, and needed to be recognised as such. The young Australian journalist 
C.E.W. Bean put it trenchantly in a letter to the Spectator: 
 
Need you ask: How will the existence of a great British sea nation in the Antipodes, with 
British ideas and interests, and a big navy, affect that other forty millions of Britons in 
the North Sea? Remember, this is the last land open to the white man – the only one that 
can be purely British.54 
 
This was a claim, moreover, to which a portion of British opinion proved highly receptive. As 
Richard Jebb’s Morning Post noted, the establishment of Australia and New Zealand as 
autonomous naval powers would a momentous development, that would in turn release the 
empire ‘from dependence upon other allies in that quarter of the globe’.55 Even The Times 
acknowledged that colonial opinion, in its stolid defence of whiteness, ‘is fighting in its own 
belief for a vital principle of Imperial power’.56  This Britannic gloss did not, in and of itself, 
guarantee political harmony. There was little appetite for the schemes of imperial reform that the 
Australasians were touting: as far as Whitehall was concerned, the Anglo-Japanese alliance 
remained the best guarantee of British security east of Singapore, and dominion navies were 
unlikely to be a credible alternative anytime soon. Moreover, the racial exclusivity through which 
Deakin and others framed their appeals for imperial cooperation struck many in London as 
dangerously reductionist. ‘I laugh when I think of a man who blows the imperial trumpet louder 
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than other people,’ wrote Morley of Deakin, ‘and yet would banish India, which is the most 
stupendous part of the Empire… into the imperial back-kitchen.’57  
 
 ‘Stars and Stripes, if you please, protect us from the Japanese’ 
 
 These tensions between Australasia’s aspirations and London’s reality surfaced during 
the summer of 1908, when the American Atlantic fleet visited Australia and New Zealand as part 
of its Pacific tour. The journey had been announced in July 1907 as a training exercise, but few 
doubted that its true purpose was, as the British naval attaché in Washington reported, ‘the final 
settlement of the Japanese immigration question’.58 Concerned that American efforts towards a 
formal immigration treaty (to replace the informal ‘gentlemen’s agreement) were making little 
headway in Tokyo, Roosevelt decided to turn up the pressure by tilting America’s naval power to 
the Pacific; it was no use speaking softly, after all, while the big stick drifted on the wrong side of 
the continent. Roosevelt reiterated the point during his discussions with Mackenzie King. 
Without a credible military presence in the Pacific, Japan had been ‘taking advantage’: ‘I decided 
to send the fleet into the Pacific, it may help them to understand that we want a definite 
arrangement’.59 Such bellicose language caused concern in London: the Foreign Office doubted 
that Roosevelt was in earnest, yet the introduction of the fleet into the volatile politics of the 
immigration crisis was nonetheless troubling.  
 Initially, British anxieties concentrated on Canada: during his talks with King, Roosevelt 
had offered to send the fleet to visit Vancouver, and Laurier had received several petitions from 
prominent British Columbians to formally invite it. According to one Vancouver city councillor, 
a fleet visit ‘would be an object lesson to Asiatics and would show them that the Anglo-Saxons 
were united’.60 Indeed, given the implicit anti-Japanese motives for the tour, there is no question 
that such a move would have been highly provocative; it might even spark another wave of racial 
violence. McInnes, Ottawa’s agent in Vancouver, warned Laurier that the local Asiatic Exclusion 
League would have to be purged of its American elements before the fleet’s arrival, or another 
riot might be in the offing.61 He also urged Lord Grey to come out west, as the presence of the 
governor-general might help steady ‘the Imperial spirit of our people’, and keep ‘our young 
fellows from being too much impressed with the might of Washington and the glory of the Stars 
& Stripes’.62 Laurier needed little encouragement for caution: keeping the Americans at arms’ 
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length had been a guiding principle of his approach throughout the immigration crisis. The fleet 
would not be going to Vancouver. 
 It came as an unpleasant surprise, therefore, when Deakin circumvented the Colonial 
Office to issue an invitation of his own. After taking soundings from the American consul in 
Sydney, Deakin made a personal appeal to Whitelaw Reid, the U.S. ambassador in London, in 
January 1908: Australia was ‘deeply interested’ in the voyage of the fleet, and would greatly 
welcome an opportunity to receive its American ‘kinsmen’ during ‘their timely demonstration of 
naval power’.63 This broke protocol – the dominions were expected not to communicate directly 
with the representatives of foreign powers – but since word of the invitation had already made its 
way to Washington, Deakin had effectively backed London into a corner. ‘I do not see how we 
could possibly refuse,’ concluded Sir Charles Hardinge, the permanent under-secretary at the 
Foreign Office.64 Roosevelt was only too delighted to accept. Mackenzie King, who returned to 
Washington a few days after the inclusion of Australia in the fleet’s itinerary had been 
announced, found the president relishing the idea of turning the tour into a demonstration of 
Anglo-Saxon solidarity. ‘[Deakin] is very anxious to have the fleet visit his waters,’ he told King. 
‘It is all for the same object, to impress these other peoples [e.g. the Japanese] with the common 
interest.’65 The United States took a keen interest in the preservation of the Australian continent 
for ‘white civilization’: ‘If the population of that country is not increasing and strengthening, how 
can it defend itself against the blackbird or the yellow-skin?’66 On another occasion, Roosevelt 
told a group of visiting Canadian MPs ‘very vehemently’ that the demonstration of American 
naval power was ‘in the interest of the whole Pacific Coast, the interest of British Columbia as 
well as those of California, and it is in the interests of Australia as well.’ Asked whether he held 
the Monroe Doctrine to apply to British Columbia, Roosevelt replied: ‘Yes, and to Australia as 
well - if it is doesn't I'll make it apply!’ When word of this exchange reached London, the Foreign 
Office could only consider it ‘a mercy’ that this latest round of presidential indiscretion had not 
made its way into the press: ‘This is taller talk on the part of the President than anything we have 
had yet.’67  
 There was little doubt in Whitehall that the sight of American warships in Australian 
ports was intended as ‘a demonstration for the delectation of Japan’, and Deakin’s meddling in 
imperial foreign policy led to a great deal of official grumbling.68 When Australia subsequently 
contacted the Colonial Office with a view to inviting Roosevelt to visit Australia personally after 
the end of his presidency, one official thought the request ‘unworthy’ even by Australian 
standards: ‘To play off U.S. against us is not only foolish (for U.S. will not fight Japan for Aust'), 
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but is intended to be used to induce us to break our Japanese alliance.’ 69 Deakin was hardly 
troubled by official displeasure, again brushing over petty objections by appealing to a higher 
imperial cause. As he noted to Leo Amery, the minutiae of official protocol surely paled in 
comparison to the significance of the occasion. If the visit would help ‘to bring the great English-
speaking peoples together,’ then surely that would be ‘a very good day for the Empire’?70  
 Yet this remained a vision of empire that was framed overtly in racial terms. The 
Colonial Office guessed Deakin’s motives correctly: the fleet’s visit to Australia was meant to 
showcase the bonds between the United States and the British world, and demonstrate their 
common determination to preserve their societies as ‘white man’s countries. Writing, 
anonymously, in the Morning Post, Deakin noted that most Australians associated the visit ‘with 
the racial disputes which recently became acute’ on the Pacific coast of North America, and 
keenly sympathised with their fellow Anglo-Saxons. ‘Nowhere in the Empire,’ he noted, ‘and 
perhaps nowhere outside the Southern States of the Union is the import of the colour question 
more keenly realised than in the Commonwealth.’71 Deakin was even more candid with his friend 
Richard Jebb: 
 
The visit of the U.S. fleet is universally popular here not so much because of our blood 
affection for the Americans, though that is sincere, but because of our distrust of the 
Yellow races in the North Pacific & our recognition of the ‘entente cordiale’ spreading 
among all white races who realise the Yellow Peril to Caucasian civilisation, creeds, & 
politics.72 
 
 The visit’s popularity was indeed overwhelming. When it arrived in New Zealand on 9 
August 1908, a crowd of 100,000 people (one in every ten New Zealanders) watched the fleet 
steam into the harbour of Auckland.73 Its entries into Sydney and Melbourne drew crowds of 
over half a million. The sheer scale of the festivities, the largest public spectacle since federation, 
undoubtedly accounted for much of the celebratory mood. Yet it was also clear that the visit 
offered the southern dominions an opportunity to voice their racial and geopolitical concerns: 
many explicitly welcomed the Americans as allies in the expected struggle between ‘white 
civilisation’ and an expanding Asia. One Australian legislator believed that ‘the entire population 
of Australia regard the arrival of the Fleet as the presage of a future distinct understanding with 
the United States of America, respecting the yellow peril to the white races in Australia’.74 One of 
his counterparts in New Zealand similarly declared that he was ‘pleased America had invaded the 
Pacific’, since it would help to preserve New Zealand against the danger of ‘Asiatic aggression’. 
The United States might not owe allegiance to the crown, but ‘in every other sense’ it was ‘a 
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British Power… united with our Empire by ties of commercial, racial, and sentimental 
interests’.75 Such feelings were widely echoed in the press. William Lane, the editor of the New 
Zealand Herald, waxed lyrically over the ‘thunder of guns, and the cheering of white-faced crews’. 
Blood was thicker than water: ‘British and American will be found shoulder to when the West 
clinches in death-grip with the East.’76 Or, as some mercifully brief doggerel in the Wellington Post 
had it: ‘Stars and Stripes, if you please/Protect us from the Japanese.’77 Indeed, the torrent of 
racial rhetoric somewhat embarrassed the fleet’s commanding officer, Admiral Charles Sperry, 
who noted to his wife that he had to be careful not to encourage it further, ‘as the Asiatic 
question causes great excitement here.’78 
 This roaring reception signified how far Australasia’s perspective on global politics, and 
on Japan in particular, was shifting away from official policy in London. As the fleet left Sydney, 
the American correspondent for the Morning Post remarked that although Australia was bound to 
Japan by the alliance, there was nowhere else in the world ‘where the Japanese are more bitterly 
disliked than on the island continent’. 79  Indeed, it was impossible not to read the fleet 
celebrations as an implicit criticism of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. As a subsequent report from 
the British embassy in Tokyo attested, this was threatening to become a serious irritant in the 
relationship:  
 
the constant reiteration in the press and on the platform of the old theme of a white 
Australia and a white New Zealand which is to be upheld at all cost, and in the last resort 
with the assistance of the American fleet, cannot but be galling to a proud nation like the 
Japanese, who have recently so far lowered their pride as to consent to restriction being 
placed on the free entry of their nationals into the continent of North America.80 
 
Chirol, still a leading voice in a dwindling Japanophile chorus, privately fumed that Australia had 
rewarded Tokyo’s reasonable attitude in the immigration question by issuing a ‘demonstrative 
invitation to the American fleet’ as a none-too-subtle ‘warning’.81  
 The Australasian flirtation with American naval power was no less disconcerting to self-
declared imperialists. Lucas at the Colonial Office warned that if Britain failed to reassure its 
colonists that the empire would guarantee their racial security, there was a ‘constant and serious 
danger’ that ‘the United States may stand out… as the leaders of the English-speaking peoples in 
the Pacific against the coloured races. This is not my view alone.’82 Amery similarly cautioned 
Deakin that the fleet visit had given ‘impressionable people’ the idea that ‘the USA might be 
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Australia's stand-by in case of trouble with Japan, which is tantamount to presupposing that the 
Imperial Gov’t prefers the Japanese alliance to Australia.’ 83 The suggestion that Australia was 
welcoming the Americans not merely as guests but as ‘possible defenders’ would in the long run 
do great harm to the cause of imperial unity. Even The Times acknowledged that the defence of 
the White Pacific would prove a powerful centrifugal force:  
 
With New Zealand, British Columbia, and the United States, modern Australia believes 
herself the trustee of white civilisation in the Pacific amidst the awakening forced of the 
East. The welcome extended to the American battleships owes its spontaneity partly to 
this idea… Their welcome is the warmer that they have lately felt new doubts of 
England's sympathy and support.84 
 
 Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds have cited these tensions as evidence that the fleet 
offered Australasians the opportunity to imagine ‘a transnational fraternity of white men,’ that 
might act an alternative to the ‘hierarchical’ British imperial system.85 This overstates the case. 
Declarations of Anglo-Saxon solidarity did not necessarily indicate a desire to replace – or even 
supplement – the British connection with an amorphous attachment to the United States. The 
mere suggestion prompted several New Zealand legislators to warn that too fulsome praise for 
the Americans might cross over into disloyalty. The member for Dunedin North found himself 
‘unable to understand why we should prostrate ourselves in adulation’ before the American 
fleet.86 One opposition member similarly remarked that ‘we were asked… to grovel before our 
visitors’, as if ‘John Bull is too old and feeble now to protect us’. This was surely nonsense: ‘If the 
time does come when the white race has to fight the yellow one… the Union Jack will be there… 
on the front as usual’.87 Deakin himself explicitly denied that his invitation to the fleet was 
intended as a sign of ‘our looking for support to America instead of the Empire’. This was ‘too 
silly for words’.88 To emphasise the point, the Australian government requested a visit from a 
British fleet, ‘as impressive as possible in size and quality,’ a little over two weeks after the 
departure of the Americans.89 Nonetheless, the fleet visit made clear that the southern dominions 
were becoming increasingly assertive – and creative – in foisting their own distinct outlook on 
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The arms race and the race in arms: The 1909 naval scare 
  
 Thus far, London had paid little heed to the discontented noises rising up from the 
Pacific, but the sands were shifting. Asquith’s elevation to the premiership in April 1908 laid the 
basis for an imperial turn in British policy, as Reginald McKenna, who replaced the ailing Lord 
Tweedmouth at the Admiralty, brought a more sympathetic view of colonial concerns to his new 
appointment. When Deakin, after learning of the new occupant at Admiralty House, made 
another bid to secure Britain’s blessing for an Australian navy, McKenna proved more receptive 
than his predecessor.90 The Second Sea Lord, William May, similarly argued that there was no 
reasonable prospect that Australia would continue writing cheques for a navy kept in the North 
Sea, whereas it would spend more generously on a force it could identify as distinctly Australian. 
As he noted to McKenna, London should look benevolently on ‘a local defence force 
independently administered, but closely identified with the Imperial Navy’. Admiral May 
recognised that London had more to gain from co-opting Australia’s national navalism than 
resisting it: ‘It is desirable from an Imperial point of view that a country like Australia should 
foster a maritime spirit, and this ought not to be lost sight of.’ Besides, the creation of a local 
force might also yield strategic benefits: ‘Without some naval defence Mr Deakin's National 
Guards would be a very inadequate protection against a sudden determined attack from a Power 
such as Japan.’91 
 Strategic crisis gave these ideas force and direction. The growth of the German navy had 
loomed increasingly large in defence planning since 1905, but until now, the Admiralty had been 
confident it could retain the ‘two-power standard’, the traditional measure of naval supremacy, 
without overstraining Britain’s domestic resources. That assumption was dramatically overturned 
in December 1908, when reports reached the cabinet that Germany was accelerating its naval 
programme. The revelation that British naval supremacy might be seriously under threat 
provoked a frenzied response from the Conservative opposition and the press, and soon 
acquired the character of a naval panic spanning across the entire British world.  
  The ‘dreadnought scare’ acquired a distinct complexion in the British Pacific, where it 
brought the conflicting demands of the imperial connection and local fears of Asia into clearer 
focus. As the naval scare was reported in the press, pressure immediately mounted on the 
dominion governments to come to the assistance of ‘the Mother of our race’, as one 
parliamentarian put it.92 Little more than a week after McKenna had presented the new naval 
estimates to the Commons, the New Zealand government announced that it would bear the full 
cost of a dreadnought, and would fund another one if necessary. Not to be outdone, in Australia, 
the conservative press and the opposition called on the government to follow New Zealand’s 
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example, and provide a battleship – or several – of its own. In an effort to stir the federal 
government into action, the state premiers of Victoria and New South Wales started 
‘dreadnought funds’ to solicit private contributions. Britannic rhetoric lay heavy in the air. The 
New Zealand Herald pledged its ‘unqualified endorsement’ to the donation: ‘the unsolicited rallying 
of the Colonies round their Mother Country,’ it noted, would show Germany that Britannia still 
ruled the waves. ‘The sea is English and English it must remain.’93 The Sydney Morning Herald 
loudly joined the call for a dreadnought donation, declaring that it was Australia ‘real and abiding 
duty’ to provide for ‘the maintenance of an impregnable British navy, ready to strike at once, and 
to strike for all’.94 Joseph Cook, leader of the opposition, thought the dreadnought agitation a 
striking illustration of imperial unity, noting in his diary that the empire was ‘a coherent whole; 
not an aggregation of unrelated pieces to be jolted to pieces at the first jar’.95 
 Yet the call to rally around the Mother Country did not mean that the dormant Asian 
threat was suddenly forgotten. ‘Britannic’ sentiment drew forcefully on the argument that British 
naval supremacy remained the best guarantee of the security – and racial purity – of the 
Australasian dominions, since a defeat in the North Sea would leave the dominions at the mercy 
of the ‘teeming millions’ of Asia. In a speech a few days after the dreadnought offer, Ward 
reiterated that the dominion owed ‘the maintenance of a condition for the white race, superior 
probably to that of any other country in the world’ to the Royal Navy; its defeat ‘would sound to 
us our death knell’.96 A week later, he reiterated that his decision had been motivated by a 
determination ‘to maintain unsullied… a country peopled by a white race proud to belong to the 
Old Land’.97 The argument was made more explicitly when the gift was debated in the New 
Zealand parliament in June 1909. ‘Let the British navy be stricken in the North Sea by a German 
combination,’ proclaimed one member of Ward’s Liberal party, ‘and the vultures would soon be 
down on this country.’ It was clear which particular predator he had in mind: 
 
Consider, also, that not three weeks sail from our shores is that puissant nation the 
Japanese, with a magnificent fleet, and which, were it not that the flag of England flies 
over this country, would probably at an early date be in possession of these Islands.98 
 
In Australia, too, Japan loomed large over the dreadnought debates. Deakin, who had come out 
in favour of a donation, argued that Australia, with ‘her neighbours so close at hand’, would rely 
on British protection for decades to come.99 If Britain were to lose its naval supremacy in the 
North Sea, it would be left defenceless. Similar fears motivated Cook: ‘British naval defeat means 
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more for us than G.B.: It means for them white dominance – it means for us brown-coloured. 
The enemies of White Australia are those who will not offer [a] Dreadnought.’100 
 Nevertheless, this identification of the dominions’ security with the imperial connection 
proved bitterly divisive. Financing battleships to be stationed in the North Sea was at odds with 
the national navalism on which colonial opinion was increasingly coming to insist. Moreover, the 
Admiralty’s increasingly myopic focus on Germany meant that naval supremacy in the Pacific 
would still be left, unpalatably, to Japan. Admiral W.R. Creswell, director of the Australian naval 
force and a long-standing advocate for an Australian navy, made the point in a letter to Jebb:  
 
It is always the great Naval action in European waters that will decide Australia's fate – so 
we have always been told. Is there the same certainty now that the Jap [sic] has had the 
Pacific made over to him? How long will that alliance last?101  
 
Australia’s government, headed since November 1908 by Deakin’s erstwhile coalition partners in 
the Labour party, thought along similar lines.102 A week after New Zealand’s gift had been 
announced, the new prime minister, Andrew Fisher, pledged that Australia would do its duty by 
the empire by accelerating its own defence programme, introducing universal military training, 
and establishing an Australian navy of twenty-three destroyers. Instead of simply donating to the 
Royal Navy, Australia would make itself the ‘naval base for the Empire in the South Pacific’.103 
As Labour defended its policies against the charge of disloyalty, references to Japan again 
featured prominently. Fisher pointedly noted that naval competition might soon shift again from 
the North Sea to the ‘Near East’.104 Pearce similarly referred to the danger of a ‘nation that was 
not Germany, but was darker skinned’, and which he believed was spying out Australia’s 
northern coastline.105 Self-declared loyalists groaned with disappointment, yet found it difficult to 
dismiss these concerns about the vulnerability of Australia.  
 Even in New Zealand, where the imperial trumpet was blown loudest of all, Britannic 
loyalism was hedged by geo-racial anxiety. The attitude of the New Zealand Herald was typical: it 
supported the dreadnought, but insisted that the British fleet should not be considered the sole 
guarantor of the dominion, and that the government would have to accompany it with a drive to 
improve local defence, attract more immigrants, and introduce compulsory military training. 
Above all, it concluded, ‘Every New Zealander ought to keep constantly present in his mind the 
shutting of our gates against Asia.’106 In parliament Allen similarly argued that paying for a 
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dreadnought would neither advance the national project nor lessen New Zealand’s strategic 
exposure. Japan still controlled the Pacific ‘absolutely’, and if New Zealand was to hold its own 
when the alliance ended it needed to make an immediate start on a national defence. For Allen, 
this was both a strategic necessity and a central component of the nation-building project. ‘I 
refuse to believe,’ he declared, ‘that the national spirit of a New Zealander will allow him to rest 
in peace relying on the protection of the United States or of Japan in the Pacific.’107  
 This emphasis on national growth and racial destiny ran as a common theme through 
the dreadnought debates. The Sydney Morning Herald, which supported a dreadnought offer, 
insisted that Australasia’s ‘manifest destiny’ in the Pacific would have to be kept in view. In the 
long run, ‘whether the German menace passes or not… it will be essential that the mastery of the 
Pacific shall be in the hands of the Anglo-Saxon race.’108 Ultimately, the ‘Pacific question’ would 
only be resolved through the continued evolution of the dominions into strong, populous white 
states, capable of looking after their own defence. ‘It is essential for our very existence,’ noted the 
New Zealand correspondent of The Times, ‘that we should commence to-day to lay the 
foundations of a power that will render us immune from any alien menace in the future.’109 Yet 
although the naval crisis provoked intense controversy in Australia and New Zealand, yet it is 
important to stress that the defence debates were hemmed in by a set of common assumptions. 
The first was the latent threat of Japan to White Australasia, which both the advocates of a local 
navy and of an imperial contribution enlisted in their arguments. The second was that in the long 
term, the security of the southern dominions – and hence the future of the ‘British race’ in the 
Pacific – could only be secured through a continuous nation-building project at home. The third 
was that until that project was complete, the strategic and racial security of the Australasian 
dominions relied on the British fleet, and even afterwards, the future of the nation would be 
inextricably bound up with that of the British world-system as a whole. As Charles Lucas, whose 
tour of the two Australasian dominions had largely coincided with the local naval debates, 
reported to the Colonial Office: ‘it seems to me that Australian Nationalism and Australian 
Imperialism are the two most compatible things in the world.’110 
  
 
‘You might as well ask us to separate ourselves from the Empire’: The 1909 Defence Conference 
  
  Meanwhile in London, the naval scare and the heated debates that followed it in 
Australia, New Zealand, and Canada forced a rethink on several key issues of imperial defence. 
Asquith’s government, battle-scarred from its own internal struggles over the fiscal burden of the 
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naval race, now recognised that it might be able to persuade the dominions to bear a greater 
share of the cost of imperial defence.111 Yet doing so also meant revisiting wider issues of 
national control and naval strategy. Accordingly, Asquith announced that the British government 
would hold a consultation with the dominions in July 1909, with a view to developing a new 
naval arrangement. The Admiralty’s challenge now was to strike a balance between politics and 
strategy: direct financial contributions were no longer politically viable, but the ‘tin-pot’ navies 
that Australia and Canada had mooted as an alternative seemed unlikely to make a substantive 
contribution to imperial defence.112 In a wider sense, it was dawning on Whitehall that any new 
pan-imperial arrangement would have to reconcile the strategic demands of Britain with those of 
the dominions. As the ranking civil servant at the Admiralty subsequently remarked: 
 
something had to be done to meet Australian and New Zealand nervousness who did not 
like being with no large armoured ships in the Far East… it is the dread of the Japanese 
which is at the bottom of the matter.113  
 
 The upshot was an ambitious proposal, cobbled together in the weeks before the 
conference, to re-establish a substantial British naval presence in the Pacific. It provided for a 
Pacific fleet, composed of a series of ‘fleet units’, stationed on Sydney, Singapore, Hong Kong, 
and Vancouver, operated as required by the Royal Navy or the individual dominions. Each unit 
would consist of a battlecruiser of the newest type plus the necessary support ships, allowing 
them to operate independently to deter raids, or join together to form a grand Pacific fleet, ‘thus 
relieving the Imperial fleet of direct responsibility in distant seas’.114 From the perspective of the 
traditional historiography on imperial defence, which has concentrated on Germany, this appears 
a curious aberration: even if the Sydney unit would be entirely run by the Australians, the 
Admiralty would still be committing itself to maintaining twenty-six vessels in Asian waters. The 
total expenditure amounted up to £ 5,500,000 over four years. This hardly squared with the 
Admiralty’s dire warnings about the imminent loss of British naval supremacy in Europe not six 
months ago. The likeliest explanation appears to be that suggested by Nicholas Lambert: the 
Admiralty, and above all the First Sea Lord, Sir John Fisher, remained committed to maintaining 
British naval supremacy on a global scale, yet kept the German naval menace prominently in view 
as its first line of defence against a Liberal attack on its budget. The scheme for the Pacific fleet, 
where the Admiralty was able to move into a policy vacuum, showed the true nature of its 
ambitions.115 Fisher, certainly, was ecstatic: ‘It means eventually Canada, Australia, New Zealand, 
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the Cape (South Africa), and India running a complete Navy! We manage the job in Europe. They’ll 
manage it against the Yankees, Japs [sic], and Chinese, as occasion requires out there!’116  
 It is possible that Asquith accepted the scheme, without realising its full fiscal 
implications, as a ready-made solution to forestall an embarrassing confrontation at the 
upcoming conference. In this respect, it certainly succeeded. Ward, who personally headed the 
New Zealand delegation, immediately agreed to bring his government’s policies into line with the 
new scheme. So, after some wavering, did the Australians. Colonel Foxton, the Australian 
representative, agreed that the Admiralty’s proposal fitted the Commonwealth’s strategic needs in 
the Pacific, and proceeded to spell out what these were: 
 
there is always present with us in Australia – and the same remark applies with equal 
force to New Zealand – the fact that we are in close proximity to the teeming millions of 
the two great Asiatic powers. The awakening of the East has very great significance for 
Australia and New Zealand… we have to look far into the future, and there might be 
possibilities in that connection which it is necessary for us to make provision for.117  
 
This was a familiar analysis of the racial danger to Australia – albeit expressed in milder terms 
than customary in the Commonwealth. Ward endorsed this view: New Zealand looked with 
foreboding to the day ‘when the Eastern races are a trouble to Australia and to my own 
country’.118 The creation of a Pacific fleet, he thought, would offer a degree of protection, and 
eventually would relieve Britain of having to rely on the Japanese alliance. Although Ward 
referred to Japan in highly circumspect terms – ‘a country happily attached to England… against 
which I am not saying a word’ – he nonetheless made it clear that he could not indefinitely accept 
the alliance as a substitute for British naval power: ‘We should have no doubt as to who are to be 
the controllers of the Pacific in the years to come. It should from every standpoint be the British 
Empire.’119 
 Racial sentiment shaped discussion at the conference in several ways. At one level, it 
expressed itself as a confident assertion that the unity of the ‘British race’ transcended the 
formalities of self-government. In one instance, the Colonial Secretary, Lord Crewe, noted that a 
formal obligation to assist the Mother Country in wartime would be unnecessary – the 
Canadians, in particular, rejected this as undemocratic – since he was confident that the 
dominions would offer their support ‘in 999 cases out of a 1000’.120 Yet tellingly, the one scenario 
that did provoke controversy was the one in which the dominions’ racial loyalties might clash 
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with their attachment to the empire. John Merriman, the premier of the Cape Colony, put it 
frankly:  
 
Supposing that by any misfortune or mischance your alliance with Japan was to bring you 
into collision with the United States… do you suppose that any colonist would for a 
single moment send an expeditionary force to help an Eastern Power? Never!121 
 
Ward agreed that New Zealand could never ‘send an expeditionary force to assist in helping the 
Eastern races, you might just as well ask us to separate ourselves from the British Empire. It 
would meet a refusal point blank.’122 
 The conference offered a potent illustration of how the dominions had come to define 
their Britannic loyalism through the prism of race. As ‘British nations’, they were prepared to 
shoulder an increasingly larger share of the burdens of imperial defence, and looked forward to 
the day when they – and not the Japanese – would uphold British supremacy in the Pacific. Yet 
as events since 1905 had made clear, this commitment did not imply an unqualified 
subordination to the strategic consensus that prevailed in Whitehall. There was a basic 
expectation of reciprocity: imperial cooperation on defence was meant to serve not merely the 
safety of the British Isles, but also the consolidation and expansion of the ‘British race’ 
demographic frontier in the settler colonies. Jan Smuts, representing the Transvaal, echoed the 
latter point: the South African colonies, he argued, contributed to imperial defence by preserving 
a strategic white foothold against their ‘internal enemy’.123 Racial parochialism was fitted into an 
expansive vision of the British Empire, as a polity maintained for and by a global family of 
‘British peoples’. It was an appealing image, which, for the moment at least, had appeared to yield 
real political results.  
    The defence settlement marked the culmination of the debate over Pacific security 
waged in the wake of Tsushima. As Joseph Cook, now defence minister in Deakin’s new 
government, declared to parliament, it had been a ‘family council’, which had produced ‘a hearty 
and cordial response… by all overseas members of the family’.124 The new naval scheme 
appeared to combine the best of both worlds: it promised the development of a national navy 
within a wider British commitment to the Pacific – the combination between nationalism and 
racial solidarity that Deakin had sought. ‘It is an arrangement by which the younger nations of 
the Empire – those that are now dependencies – so to speak – will become partners’, as Massey 
in New Zealand endorsed it.125 The promise to re-establish a significant British naval presence 
east of Singapore – thirty-nine vessels, including three battlecruisers – seemed to signal that the 
British government had taken colonial anxieties about Japan to heart. In turn, the dominions 
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would help offset Britain’s dependence on the Japanese alliance: as Cook told parliament, it was 
Australia’s ‘duty as an integral portion of the Empire’ to be the bulwark of British power in the 
Pacific, ‘now as important from a naval point of view as are the waters of the Mediterranean and 
the Atlantic’.126 In military terms too, the aftermath of the conference marked a shift towards the 
consolidation of civic militarism: in what the Round Table described as ‘a striking testimony to the 
determination of the Australasian people to preserve their countries for the white races,’ both 
Australia and New Zealand introduced universal military training by the end of 1909.127 During 
the Pacific tour of the American fleet, it briefly appeared as though the Australasians’ Asian 
paranoia might become a growing source of inter-imperial friction. Instead, the naval crisis and 
its aftermath reaffirmed, in bold rhetorical strokes, the nexus between race and Britishness.  
 No doubt encouraged by the formation of the new naval arrangement, Deakin launched 
a further ballon d’essai, aimed at shoring up the international order in the Pacific. The initiative 
came from Dr Richard Arthur, the head of the Immigration League, who had long shared 
Deakin’s anxieties about the exposure of Australia’s tropical north to Japanese power: ‘The 
question of the future of Australia is becoming almost an obsession with me.’ 128 Although the 
new naval arrangement was a step in the right direction, the state of the Pacific remained 
unsettled, and dependent on the precarious balance in Europe. Arthur’s proposal, therefore, was 
a general pact, involving Britain, the United States, and possibly France and the Netherlands, to 
freeze the territorial status quo, and establish ‘an international fleet of Dreadnoughts’ for that 
purpose: ‘such an agreement would have a wonderfully sedative effect in the Pacific’. 129 
‘International’ meaning, in this case, anyone but the Japanese. Arthur made the same case in an 
article circulated to several Australian newspapers.130 The scheme spoke to Deakin’s imagination: 
he himself, after all, had speculated about a Pacific “entente cordiale’ between all white races’ 
little over a year before. A few days after receiving Arthur’s letter, he repeated the proposal to the 
colonial secretary, Lord Crewe, as a ‘proposition of the highest international proportions’. The 
British government, Deakin suggested might consider initiating what he described as an 
‘extension of the Monroe Doctrine to all the countries around the Pacific Ocean,’ supported ‘by 
the guarantees of the British Empire, Holland, France, and China added to that of the United 
States’. Such an agreement, he noted, would be ‘of inestimable service to the empire’. Pointedly, 
Deakin’s scheme excluded Japan and Germany, the two powers against it was rather 
transparently directed.131 
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 The ‘Monroe doctrine’ proposal represented Deakin’s latest attempt to readjust British 
diplomacy to suit his own racial convictions. Once again, the Colonial Office was unimpressed. 
Lucas, recently returned from Australia, thought it was ‘a most interesting letter’ – a backhanded 
compliment at the best of times – put pointed out that it was but riddled with legal and 
diplomatic difficulties. Deakin had interpreted the Monroe Doctrine as a broad principle of 
territorial inviolability, where in fact, Lucas argued, it was ‘really is no principle at all; it is – not to 
put too fine a point on it – domination by one overwhelmingly strong American power.’132 The 
sweeping rhetoric that accompanied the tour of the Great White Fleet had been troubling 
enough; talk of a ‘Pacific Monroe Doctrine’ would only further the impression that British power 
in the Pacific was giving way before the Americans. The chief problem, however, as J.E.B. Seely, 
the parliamentary undersecretary, pointed out, was that Britain could hardly countenance an 
arrangement that so blatantly excluded Japan:  
 
The proposal is in effect a defiance of Japanese ambitions. The day may come for such 
an attitude with or without American help, but at present Japan is, as I understand, our 
only ally, and therefore in theory our closest friend. A conference such as Mr Deakin 
suggests would be fraught with danger, premature and useless.133 
 
It again proved difficult to square Australian geo-racialism with the more complex reality in 
which London was forced to operate. As Lord Crewe concluded, with a note of resignation, ‘I 




 In Studies in Colonial Nationalism, the result of his travels to the dominions during the 
South African war, the journalist Richard Jebb attempted to address an issue that dogged 
contemporary observers of empire: could the imperial system be able to accommodate the 
evolution a ‘national consciousness’ in the settler colonies, without losing its capacity for 
concerted action? As a supporter of Joseph Chamberlain’s campaign for tariff reform, Jebb was 
contemptuous of the ‘pathetic futility of that conservative English imperialism’ that took colonial 
loyalties for granted. ‘Practical imperialism’, he insisted, was to recognise that the dominions were 
developing into self-contained political communities, mindful of their own interests. If the 
empire were to persist, therefore, it would be because the colonists would continue to recognise 
the ‘solid national advantages accruing from the imperial connection’. Nowhere was this more 
evident than in Australia, where the ‘spectacle of an armed Japan, flush with victory over a white 
Power’ had aroused the ‘liveliest apprehensions’. At the heart of the matter, Jebb concluded, the 
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best guarantee of Australia’s imperial attachment might well be this: ‘Australian patriots are 
predisposed to imperialism so long as it connotes the defensive co-operation of white nations 
rather than the exploitation of Australia by the coloured races.’135  
 The truth of that statement was tested in the years after the Russo-Japanese War, as 
racial anxieties prompted new calls to reinforce the national project. Britain’s ability to protect 
White Australia was repeatedly questioned. The foundations for a national navy were laid. In 
August 1908, the American fleet was welcomed almost as an alternative protector. Yet even a 
cursory glance at the period reveals that colonial elites continued to recognise that their external 
security, as well as their racial purity, was bound up with their membership of the British world-
system. British sea power was the strategic glue that held the British world together. Its 
disappearance – because of, say, a German naval victory in the North Sea – would have left 
Australia and New Zealand to face Japan’s displeasure by themselves alone. This was the 
Britannic logic of Australasian defence, much in evidence during the dreadnought debates, which 
would again form a central argument for Australia and New Zealand’s whole-hog participation in 
First World War.  
 For all their talk of self-reliance and national destiny, none of the ‘nationalists’ in the 
defence debates – including Deakin, Allen, Fisher, and Hughes – seriously questioned the 
centrality of British power. Indeed, they argued that by accelerating the consolidation of Australia 
and New Zealand as ‘national societies’, they could expand their own contribution to it.  ‘I look 
forward to a day when Australia will take its place as a part of the British Empire,’ Allen declared, 
‘and do its duty… to help to police the Pacific Ocean.’136 In light of this, and contrary to recent 
claims, Deakin’s often frictious interaction with the Colonial Office – over naval defence, the 
American fleet, and his ‘Monroe Doctrine’ scheme – looks not so much as a nationalist straining 
under an overbearing bureaucracy, and rather more as an over-imaginative thinker pitching 
imperial schemes to London.137  
 This, then, was the real problem that underlay the discussions on empire, race, and 
defence in the Pacific: if Japan concentrated Australasian minds on the importance of the 
imperial connection, it also engendered a greater demand for reciprocity. The dominions, in 
other words, would do more for imperial defence, but they also expected their interests to be 
acknowledged, and their own justification for empire – as one of racial solidarity against the 
danger of an expanding Asia – to be understood and reciprocated. The conspicuously loyalist 
rhetoric of Joseph Ward, in this regard, shared a basic goal with Deakin’s national navalism: both 
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were strategies to carve out new handholds on imperial policy, and use these to drag it towards 
the Pacific. These strands had converged on the 1909 defence conference, which worked out an 
imaginative scheme for collective naval defence in the Pacific that appeared to satisfy 
Australasia’s concerns about Japan, and its aspiration to address these through deeper imperial 




Rethinking the Japanese Alliance, 1910-11 
 
 In the years following the Russo-Japanese War, Japan’s exchanges with the British world 
had deepened, widened, and multiplied across a vast arc ranging from Singapore to Vancouver. 
The scope for imagined interaction was wider still: although the physical presence of Japanese 
remained negligible in Australia (outside the tropical north) and New Zealand, political debate in 
both dominions became increasingly preoccupied with the rising power to the north. The result 
was to introduce a wide array of new controversies into the Anglo-Japanese relationship, over 
immigration, trade, political activity in China – and in a wider sense, over the challenge that Japan 
appeared to pose to the ascendancy of the ‘Anglo-Saxon race’ in the Pacific. Although the core 
of the relationship – the alliance itself – remained formally unchanged since its latest revision in 
1905, it too was forced to perform a new set of functions, mitigating and managing the various 
points of tension that had sprung up in the Pacific and continental Asia. 
 Meanwhile, the geopolitical circumstances under which the alliance operated were 
similarly evolving. The 1902 treaty had been aimed at checking Russia’s advance into East Asia, 
its 1905 successor at forestalling a revanchist war. The Russian threat, however, had been eased – 
though not removed entirely – through the 1907 convention that delineated the Russian and 
British spheres in central Asia.1 Tokyo concluded its own settlement with St Petersburg, by which 
the latter recognised Japanese primacy in southern Manchuria, in the same year. Instead, the 
rationale for the alliance was increasingly dominated by the naval race with Germany. ‘It is the 
naval question which underlies the whole of our European foreign policy,’ as Grey argued to the 
representatives of the dominions in 1911.2 Indeed, it underlay more than that: through the 
pressure of the naval race on Britain’s public finances, the naval issue tied up domestic politics as 
well.3 From this perspective, the alliance with Japan came to serve a dual purpose. By relieving 
Britain of the need to maintain a naval presence in East Asia or the Pacific, it underpinned the 
strategic logic of concentration in European waters, keeping the cost of the naval race within 
manageable limits. Equally crucially, it prevented Japan from seeking an alternative partnership 
with Russia or Germany at Britain’s expense.  
 The consensus in Whitehall, therefore, was that the strategic benefits of the alliance 
outweighed whatever objections might be raised to Japan’s actions in Manchuria and elsewhere. 
If the alliance were allowed to expire in 1915, noted Hardinge at the Foreign Office, Britain 
would ‘find the Japanese fleet arrayed against us in the Pacific or allied with that of another 
Power.’ Such a change was ‘unpleasant to contemplate, and I believe that in 1914 it will still be 
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our policy to be in alliance with Japan’.4 Grey agreed that it would be ‘disastrous’ to lose the 
alliance.5 Indeed, many who took an otherwise critical view of Japan, such as Charles Bowra, a 
British official employed by the Chinese customs in Manchuria, recognised the force of the 
argument: 
 
The sad thing about is that, owing to the German fleet, we hang round [Japan’s] neck in 
Eastern waters and can only help her advance. Had the German Emperor not embarked 
on this insane fleet policy we might, in conjunction with Germany and America, have 
been in a position to hinder the advance of Japan into China. As it is, all our energies 
must be reserved for the coming European struggle, and our military position here 
depends on Japan. It is all very sad. 
 
 All the same, this strategic calculus was far from universally accepted. There were several 
reasons for this. A wide range of dissenters, from colonial politicians to dejected China traders, 
insisted that Japan represented an equal, if not a greater threat to British world-supremacy than 
Germany. One did not have to take a ‘Yellow Perilist’ view, moreover, to recognise that the 
single-mined pursuit of the naval race in the North Sea would leave British security in Asia 
increasingly – and perhaps dangerously – dependent on Japan. Thus Sir John Colomb, the 
éminence grise of British naval thought, argued that London’s view of imperial defence remained 
‘fragmentary’, myopic, and particularly inattentive to the concerns of the dominions: ‘We have 
got hysterics at home of the spectres of German Dreadnoughts at the one side of the North Sea - 
but for the Dreadnoughts of Powers in the North Pacific we have no regard.’6 Such views broadly 
resonated, as noted above, in the Australasian dominions. The Japanese alliance, noted the 
Wellington Evening Post, might be ‘a delightfully cheap way of policing the sea, but it is as 
precarious as it is cheap’.7 
  Even within the corridors of Whitehall, concerns were raised over whether Britain relied 
too much on Japanese support. The first real signs of disquiet surfaced in April 1909, when 
Hedworth Lambton, the commander of the China station, submitted an emotive report on the 
defence of Hong Kong, which he thought ‘entirely futile and insufficient’. The defence of Hong 
Kong, and Britain’s other outlying bases in Asia, Lambton argued, remained predicated on the 
assumption of British naval supremacy. Yet since 1905, command of the sea had effectively 
rested with Japan. ‘This superiority there is no reasonable prospect of England being able ever 
again to challenge.’8 When the Admiralty retorted that the China station could be reinforced, if 
necessary, at ‘very short notice’, even in the ‘almost unthinkable event of Japan prematurely 
denouncing her alliance in order to join Germany in attacking us’, several members of the CID 
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protested against this all-too-breezy dismissal of Lambton’s concerns. Sir William Nicholson, the 
Chief of the General Staff, argued out that without a permanent naval presence in the Far East, 
Japan might overwhelm Hong Kong – and subsequently Singapore – before reinforcements 
could arrive. The assault on Port Arthur had, after all, demonstrated what the Japanese army was 
capable of. Any British relief force would then be in the unenviable position of the Russian Baltic 
Fleet in the run-up to Tsushima: operating in hostile waters out of range of a friendly base. In 
addition, as Lord Crewe, the Colonial Secretary, pointed out, the political foundation of the 
alliance might not be as solid as the Admiralty assumed it to be: ‘It was possible that, in her 
dealings with China, Japan might behave in such a manner as to cause us to refuse to identify 
ourselves further with her as an ally.’9 
 A further objection was that the Anglo-Japanese alliance precluded relationships rooted 
in greater ideological, cultural, and racial convergence, either with the white dominions or the 
United States. ‘I am one of those who as you know mistrust & dislike the Japanese Alliance,’ the 
young Lord Stanhope, who upon entering the House of Lords became a leading critic of Japan’s 
actions in Asia, wrote to Mackenzie King. Stanhope’s preferred alternative was a ‘closer drawing 
together of the great English speaking peoples of the world’.10 The possibility of an American-
Japanese confrontation, either over immigration or China, continued to be source of anxiety. 
According to the writer Archibald Colquhoun, the immigration dispute in the Pacific remained 
‘the Damocles’ sword of the international situation’. If it fell, it would spark a general racial 
conflagration: ‘It is not merely Japan versus the United States, or Japan versus Canada and 
Australia, but Asia versus Europe, North America, and South Africa – East versus West.’11 The 
Round Table, a new imperial review founded in 1910, similarly insisted ‘that a real quarrel over 
immigration would make a continuance of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance impossible’, and might 
even ‘range Japan in definite hostility to the Empire’.12 Again, such considerations were not 
limited to pundits alone. The Valor of Ignorance, an American work that purported to analyse a 
Japanese attack on the American Pacific coast, was submitted for consideration in the CID by 
Lord Esher, who considered its conclusions highly pertinent to British defence planning:  
 
The racial quarrel which looms over the heads of these two nations has a very direct 
interest for us, inasmuch as we are bound on the one hand by Treaty to Japan… we are 
hampered on the other hand by the prejudices of our Colonial fellow-countrymen in 
Australia and Canada against men of colour.13 
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 These growing doubts about the strategic implications of the alliance ran in parallel with 
the decline of Japan’s public image.14 According to Horace Rumbold, who joined the Tokyo 
embassy as Macdonald’s deputy in 1909, there was ‘no doubt that the popularity of the Alliance 
has waned and that the Japanese are becoming increasingly unpopular’. 15  The Japanese 
government, which received regular despatches from its London embassy on the tone of the 
press, similarly worried that the tide of public opinion was moving against it.16 Partly, this shift 
grew out the various nodes of tension that emerged out of Japan’s expansion; partly, it reflected 
the fact that much of the positive, pro-Japanese imagery built up during the war had either waned 
or collapsed in collision with reality. As Macdonald observed, where British society had once 
marvelled ‘at a military and naval organization and efficiency of the very highest order, coupled 
with a patriotism and dauntless bravery in battle’, it had discovered that the Japanese were 
‘ordinary human beings’, with ‘a commercial morality of not very high character’. No wonder 
then, that ‘severe disappointment’ had set in.17 
  The erosion of British goodwill became increasingly evident in a series of commercial 
disputes. The growing sense of commercial rivalry between British and Japanese merchants 
operating in the Yangzi valley and Manchuria has been noted in the chapter three. In the latter 
half of 1910, they were compounded by another, more serious controversy over the revision of 
the Japanese tariff. To ease the passage of the Anglo-Japanese commercial convention of 1894 – 
the treaty that had abolished most of the ‘unequal’ constraints on Japanese sovereignty – Japan 
had agreed to retain a wide measure of foreign access to its internal market, and not to raise 
tariffs for the duration of the treaty In July 1910, a year before the treaty was due to lapse, Tokyo 
duly informed London that it desired a new commercial agreement that would allow for the 
introduction of a series of new statutory tariffs, particularly on textiles. The British press, perhaps 
expecting special consideration from its ally, bristled with indignation as it learned the details of 
the Japanese proposals, and during the fall of 1910, the Foreign Office found itself beset by 
dozens of petitions and delegations from resentful manufacturing firms and chambers of 
commerce. The China Association declared that the new tariff would ‘pave the way to that 
Japanese hegemony of the Far East’.18 The Economist, the standard-bearer of free trade (and never 
keen on the alliance) denounced Japan’s protectionist stance as a return to the ‘anti-foreign 
policy’ of the sakoku edicts, and predicted it would ‘soon reduce the popularity of the Anglo-
Japanese alliance to vanishing point’.19 Writing in the Manchester Guardian, Sir Edward Holden, 
secretary to the London Chamber of Commerce and head of the Midland Bank (Britain’s largest) 
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interpreted the new treaty as a deliberate slight: ‘Japan’s greatness is largely due to the generosity 
of the moneyed classes of this country… We have supplied them with capital to establish 
themselves on a sure footing, and now our exports are to be made almost impossible.’ Unless the 
tariff was adjusted, Holden declared that he would not be buying into in any more loans floated 
by the Japanese government: ‘our pockets will remain closed against them’.20  
 The deluge of public acrimony over the tariff question stirred the Foreign Office into 
action.21 Calling on the Japanese prime minister in October, Macdonald pointed out that the new 
tariff was generating a ‘very unfavourable feeling’ that threatened to further undermine public 
support for the alliance: ‘I was sorry to have to tell [Katsura] that the feeling of the British people 
towards their allies was very far from being as cordial as it used to be.’22 Such feelings, he warned, 
would have to be taken into consideration when the alliance came up for renewal: the British 
government could not altogether ignore public opinion. Although Grey instructed Macdonald 
not to draw an explicit connection between the tariff and the alliance, he repeated the warning in 
more guarded terms to the Japanese ambassador the following month. While Grey reiterated that 
the British government was ‘most anxious to maintain and strengthen our alliance,’ he also noted 
the ‘very strong’ feeling against the new tariff: the support of the British public, he noted, ‘must 
always be a factor’ on which the alliance depended.23 The Japanese government took the hint, 
and after some deliberation, it offered new concessions, including the exemption of a wide range 
of British goods from the new statutory tariffs.  
 The Times, meanwhile, continued to fight a rear-guard action against the decline of 
Japan’s popularity. Its leaders defended Japan’s Manchurian policies, its annexation of Korea – 
‘the only sound solution’ for its internal problems – and the new Japanese tariff.24 It also regularly 
admonished the Australian press for its ‘reckless and often indefensible’ criticism of Japan, and 
urged the dominions to reflect on fact that the Anglo-Japanese alliance constituted the ‘real basis 
of their white policy’.25 It produced a weighty supplement – ‘much too large to be read by any 
ordinary mortal’ was the verdict of W.T. Stead – to accompany the opening of the Japan-British 
Exhibition in White City in July 1910, in which it once again laid out the Japanese case on 
Manchuria and other controversies.26 Chirol, still the guiding spirit of the paper’s pro-Japanese 
line, was unapologetic. While he acknowledged that the paper’s praise for Japan might be a little 
too fulsome at times, the strategic importance of the alliance, especially in view of the German 
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naval challenge, more than justified this editorial line. Particularly given Japan’s waning 
popularity, The Times had a public duty to put the case for the defence: ‘I confess that the 
importance for us of preserving the A.J. alliance in the present position of world politics would 
incline me to assent to a much weaker case than Japan is able to make out for herself.’27  
 Such a stance was arguably ‘more suited to a foreign ministry than a newspaper’, and The 
Times was increasingly criticised for it.28 Ian Hamilton, who had fallen out with all things Japanese 
following the controversy over the publication of his account of the Russo-Japanese War, 
protested to Leo Amery that the paper’s coverage of Japan was ‘biased’ and ‘misleading’: ‘it is 
truly appalling that kowtowing to Japan should be carried to such lengths’.29 From Beijing, Jordan 
similarly complained that ‘owing to the attitude of The Times… we are more identified with the 
Japanese than is altogether comfortable’.30 When the young Lord Stanhope, following his tour of 
East Asia, announced his intention to raise the issue of Brinkley’s biased coverage in the Lords, 
Chirol was forced into a humiliating defence of his Tokyo correspondent’s credentials.31 More 
damaging still was the rumour that the paper’s recent Japanese supplement had been paid for by 
Tokyo.32 Amid the turbulence that followed the paper’s acquisition by Lord Northcliffe, Chirol 
found himself increasingly isolated in his defence of Japan’s policies: as Lady Lugard (a former 
Africa correspondent) told Morrison, he was ‘the only man on The Times who still cherished the 
Japanese illusion’.33 Sensing an opening, Morrison made a bid to steer the paper away from its 
pro-Japanese line when on leave in Britain in January 1911. As he informed the paper’s managing 
editor, he would only return as Beijing correspondent on the condition that control over East 
Asian editorial policy would be delegated to him.34 A week later, he followed up with an all-out 
assault on the paper’s ‘unbalanced praise’ of Tokyo’s actions, so out of step with the ‘feeling of 
distrust of Japan, growing so quickly in this country’.35 Although Morrison eventually relented, 
the episode marked the dissolution of a journalistic partnership that had shaped British attitudes 
towards East Asia for over fifteen years.36 Morrison and Chirol both left The Times the following 
year.37 
 By the time of the alliance’s second revision in 1911, therefore, British attitudes towards 
Japan were becoming more guarded and transactional. Much of the earlier warmth was gone. 
While Whitehall remained committed to the alliance, and regarded it as a vital element in its 
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containment of Germany, it was under no illusion that using Japan as the empire’s bulwark in 
East Asia and the Pacific came at a price. Most obviously, if left Britain with little choice but to 
acquiesce in its ally’s efforts to tighten its hold over its sphere in continental Asia. London did 
not object to Tokyo’s annexation of Korea in August 1910, requesting only that Japan did not 
immediately extend its new tariffs to the country. It also refused to back the attempts by 
American and British railway concessionaires to water down the Japanese railway monopoly in 
Manchuria, even if it meant that the United States continued to view British China policy, as 
Jordan put it, ‘with unreasonable suspicion’.38 There other reasons to allow Tokyo a relatively 
free hand in northeast Asia: given that Japanese migrants were excluded from the white settler 
states around the Pacific, many accepted that Japan required an outlet for its expanding 
population. ‘With Korea to develop, and possibly Manchuria, I do not think that she will be very 
keen on acquiring a part of our empty North,’ noted Arthur Atlee Hunt, the long-serving head of 
Australia’s department of External Affairs39 Writing from Canada, Lord Grey took a similar view: 
‘to relieve the Pacific Coast, Philippines, Australia &c. of Japanese pressure,’ Britain should allow 
Japan ‘to spread herself in Manchuria’.40 Grey even made several suggestions to London that this 
quid pro quo might be formalised in a general agreement ‘between the white and Asiatic Powers… 
which would restrict each colour to its own zone’.41  
 Yet there were limits to British indulgence. Despite repeated overtures from Japan, 
London was reluctant to develop the alliance into a more wide-ranging partnership in China, as it 
feared this would effectively tie British policy to Tokyo’s apron strings. Already in December 
1907, Itō Hirobumi, now resident-general in Korea, had sounded the British embassy about 
whether, given the ‘dangerous and revolutionary nature’ of the Chinese reform movement, the 
two allies might cooperate to guarantee the survival of the Qing. Itō noted that in the event of 
revolutionary unrest, Japan would ‘strike quickly and hard in repressing trouble,’ but it would 
prefer to do so with ‘the approval and consent of her ally’.42 This was troubling talk. Itō was well-
liked in London – according to Francis Campbell, he was ‘perhaps the one Japanese it is more or 
less safe to trust’ – yet the Foreign Office was reluctant to issue Japan with a blank cheque to 
intervene in Chinese politics under the cover of the alliance. As one official put it: ‘In the case of 
trouble in China, it would no doubt be a great advantage to be working in concert with Japan – if 
we could completely trust her.’43 A similar proposal for a joint Anglo-Japanese agreement on 
China was again touted in the spring of 1911, and London’s response was much the same. 
Campbell declared himself ‘strongly opposed’ to ‘endeavouring to formulate a policy in 
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conjunction with Japan’, noting that this might prove might prove ‘embarrassing’ and would 
simply be ‘inviting trouble’.44 
 In fact, rather than agreeing to a coordinated policy, London increasingly came to view 
the alliance as a leash on its ally’s activities in China. As Macdonald noted during the 
deliberations on whether to renew the alliance in the spring of 1911, it remained a ‘useful lever’ 
with which to check ‘any unnecessarily forward policy’ on the part of Tokyo.45 Macdonald went 
so far as to suggest that renewal should be made explicitly conditional on Japan’s good behaviour 
in Manchuria. Rumbold, his deputy, similarly thought the alliance should be allowed to run out 
its ‘natural term’ until 1915, after which ‘we shall see more clearly what line our Japanese friends 
are taking or are going to take in Manchuria and elsewhere.’ If it should prove that the alliance 
was proving ineffective as a restraint, ‘we should then drop Japan’.46 The notion that the alliance 
could be used to contain Japan was not, strictly speaking, new: during the immigration crisis, 
London had made a very similar argument to the dominions. When Mackenzie King returned to 
London in December 1908, and asked Grey outright ‘if he did not think the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance had been a mistake in that it had taught the yellow man to regard themselves as the equal 
of the white,’ the Foreign Secretary retorted that ‘the Japanese had never pressed the alliance in a 
single particular’. Canada, he noted, had itself benefited from the alliance in its negotiations over 




 These views crystallised as the government wrestled with the question of whether to 
renew the Japanese alliance – and in what form – in early 1911. The question was initially raised 
in conjunction with the preparations for a new imperial conference, to coincide with the 
coronation of George V. The conference would offer an opportunity – the first since 1909 – for 
further coordination on imperial defence, yet as Sir Charles Ottley, the new secretary to the CID, 
pointed out, it would be difficult to engage in any substantive discussions on the subject while 
the future of the alliance remained uncertain. ‘[T]he whole defensive policy of Australia and New 
Zealand,’ he noted, ‘is at present assessed on the basis of the status quo being maintained.’ 
Moreover, the conference would likely be the last opportunity to broach the subject with the 
dominions before the question of renewal would have to be formally confronted in 1914. Ottley, 
who had served on the Australia station in the 1880s, was well aware of the difficulties this might 
raise: ‘Frankly, I dread any sort of discussion with our brethren in Australasia on these delicate and 
secret topics.’ Yet setting out the case for the alliance now might forestall ‘ignorant criticism’ 
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down the line: ‘the last thing wanted is a howl from Australia or Canada, if and when the British 
Government decide to renew the Alliance.’48 The Foreign Office was not yet convinced. Sir 
Arthur Nicolson, the permanent undersecretary, thought the question ‘of such vital imperial 
interest’ that it was a matter ‘solely & exclusively’ for the British government, without reference 
to the dominions.49 Grey agreed, as did Asquith, who noted that he could not conceive ‘of a 
more inopportune topic’ to discuss at the imperial conference.50 
 This Olympian attitude soon yielded before the realisation that the future of the alliance 
was a much more pressing issue than London had initially thought. The immediate impetus was a 
sudden opportunity to mitigate what was, in the Foreign Office’s view, the main downside of the 
alliance: the resentment it engendered in the United States. Since the autumn of 1910, Britain had 
conducted tentative negotiations with the Americans about subjecting all future bilateral disputes 
to international arbitration. By January 1911, these talks had produced a serious proposal for an 
Anglo-American arbitration treaty, leaving the Foreign Office to puzzle out how such an 
agreement might be reconciled with Britain’s obligations under the alliance, which, as the older 
treaty, held pre-eminence. Grey’s initial suggestion, to bring Japan into the arbitration regime 
either by including it as a third party in the Anglo-American treaty, or to encourage it to seek its 
own arbitration treaty with the United States, proved a non-starter: there was no chance that the 
Americans would agree to submit the immigration question, for one, to an international 
tribunal.51 In the event, Tokyo resolved the impasse itself, by proposing an early revision of the 
alliance. As Ian Nish has observed, it did so at least partly on the understanding that the 
popularity of the alliance was waning, and that opposition from the dominions and the China 
coast might well complicate renewal in 1915. As much as some in Britain might fear a German-
Japanese alliance, Tokyo was equally apprehensive at the prospect of being excluded from the 
Entente, as this might mean encirclement by an Anglo-American combination supported by 
France and Russia. 52 Under the new terms, approved by the cabinet on 30 March, the alliance 
would be extended for another ten years, with the new proviso that it could not be invoked 
against a country with which either party had an unlimited arbitration treaty. This confirmed 
what had previously been tacitly understood: Britain would not consider itself bound to support 
Japan in a conflict with the United States.  
 Considering the acceleration of renewal, London also recognised that it could not ignore 
the attitudes of the dominions. As Lord Crewe reminded the CID in January, his experience at 
the Colonial Office had taught him that ‘in Australia public opinion was thoroughly hostile to the 
alliance’ and that the other dominions were not far behind.53 If the alliance was now to be 
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renewed early, it might be necessary to present them with the strategic arguments – preferably in 
an environment that London could control. Lewis Harcourt, the new Colonial Secretary, was 
convinced that a heart-to-heart ‘might perhaps have a useful educative effect on Colonial 
opinion’.54 Lord Grey made the same appeal from Ottawa: if the alliance was to be renewed, he 
wrote to his cousin at the Foreign Office, ‘the Dominions ought to be well schooled in time as to 
the reasons why. They cannot kick afterwards, if they abstain from putting in any protest when 
the opportunity is there before them.’55 Sir Edward was swayed, and agreed that the that the 
conference would afford an opportunity to drive home the importance of the alliance: 
 
Laurier, I have no doubt, understands the different aspects of it. But one or two others, 
and certainly the Australians, require a great deal of education… The logical conclusion 
of denouncing the Japanese Alliance would be that Australia and New Zealand should 
undertake the burden of naval supremacy in the China seas. This they are neither willing 
nor able to do.56 
  
The cabinet settled on having a confidential discussion in the CID. There would be no formal 
agenda, and the dominions would not be asked to prepare their positions. This would be a 
‘consultation’ in name only, skirting around the awkward fact that the cabinet had already 
approved the renewal: Grey could confidently inform the Japanese ambassador that the 
discussion with the dominions would ‘not hinder the discussions for revision’.57 An informal 
joint committee of the Foreign, Colonial and India Offices, meanwhile, would prepare the 
government’s position on the immigration issue. Again, no formal resolution would be tabled, as 
this, one official noted, would merely ‘stir up the Premiers to a fight’.58 Instead, the subject would 
be discussed at a closed session, where the Secretary of State for India would restate the essence 
of London’s policy. The discussion would also be limited to India. ‘In the case of the Japanese,’ 
noted A.B. Keith, ‘nothing really is needed to bring home to the various Dominions the 
seriousness of the position.’59  
  Compared with this low-key approach, preparations on imperial defence were 
considerably more extensive. Here too, the alliance featured prominently; yet where the Foreign 
Office had been concerned with securing a renewal, the British defence establishment was not 
above playing on colonial fears of Japan to spur the dominions to greater exertions. Hence Lord 
Esher, who chaired the committee to prepare the agenda on imperial defence ahead of the 
conference, proposed to treat the dominion leaders to an overview of the ‘existing strategic 
situation of the empire’, and remind them of the extent to which their external security currently 
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depended on the Japanese alliance.60 This approach took shape as the conference drew closer. In 
December 1910, an assessment of Australian defence conducted by the Colonial Defence 
Committee had reiterated that British naval supremacy made it ‘highly improbable’ that Japan 
would risk a large-scale invasion of Australasia, even if the alliance were suddenly terminated.61 
An attack on British Columbia was similarly ruled out.62 Yet this analysis came in for severe 
criticism when it was submitted to the CID. General Nicholson was particularly scathing, 
stressing the vulnerability of the empire in the Pacific while the British fleet remained tied up in 
the North Sea. Australia, he argued, would have to develop a substantial military force as a 
‘second line of defence’ – a view echoed by Haldane, Churchill, and Crewe.63 When the issue 
came up again in March, Nicholson reiterated his concern that the Admiralty’s blue-water 
‘dogma’ was ‘hindering the satisfactory development of local defence forces’.64 In its final form, 
the analysis was notably less reassuring. The CID reiterated that the Pacific dominions remained 
safe as long as the alliance existed. Yet if conceded that if and when it was terminated, Australia 
and New Zealand would be exposed to raiding on a considerable scale, particularly if the bulk of 
the British fleet was engaged elsewhere. To hammer the message home, the memorandum 
concluded with a number of far-reaching recommendations for the expansion of local military 
and naval forces. ‘The whole strategic situation in the Far East,’ the CID pointedly noted, ‘will 
depend largely upon the extent to which Australia and New Zealand find it possible to develop 
their respective contributions to the naval forces of the Empire.’65 
  Robert Gowen has rightly concluded that British military planners began to play on 
Australasian fears of Japan in an increasingly systemic way.66 There is little evidence, however, to 
support his claim that they did so in a cynical effort to harness the dominions to an imperial war 
chariot that they already aimed to drive across the Channel against Germany. For one thing, this 
view credits British defence planning with a strategic coherence it did not possess. More to the 
point, those most keenly interested in developing a fighting role for the dominions, including 
Esher, Fisher, and Nicholson, saw them acting in an imperial capacity, stepping into the gaps that 
had opened up through the containment of Germany. All three were ambivalent over the extent 
to which the naval ‘pivot’ had left Britain dependent on Japan in Asia and the Pacific, and looked 
to the ‘Britannic alliance’ to rectify this. Fisher had been the driving force behind the naval 
settlement agreed in 1909, which laid the basis for an ‘empire fleet’ in the Pacific. Esher took a 
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similarly global view of imperial defence, and in preparation for the 1911 conference, he urged 
the Admiralty to consider how the dominions could assist in maintaining ‘the command of the 
seas, not only in home waters, but in the Mediterranean and in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans’.67 
Nicholson, for his part, was a trenchant critic of the Admiralty’s concentration in the North Sea, 
and seems to have aspired to corral the dominions into an imperial fire-fighting force, ready to 
reinforce Egypt, India, or other ‘defended ports in Asiatic waters’ if Britain was occupied in 
Europe.68  
 
‘At the back of their brain is the fear of the Japanese’: The dominions and the alliance 
 
  Historians of the Anglo-Japanese alliance have traditionally tended to follow the views of 
British officialdom in regarding the dominions, and particularly Australia, as instinctively hostile 
to the alliance, and sorely in need of education in the finer aspects of foreign policy. Ian Nish, in 
his seminal work, maintained there existed ‘a strong body of dominion opinion which called for 
the denunciation of the alliance.’69 Peter Lowe, for his part, argued the dominion elites ‘rarely 
discerned or were qualified to discern great imperial issues’.70 This is altogether too crude. It was 
certainly true that opinion in the dominions was suspicious of Japanese power, and remained 
uniformly set against Japanese immigration. Vulgar racism also played a role. ‘There has been this 
feeling in Australia,’ as George Pearce subsequently admitted to the imperial conference, ‘that to 
a certain extent it degraded the position of the Empire to go into a Treaty with an Asiatic 
country.’71 Inevitably, such views did cause a section of the Australasian press to rail against 
continuing the Japanese treaty. The populist paper Truth, which published editions in several 
Australasian cities, declared the alliance a ‘blunder’, and a ‘staggering blow to British prestige’.72 
Alone among the Australian papers, Truth condemned the renewal after it was announced, 
considering it ‘a matter of regret that the imperial government should have chosen to continue its 
alliance with an inferior race’.73  
 At the same time, it was painfully obvious to the Australasian dominions that their 
external security remained, for the foreseeable future, tightly bound with British naval supremacy 
against its European rivals, and that this in turn hinged on the support of Japan. They also 
recognised that the alliance served local as well as imperial interests, insofar as it prevented Japan 
from pressing the immigration issue. Hence the Sydney Morning Herald warned that the 
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termination of the alliance would surely be followed by a renewed protest against White 
Australia: ‘immunity from this danger is assured to us only so long as the Anglo-Japanese treaty 
lasts.’74 In the meantime, or so the rationale went, it afforded the dominions time in which to 
grow their populations, organise a self-sufficient defence, and work out a system of imperial 
cooperation, so that the Japanese challenge, when it came, could be met with confidence. It gave 
each dominion ‘breathing time to set her house in order,’ as H.A. Gwynne, the editor of the 
Standard, argued to Andrew Fisher, while keeping Japan out of the arms of Germany – the 
combination which, from an Australian perspective, was the most threatening of all.75  
 This argument was also articulated by the imperial luminaries of the Round Table, the 
small but well-connected pressure group started by former members of Milner’s ‘Kindergarten’ 
in South Africa.76 The group’s journal, launched in 1910, quickly established itself as a leading 
commentator on imperial affairs, and the leading article of its second issue was a fifty-page 
analysis of the Japanese alliance. Its author, Philip Kerr, who also acted as the Round Table’s 
editor, began by noting the extensive benefits Britain had received from its friendship with Japan: 
the alliance secured the Pacific; it guaranteed the frontiers of India; and allowed Britain to pursue 
the naval race with Germany free from distractions. Above all, it had kept Japan, ‘the only power 
which could bring effective force to bear in the East, a friendly ally instead of a suspicious rival’.77 
At the same time, it was no use pretending that cooperation had been entirely harmonious: on 
the issue of immigration, in particular, the alliance was difficult to reconcile with the dominions’ 
determination to guard their racial exclusivity. On the latter issue, Kerr, along with his colleagues, 
came down strongly on the colonial side: the only way the British Empire could retain its 
position of global primacy, he had previously argued to Arthur Balfour, was by retaining and 
filling up the last ‘still undeveloped white man’s lands’ in southern Africa and Australasia, and 
keeping them away from ‘covetous eyes’ of other powers. ‘Not until these countries are more 
thickly populated than they are to-day can their future as Anglo-Saxon States be assured, unless 
they are protected by a power invincible at sea.’78 In this georacial view of global politics, the 
chief benefit of the alliance was that it bought time for a proper imperial system to be organised: 
 
In the long run the project of a “White Empire” will only be accomplished if the Empire 
has the strength to resist the terrific expansive pressure of the teeming millions of Asia. 
And that strength it will be able to exert only if all its parts are absolutely at one on the 
policy they should pursue.79  
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The argument was aimed at a dominion audience, and Kerr asked J.C. Watson, Australia’s first 
Labour prime minister and a leading local Round Tabler, to distribute his article to the ‘leading 
people in parliament,’ noting that it was an issue of ‘first class importance to Australia’.80 Watson 
acknowledged that he found it ‘extremely interesting’: ‘The moral of it all is that we must 
prosecute the development of our defence policy, and also devote ourselves to securing the basis 
of all defence - people.’81 
 Australasians might have chafed at seeing their white man’s countries in ‘a position of 
sufferance under an Eastern race,’ as the Sydney Morning Herald put it, but they needed no 
instruction from British officialdom to recognise that there was no immediate alternative to the 
Japanese alliance. The establishment of the Pacific ‘empire fleet’ was still in its infancy –Churchill 
would smother it in 1913 – while the prospect of American assistance, pace the Great White Fleet, 
was ringed with uncertainties. Securing the southern dominions on the basis of their own 
resources alone, meanwhile, looked to be a task of Herculean proportions. Lord Kitchener, who 
performed an assessment of Australia’s military needs in 1909, insisted that the Commonwealth 
would need a trained force of at least 80,000 men. Admiral Reginald Henderson, who did the 
same for the navy in 1910, set out a twenty-year scheme for the construction of an Australian 
navy composed of eighteen capital ships. Neither mentioned Japan by name, but both reports 
cited Australia’s isolation, its large stretches of unoccupied coastline, and its proximity to possible 
enemies. 82  The Australian government could hardly fail to grasp the allusion to its own 
vulnerability. ‘At the back of their brain is the fear of the Japanese’, noted George King-Hall, the 
admiral in charge of the Australia station, ‘they are hoping the Treaty will be renewed, but I tell 
them pointedly, this is very uncertain, & not to build upon its being done.’83  
 These strands converged during the imperial conference, which lasted from 23 May until 
20 June. A special meeting on foreign policy was scheduled early on, in a closed session of the 
CID on 26 May. Asquith presided, although Grey commanded the meeting with an exposition of 
British foreign policy, taking in Britain’s relations with every major power, and its priorities in 
Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. Its purpose was to reassure the dominions that the British 
government considered their defence of paramount importance, and that the strategic priorities 
of the United Kingdom and those of its settler colonies remained deeply intertwined. Grey 
stressed that the deeper involvement in European affairs over which he had presided had been 
driven by one overwhelming consideration: to prevent the emergence of a ‘Napoleonic’ power 
that might attempt to break the European balance, and subsequently overturn British naval 
supremacy. Yet Grey was quick to point out that the destruction of British sea power, would be 
equally catastrophic for the dominions: South Africa would be at risk of invasion from the 
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nearby German colonies; the position of Australia and New Zealand would be equally precarious; 
while Canada would have to settle for an uncertain future of dependence on the United States. 
When viewed in these terms, the main purpose of alliance with Japan, which he moved on to 
discuss, was to preserve the global supremacy of the British navy – and by extension, the security 
of the empire. If it were terminated now, the effects were likely to be dire. Tokyo would look for 
another ally, and expand its own naval programme, forcing Britain, in turn, to balance the 
Japanese fleet in the Pacific. It would produce a ‘tremendous and undesirable change’ in the 
empire’s strategic condition.84  
 Grey acknowledged that the racial question was the only ‘possible objection’ that could 
be levied against renewal: London was well aware that the dominions were ‘very averse’ to 
Japanese immigrants, and ‘perfectly determined’ never to admit them in large numbers. Yet he 
was careful to reiterate that the alliance did not interfere with the dominions’ right to maintain 
their racial exclusivity. Nor had Japan ever used the alliance as leverage: 
 
I think people may say: ‘Is it possible that you should continue an alliance with Japan, 
and that Japan should not sooner or later raise the question – what she would call her 
claim, I suppose – to have her people admitted into the territories of her ally?’ She has 
never raised that point yet. She has never mentioned it in connection with the alliance at 
all. 
 
Indeed, Grey stressed that the Japanese government had only a sentimental interest in 
immigration: its policy was to ‘concentrate her people in Korea and Manchuria… she does not 
want to encourage them to go abroad, though she has some difficulty in preventing them’.85 The 
arrangement with Canada illustrated that Tokyo was perfectly willing to impose effective 
restraints on emigration. Laurier, the only premier to have been forewarned that the alliance 
would be discussed, rose to his cue, declaring that the alliance had produced ‘the most happy 
results’ and had made the dominions ‘absolutely free from the fear of invasion’. Glossing over his 
own frustrations over the difficulty of committing Tokyo to a definite restriction, Laurier noted 
that as far as Canada was concerned, the immigration question had been ‘absolutely settled’ with 
Japan’s full cooperation. If Japanese were respected, and ‘treated like civilised people,’ concluded 
Laurier, there was no reason why the alliance ‘should not last for forty or fifty years more’.86 
 None of the other dominion leaders came close to Laurier’s full-throated endorsement, 
but all fell in with the conclusion that the alliance should be continued, on the understanding that 
it would not ‘in any way affect the question of the freedom of the Dominions to deal with the 
question of immigration’ – a point that Grey had already conceded.87 Joseph Ward noted that 
opposition to the alliance in New Zealand mainly sprang from the fear that it ‘might entail our 
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yielding, against the fixed policy of our people, to the introduction of Eastern races’; Grey’s 
reassurance to the contrary was ‘gratifying in the extreme’.88 The Australians were more guarded. 
Fisher noted that renewal, on the condition that it would not affect exclusion, would be ‘a great 
satisfaction’ to the Commonwealth, ‘because undoubtedly we are somewhat apprehensive of the 
immediate future’. Yet he dismissed any suggestion that Australia might modify its immigration 
policy to accommodate Japanese opinion, or that exclusion might be effected through a bilateral 
arrangement on the model of the Lemieux agreement. It was one thing for Canada to do so, 
since it enjoyed the protection of the United States: ‘You have a 100,000,000 of white people 
there and are in quite close touch with Europe. Where are we?’89 Australia would do its duty by 
the empire by eschewing legislation specifically aimed at Japan, but it also expected London to 
understand that White Australia was non-negotiable: ‘we rely, of course, on [the British 
government] to safeguard our immigration powers absolutely, in the last extremity.’ Pearce 
echoed the point: there would be an ‘outcry’ against the renewal of the treaty unless it was 
explicitly stated that Australia’s exclusion policies would not be affected.90  
 Antipodean misgivings aside, the meeting had served its purpose, and that same 
afternoon, Grey informed the Japanese ambassador that the dominions – and Canada in 
particular – approved of the renewal of the alliance.91 Yet the meeting had demonstrated that 
their blessing was not unconditional. Immigration remained a major stumbling block, and Grey 
managed to steer around it only by reassuring the dominions – wishfully, as it turned out – that it 
was unlikely to come up for the duration of the treaty, that Japan had no wish to raise it, and that 
even if it did so, Britain would maintain an iron wall between immigration and the alliance. It was 
an illustration of the extent to which the function of the treaty had changed. As Grey justified it, 
the alliance was above all an instrument to contain the expansion of Japan itself: it would prevent 
Tokyo from encouraging emigration, from expanding its fleet, or from allying itself with 
Germany. Even under these guarantees, the Australians alluded in barely veiled terms that they 
considered the continued reliance on Japanese power to be dangerous. As the meeting turned to 
defence, Pearce argued forcefully that the extension of the alliance would not mean the 
Commonwealth would abrogate or slow down its military preparations: as it was, ten years were 
barely enough to raise Australia’s preparedness to a level where the alliance could be safely 
dispensed with. The British government was happy to indulge him. ‘Undoubtedly if Australia is 
to develop a navy which is in any way competent to hold the Japanese navy in check in 1921,’ 
noted McKenna, ‘she would have to begin her work at once.’92 The dominions’ endorsement 
of the alliance should thus not be read as an uncritical deference to London in strategic questions 
– and still less as the result of being ‘overwhelmed’ at the privilege of being taken into the 
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confidence of the Foreign Secretary, as Peter Lowe has suggested.93 Australia and New Zealand 
accepted renewal on their own terms: as a guarantee for Japan’s good behaviour, and on the 
understanding that their security could never be fully entrusted to an Asian power. ‘Japan is 
developing very fast,’ one of the South African delegates noted in a telling aside, ‘and at any 
moment questions may arise which would bring the Far East into conflict with the West’.94  
 The enduring anxieties over Japan were again in evidence during the conference’s 
plenary sessions. Much of these were absorbed with the proposals of Joseph Ward, who stepped 
into Deakin’s shoes as the most prolific imperial centraliser.95 Among others, Ward proposed an 
imperial council to deal with naval defence, the formal separation of the dominions from the 
Colonial Office, and permanent representation for the dominions on the CID. Although his 
proposals were unpolished – ‘confused and confusing’, according to Neville Meaney – they 
represented a logical culmination to his thinking on imperial defence.96 For Ward, the 1909 naval 
crisis had sharply demonstrated that New Zealand’s security could only be guaranteed by 
maintaining the global supremacy of the British fleet; local squadrons, Ward believed, swallowed 
up precious resources that would be more usefully placed at the disposal of a central executive. 
Yet this was a highly calculated loyalism, which sought to carve out a place for New Zealand’s 
interests at the heart of imperial policy-making. As Ward argued in his accompanying speech, the 
maintenance of British interests in the Pacifc was ‘as important as the defence of the Atlantic 
Possessions or of the Motherland itself’.97  For Ward, the empire remained first and foremost a 
racial entity, its future closely bound up with preserving the white British character of the 
dominions. Particular watchfulness had to be exercised on the ‘Asiatic question’, and particularly 
on the danger from ‘one great Eastern nation’ that Ward felt no further need to specify. Even if 
his centralising solutions made little headway, the analysis of New Zealand’s strategic 
predicament was strikingly familiar.98   
 On immigration, discussed on the final day of the conference, Ward again drove the 
agenda, introducing a resolution proposing that ‘each coloured race should be encouraged to 
remain domiciled within its own zone’.99 Again, Ward displayed a striking tendency to address 
Australasian concerns through sweeping, if convoluted, schemes for imperial reform. Introducing 
the ‘zonal’ idea, the New Zealand premier launched a long speech on the merits of exclusion: 
hostility to Asian migration, according to Ward, did not stem from racial prejudice, but rather 
                                                      
93 Lowe, Great Britain and Japan, p. 277. 
94 CID Minutes, 111th Meeting, 26 May 1911, TNA, CAB 2/2/111, p. 32. 
95 J.E. Kendle, “The Round Table Movement, New Zealand, and the Conference of 1911,” Journal of Commonwealth 
Political Studies 3, no. 2 (January 1965): 104–17. 
96 Meaney, Search for Security, p. 218. 
97 ‘Minutes of the Imperial Conference,’ 25 May 1911, TNA, CAB18/13A, pp. 40-44. 
98 ‘Minutes of the Imperial Conference,’ 1 June 1911, TNA, CAB18/13A, p. 51. 
99 ‘Minutes of the Imperial Conference,’ 19 June 1911, TNA, CAB18/13A, pp. 399-410. The scheme was similarly 
phrased to that which Lord Grey attempted to press on the British authorities form 1908 onwards. The obvious 
suspect for implanting Ward with the ‘zonal’ idea was Lionel Curtis, who met Grey on a visit to Canada in 1909 and 
played an instrumental role in shaping New Zealand’s centralizing assault on the 1911 conference.  
 172 
from economic considerations, as the competition with cheap Asian labour would drive down 
wages and living standards to the point of the ‘destruction to a very large extent of very large 
sections of white British people in some of the overseas countries’.100 Ward went on to argue that 
exclusion was equally necessary to preserve international peace. A settlement that recognised the 
races of the world as discreet units – different but equal – he believed, might reconcile Japan to 
exclusion. ‘Pride of race’ had, after all, become was a universal principle among civilised nations: 
‘It is of just as much importance to the Chinese to preserve their race as it is to the British people 
to preserve a white race, and to the Japanese to preserve their race.’101  
 Ward’s was the latest in a string of proposals to suggest delineating international racial 
divisions through a formal understanding, based on the arguably naïve belief that global racial 
tensions could be managed once they were explicitly acknowledged as such. Once again, 
however, such a scheme disintegrated upon contact with practical objections, not the least of 
which was the racial diversity of the British Empire itself.  Lord Crewe, who presided over the 
session, was careful to repeat Joseph Chamberlain’s dictum that the British government had no 
intention interfering with the immigration policies of its dominions. Even the India Office now 
recognised that free movement for all British subjects was impracticable.102 Yet Crewe devoted 
the rest of his address to a plea against overt racial discrimination, insisting that the dominions 
needed to take stock of the wider implications of their exclusion policies, which affected Britain’s 
relations with East Asia, and in recent years had become ‘a valuable asset’ to those seeking to 
challenge the legitimacy of British rule in India. The racial question, Crewe insisted, was one 
‘which seemed to threaten not merely the well being, but the actual existence, of the Empire as 
an Empire.’ As such, it was essential that the dominions kept the ‘anti-colour prejudice’ of some 
of their nationals in check. Crewe did not bother to hide his disdain for overt racism: pride in 
‘whiteness’ for its own sake, he remarked, was the attitude of one who had little else to be proud 
of, and no man was more convinced of his own racial superiority ‘than the mere bar-loafer 




  The third and final Anglo-Japanese alliance was signed in London on 13 July 1911. Of 
the three treaties, it would last the longest, running its full length until finally abrogated by the 
Washington treaties in 1923. It was also the only one that saw the two allies fight alongside each 
other, first during the First World War and later in the Allied intervention in Siberia. Yet the 
alliance never regained the popularity it had enjoyed during the halcyon days of the Russo-
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Japanese War. Already by 1911 it was increasingly redefined as an instrument to check and 
channel Japan’s expansion into China; following the disintegration of Qing rule later that year, it 
was soon tested as such.104 The logic of containment also extended to the Pacific: as Grey had 
made clear to the leaders of the dominions, the alliance served their interests not least because it 
gave Japan an incentive not to revive the immigration question. Once hailed as an instrument to 
integrate Japan into ‘civilised’ international society, the alliance, as Antony Best has noted, now 
also underpinned a racial order that excluded it.105 This was an obvious paradox, which could 
only be sustained as long as Japan was prepared to let the racial question lie dormant, and as long 
as the dominions could be assured that Britain remained committed to their racial security.  
 It was on that basis that Ward, Pearce, and Fisher, whatever their personal feelings about 
Japan, accepted the case for renewing the alliance – just as Hughes and Massey would argue for 
its continuation in 1921. Indeed, the reception of the new alliance in Australasia spoke volumes 
about how closely this rationale was aligned with opinion throughout the British Pacific. In one 
editorial, the Sydney Morning Herald noted that it was glad to learn of the renewal, and indeed it 
hoped that the alliance would again be renewed in 1921, ‘but that we will then be able to face the 
possibility of its denunciation with confidence’.106 Hughes, serving as acting premier while Fisher 
was still in London, similarly welcomed the renewal on the grounds that it would give Australia 
‘breathing time’ to bring its house in order. Implicit in all this was the assumption that the respite 
was only temporary: Australia would again have to confront its geopolitical exposure ten years 
later. Pearce, who had made the point explicitly during the conference, found his anxieties 
confirmed when he visited Japan on his return to Australia. ‘Government ironworks, coalmines, 
wireless stations, docks and shipyards, fort barracks and naval stations,’ he wrote ‘all proclaim 
Japan's readiness for war and the deadly earnestness with which she makes that readiness.’107 
‘Yellow Peril-ism’ remained alive and well, and the next few years would see these sentiments 
roaring to the fore once again. 
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SEVEN 
‘Must the bar of race be permanent?’:  
The British world and Japan, 1911-14 
    
 Writing in The Times in May 1913, just under a decade since the outbreak of the Russo-
Japanese War, Valentine Chirol, reflected on Japan’s ‘standing among the nations’: 
 
for the influence it must exercise on the future of the human race as a whole, no event 
which has happened within our own generation can compare with the rise of Japan… 
For within 50 years a nation, which is neither Occidental, nor White, nor Christian has 
for the first time taken its place…  as one of the Great Powers of the world.1  
 
Japan had made monumental strides. Its industrial modernisation, military triumphs, and more 
recent turn towards representative government – ‘hitherto exclusively associated with the West’ – 
all meant that Japan was now, in a position to claim equal standing with the Western powers. In 
practice, however, its entry into the ‘comity of civilisation’ had not been the triumphal procession 
that Chirol and other pro-Japanese commentators had hoped for. Instead, its expansion had 
produced a set of powerful opposite reactions, as white settlers and dejected China traders 
responded to Japan’s arrival by raising new barriers of race. Immigration had proved particularly 
contentious, and following the crisis of 1907-8, Japan had accepted – not without reluctance – 
that it could not expect its nationals to be treated on the same terms as Europeans at the 
Canadian, American, or Australian border. Through the ‘gentlemen’s agreements’ with Canada 
and the United States, it had salvaged a semblance of notional equality, by agreeing to restrict the 
flow of emigration voluntarily, provided no formal discrimination would be enacted. In effect, 
Japan had been forced to resign itself to the practical exclusion of its nationals as the price of 
continued cordial relations with the English-speaking powers. Katō Takaaki, the Japanese 
ambassador, told Grey in 1913 that Tokyo ‘understood it to be inevitable that [the] British self-
governing dominions should enforce measures to prevent increase of Japanese settlement in their 
territories’.2  
 Yet this remained a delicate balancing act. The Japanese government may have been 
willing to abdicate its treaty rights, yet the restrictions on Japanese immigration remained deeply 
unpopular, and commentators continued to press Tokyo to be more forceful in asserting its 
international status and defending the rights of overseas Japanese. 3  Among the white 
communities on the Pacific coast, meanwhile, many continued to demand firmer guarantees of 
their racial security than the ‘gentlemen’s agreements’ could offer. It took a generous measure of 
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political will on both sides, therefore, to keep the issue under control. Yet the immigration 
question could not be regarded as truly settled: in 1911, the dominion leaders had agreed to 
extend the Anglo-Japanese alliance largely on the assumption that it would prevent Japan from 
raising the immigration question for its duration. Meanwhile, a second arrangement had been 
cobbled together to ease Australasian fears of Japanese naval power. The 1909 naval agreement 
had promised, in theory, to combine Australia’s desire for an autonomous naval force with a 
robust imperial presence in the Pacific, even if its practical implementation had not yet been 
carried through.  
 From the spring of 1913 onwards, however, both sets of compromises again threatened 
to come unstuck. A new crisis in California, centred on the question of Japanese land ownership, 
reignited the immigration controversy in a new and potentially more menacing form, as Japan 
now began to take a firmer stance on the issue of non-discrimination. The Canadian government, 
meanwhile, worried about contagion to British Columbia, faced mounting pressure to 
supplement its own ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ with further safeguards. This in turn coincided with 
a naval scare in the Australasian dominions, who fretted (correctly) that the new regime at the 
Admiralty, now led by Winston Churchill, was preparing to jettison the Pacific agreement to 
concentrate fully on Germany. As war clouds gathered over Europe, it was Japan, and the 
prospect of racial conflict, that haunted inhabitants of the British Pacific. ‘The Pacific region… is 
overshadowed with this menace of Oriental expansion,’ noted Lancelot Lawton, the foreign 
editor of the Academy. ‘As a provocation of racial discord no more sinister problem could be 
imagined. It is a problem that stirs the elemental passions and desires of man.’4  
 
‘A vital principle’: The California land crisis 
  
 The Pacific scare of 1913-14, like previous the immigration crisis, began in California. 
Japanese immigration into the Golden State had slowed to a trickle after the finalisation of the 
‘gentlemen’s agreement’ in 1908; but the issue had refused to go away. It remained a deeply 
contested issue in local politics, and the state legislature at Sacramento typically began each new 
session with a flurry of anti-Japanese bills. Furthermore, Roosevelt’s repeated chastisements 
during the San Francisco schools controversy had created a clear opening for his political 
opponents to campaign on an exclusionist programme. During the presidential election of 1912, 
the Democratic Party explicitly fitted an anti-Japanese plank to its platform, distributing mass-
produced postcards that contrasted Woodrow Wilson’s stance on Asian immigration – ‘I stand 
for a national policy of exclusion’ – with Roosevelt’s proposal to naturalise the Japanese during 
his address to Congress in 1906. Wilson lost California, but only by a margin of 174 votes.5     
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 As the pace of immigration slowed down, the ‘Japanese question’ in California came to 
hinge on restricting the economic activities of Japanese already resident in the state, and 
particularly regarding the question of land ownership. Originally a mostly urban community, 
growing numbers of Japanese settlers had taken up jobs in agriculture, and many went on to own 
or lease their own land. By 1910, over half of all adult Japanese men in California were engaged 
in farming, and by 1913, Japanese settlers owned, leased, or worked over 281,000 acres of land 
across the state.6 The effect on white farmers was predictable: anti-Japanese sentiment made 
inroads into rural areas, and smallholders’ associations joined organised labour as a second prong 
in the exclusion movement. Starting in 1909, the state legislature made repeated attempts to bar 
Japanese from owning or leasing land, through the introduction of an ‘alien land bill’, that would 
forbid land ownership by ‘aliens ineligible for citizenship’. Under the current naturalisation law, 
that meant all those who could not prove either European or African descent: East Asians were 
excluded in toto. Thus far, California’s Republican governor, Hiram Johnson, had been responsive 
to the federal government’s wish not to allow an overtly anti-Japanese bill to go through. Yet by 
1913, with a Democrat in the White House and Johnson now outside the Republican Party – he 
had been Theodore Roosevelt’s running mate on the Progressive ticket in 1912 – the political 
balance had shifted. In March 1913, amid a state-wide campaign that rehearsed the familiar 
arguments against the supposedly ‘inassimilable’ Japanese, both Democrats and Progressives 
threw their weight behind a new land bill. ‘[T]he tide must be checked,’ Senator James Phelan, 
the doyen of the state Democratic party, wrote to Wilson, ‘otherwise California will become a 
Japanese plantation.’7 Wilson, a Southern Democrat who had run on a platform of states’ rights, 
made only a half-hearted effort to tone down its language. On 19 May, the Alien Land Bill 
became law.  
 The revival of the racial question in California sent ripples across the Pacific, and 
according to the new British ambassador to Tokyo, Sir William Conyngham Greene, was 
provoking a ‘storm of agitation’ in Japan.8 Mass demonstrations took place in Tokyo between 16 
and 19 April. Protesters gathered around the American embassy. Some even called for the 
Japanese fleet to be sent to California.9 The press was equally seething, and even papers aligned 
with the government abandoned their usual restraint; the Kokumin Shimbun, a liberal paper that 
had previously taken a moderate stance on the immigration question, now denounced the bill as 
‘immoral hypocrisy’ and a ‘national disgrace’.10 In the restive atmosphere that had gripped 
Japanese politics since death of the Meiji emperor in July 1912, such public agitation mattered: 
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the current government was the third in less than a year, and had been in office for less than two 
months when the land controversy broke. As Conyngham Greene cautioned London, Tokyo was 
now under substantial pressure to take a much stronger stance than it had during the schools 
controversy. Then, Japan had been willing to acquiesce in restrictions on immigration, but on the 
understanding that resident Japanese would not see their existing rights curtailed further; this was 
the implicit quid pro quo that underpinned the ‘gentlemen’s agreements’. The land bill did not 
merely violate this principle in actual practice – Greene thought it a transparent attempt to ‘drive 
[the Japanese] out of the country’ – but by basing itself on the racial bar in US naturalisation law, 
it explicitly targeted Japanese on the basis of their racial status. 11 As The Times observed, where 
the ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ had at least upheld Japan’s notional equality, the new bill carried 
‘implications of racial inferiority’ that the Japanese public deeply resented.12 As the bill made its 
way through the California legislature, the Japanese ambassador in Washington duly laid down a 
series of official protests: the new law was ‘mortifying’, as well as ‘deeply hurtful’ to Japan’s 
national sensibilities. Wilson continued to be evasive, again appealing to Hiram Johnson to 
remove the explicit racial provisions, but stopping well short of putting any real pressure on 
California.13 
 This was an issue, as Greene concluded, that went far beyond the status of Japanese in 
California. What was at stake was whether Japan could ever expect to be treated as a fully equal 
member of the international order, or whether it would continue to see its position circumscribed 
on account of its racial identity. The patience of the Japanese public, in particular, appeared to be 
running out. ‘People feel that the two successful wars which they have waged have not brought 
them all the reward they had hoped for, and that Japan, as one of the Great Powers, is still 
accepted more or less on sufferance.’14 The government remained committed to a diplomatic 
solution, but domestic pressure allowed it little room for compromise. On the American side, 
moreover, Wilson appeared to be far less steadfast in reining in the rhetorical excesses of 
Californian exclusionists than Roosevelt had been. There was a danger that the controversy 
might alienate Japanese opinion from the West altogether, and encourage it to seek refuge in the 
siren song of pan-Asianism. As Greene noted, the public mood in Japan was showing a troubling 
tendency of ‘contrasting the white races of the world with the coloured peoples, and accusing the 
former of having robbed the latter of their birthright’ – a charge of which the British Empire was 
no less guilty than the United States.15  
 Framing the land question as an issue of international racial equality was, in turn, a red 
rag to white opinion on the Pacific coast. ‘I gather that this is a question as to which the 
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inhabitants of Western America will admit no doubt,’ reported Cecil Spring-Rice, now British 
ambassador in Washington. California would never concede that the principle of racial equality 
gave Japan the right to challenge its immigration or naturalisation laws.16 ‘The US means to 
maintain peace,’ he noted, ‘but they cannot yield on the question of naturalisation or on that of 
land ownership’: that would mean ‘civil war’.17 Although British diplomats remained sceptical 
that the issue might lead to a Japanese-American confrontation – Lord Bryce, then visiting Japan, 
thought the notion ‘absurd’ – Spring-Rice warned that the danger should not be underestimated. 
The foundations of American power in the Pacific were fragile: the Philippines and Hawaii were 
‘absolutely vulnerable’, and the Japanese navy ‘could occupy the islands tomorrow if they 
wished’.18 Hardliners in Tokyo might be tempted to strike before the completion of the Panama 
Canal shifted the strategic balance to the United States. ‘The example of the Russian war might 
well embolden the wilder spirits in Japan to take the risk.’19  
 Back in London, the Foreign Office watched the revival of the racial question with a 
sense of foreboding, which grew worse as the United States began to hint once again at the 
possibility of a united Anglo-American front against Japanese immigration. On 16 May, the 
William Jennings Bryan, Wilson’s secretary of state, called at the British embassy to request 
whether Britain, ‘in the interests of peace’, would serve as an intermediary between the United 
States and Japan. ‘[It] appears as if it might become necessary to put in a word at Tokyo’, Spring-
Rice reported.20 The Foreign Office spotted the danger: such an intervention meant using the 
alliance as leverage on the racial question, which both sides had studiously avoided over the past 
decade.21 ‘A word from us at Tokyo, which is what the U.S. really want, would be tantamount to 
inviting Japan to surrender a degree of the vital principle at stake.’22 This would not only 
endanger the alliance itself, which, as one official noted, was ‘of a peculiarly sensitive nature,’ but 
also risked reviving the question of Japanese exclusion in the white dominions. As Francis Dyke 
Acland, the parliamentary undersecretary, argued, it was ‘too delicate a matter for us to interfere 
in unless we are prepared to risk the whole Japanese alliance’.23 Non-intervention cut both ways, 
and London also remained careful not to give Japan the impression that it would support its 
claims, as this might raise awkward complications for exclusion in the dominions: ‘we do not 
want the Japanese Govt. to imagine that we are on their side now.’24 Maintaining the balancing 
act between Japan and the white empire was as delicate as ever. 
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 The California question, hinging as it did on the legitimacy of the colour bar, also 
sparked a wider debate on the role of race in the international system. Chirol, now retired from 
The Times, took to his former paper to warn of the dangers of letting racial prejudice stand in the 
way of Japan’s integration into the ‘comity of nations’ – the same case he had made during the 
Russo-Japanese War.25 Over the last fifty years, Chirol argued, Japan had ‘made good her title to 
be treated on a footing of complete equality as one of the Great Powers of the world’. The real 
question at the core of the land bill controversy was whether those achievements would translate 
into full acceptance as a civilised power, or ‘whether her Asiatic descent is permanently to 
disqualify her for the enjoyment of full rights freely accorded to one another by the great 
nations’. The traditional ‘economic’ defence for exclusion – that it would lower wages and living 
standards – had become unsustainable, Chirol argued, since the average Japanese migrant was 
superior to ‘many at least of the ignorant and squalid masses’ freely admitted into the United 
States every year. The California controversy revolved around race, and race alone, and Japan 
could not be expected to put up with such discrimination indefinitely. The issue would only grow 
worse, Chirol warned, as Japan’s old guard gave way to the rise of popular government, ‘for the 
more democratic Japan grows, the more strongly will she resent any slur upon her position’. Just 
as white democracy had built up the Great White Walls, so a democratic Japan would seek to tear 
them down.   
 Chirol understood that the revival of the racial question in such a form carried profound 
ramifications for the British Empire. To his friend Lord Hardinge, now viceroy of India, he 
noted that if the California crisis was to lead to real trouble – a contingency that could not be 
dismissed – Britain’s predicament would be precarious in the extreme. London was still formally 
bound to Japan, but ‘in the Dominions at any rate, the feeling in favour of the United States on 
such an issue will be universally and overwhelmingly strong’.26 If it should come to war, the 
alliance could not be preserved; rather, the dominions would press Britain to actively side with 
the United States. Yet to do so would be to range imperial policy along the colour line, which 
might seriously embarrass it with the empire’s non-white subjects. Indian radicals would have a 
pulpit from which ‘to inflame Indian opinion against the white man, and to regard Japan as the 
champion of Asia against the West’.27 It was a problem with which Hardinge, who spent much of 
his viceroyalty dealing with the discrimination against Indians in South Africa, was intimately 
familiar. ‘These self-governing Colonies have the right to do absolutely as they like, and there is 
much to be said in favour of exclusion,’ he noted to Lord Crewe, ‘but it is difficult to reconcile 
these principles with the inclusion of India within the Empire.’ 28  
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 Chirol’s warnings in turn drew a response from the American admiral and naval 
historian A.T. Mahan. Writing in The Times, Mahan rejected Chirol’s claim that Japan’s 
transformation over the past half-century had made racial difference irrelevant. Japanese society 
retained ‘strong racial marks’, which prevented the assimilation of its nationals into the white 
democratic societies. The Japanese in the United States, therefore, would remain ‘a solid 
homogenous body, essentially and unchangedly foreign’. 29 Other commentators also came out in 
defence of exclusion, noting that the racial sentiments of the Californians were widely shared by 
the white dominions, and that Britain had an obligation to heed the democratic sentiments of its 
colonists. Warnings that the empire might split along the colour line again made their appearance 
in the press: thus the naval writer Archibald Hurd warned that if left unchecked, the ‘anti-Asiatic 
movement’ would become ‘the determinative factor of Imperial policy’, stronger even than the 
‘sentiment of kinship’ with Britain. Unless London reassured its colonists that it understood their 
position on the ‘great racial problem’, it would see ‘the growth of a movement which may 
dismember the Empire’. 30 The naval correspondent of the Observer similarly noted that if the 
California controversy would drag Japan and the United States into war, ‘the United States would 
be fighting the battle of the white man’s civilisation’, while Strachey’s Spectator doubted ‘whether 
the Empire could survive such an outrage to the feelings of a large and important part of its 
white population’.31  
 
‘A red herring across the California trail’? Canada and Japanese Immigration 
 
 The scenario that haunted British observers most was a repeat of 1907, when the 
California crisis had spilled over into Canada, and already there were troubling signs this might 
happen again. As Spring-Rice reported from Washington, opinion in British Columbia on the 
Japanese question was of a kind with California, and would certainly come out in support of the 
United States if Japan continued to oppose the land bill: ‘The Pacific Slope will stand firm on this 
point and stand together.’32 Similar alarms were raised in British Columbia itself: T.R.E McInnes 
warned that American agitators would again attempt to stir up tensions north of the border in an 
attempt to step up the pressure on Japan. The Vancouver riot, had after all, ‘at that time certainly 
served the diplomacy of the United States’, and British Columbia might again be dragged ‘as a 
red herring across the California trail’.33 The Canadian prime minister asked the Washington 
embassy to be kept closely informed of developments in California, as he considered the 
question to be ‘of the highest importance’.34 
                                                      
29 ‘Japan Among the Nations: Admiral Mahan’s Views,’ The Times, 23 June 1913.  
30 Archibald Hurd, ‘The Racial War in the Pacific: An Imperial Peril,’ Fortnightly Review, June 1913.   
31 ‘United States and Japan,’ Observer, 18 May 1913; ‘The United States, Japan, and Britain,’ Spectator, 24 May 1913. 
32 Spring-Rice to Grey, 7 Jul 1913, NA, Grey Papers, FO 800/83. 
33 McInnes to Borden, 7 Aug 1913, LAC, Borden Papers, C-4231, ff. 17120-22.  
34 Spring-Rice to Grey, 29 Jan 1914, NA, Grey Papers, FO 800/84. 
 181 
 That prime minister was no longer the urbane Wilfrid Laurier, but his successor, the 
Conservative leader Robert Borden. After towering over Canadian politics for fifteen years, 
Laurier was defeated in the election of October 1911, as divisions within his own party over the 
naval question and a reciprocity treaty with the United States sparked a Liberal collapse in 
Quebec and Ontario. Borden won by a landslide.35 The election brought a change in Canadian 
attitudes towards Japan: Laurier had been a strong advocate for expanding economic ties with 
Asia, and although his pro-Japanese views cooled in the wake of the Vancouver riots, he had 
consistently pursued the resolution of the immigration problem through diplomatic engagement. 
Alone among the dominion premiers, he had endorsed the Anglo-Japanese alliance with real 
enthusiasm at the 1911 conference. Borden took a more detached view. After the Vancouver 
riots, he had openly flirted with turning his Conservatives into the party of ‘White Canada’: he 
had conducted a speaking tour of British Columbia, published a pamphlet containing his 
speeches against Japanese immigration, and fitted an exclusionist plank to the Conservative 
platform during the 1908 election. 36 Notably, and perhaps curiously for a politician often 
associated with the flag-waving Britannic nationalism of Ontario and the Maritimes, Borden also 
laid less stress on the ‘imperial’ connotations of the immigration question (i.e. the need to respect 
Indian and Japanese sensibilities) than Laurier. His empire, like that of Deakin and Ward, was a 
white, English-speaking one.   
 One immediate effect of the Conservative victory was to bring the exclusionist 
aspirations of British Columbia into the inner circle of government. Sir Richard McBride, the 
province’s long-serving premier, enjoyed direct access to Borden, and wasted no time in urging 
the abrogation of the Lemieux agreement and the introduction of an exclusion act. ‘Asiatics are 
still coming to the country in great numbers,’ he claimed, ‘and today are as much a menace 
against white settlement and white labour as ever before in the history of the Province.’37 Borden 
made conciliatory noises, but was privately sceptical that the situation was as dire as McBride 
claimed: according to the monthly statistics of the British embassy in Tokyo, fewer Japanese were 
leaving for Canada than at any time since the Russo-Japanese War. As he noted during his visit to 
London in the summer of 1912, Japanese immigration was ‘almost within negligible limits,’ 
although British Columbia would raise ‘a little outcry now and then’.38 
  Even in the absence of a pressing case, the government made an effort to meet 
McBride’s concerns. In January 1912, Joseph Pope – the official who had accompanied Lemieux 
to Tokyo – drafted a memorandum for a new immigration policy, acknowledging that would 
acknowledge that British Columbians were determined to develop their province as a ‘White 
Man’s Country’ and viewed the presence of ‘alien races’ with ‘deep seated repugnance and 
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alarm’.39 If left unchecked, such immigration would ‘by mere weight of numbers… threaten the 
supremacy of the white race’ in Canada. Pope now argued that the Lemieux agreement, which 
controlled immigration remotely, in collaboration with Tokyo, lacked ‘permanence and stability’, 
and offered insufficient protection against such a danger. If the numbers should increase, this 
might compel the government to adopt ‘more exclusive measures against the immigration of 
Asiatic races into Canada’. Better to do this soon, Pope argued, before another popular outcry in 
British Columbia forced Canada to adopt a policy truly offensive to Japan. Ottawa, in other 
words, should seek to erect an inner wall of domestic legislation on which it could fall back if the 
Lemieux agreement were to collapse.    
 The opportunity arose when Canada considered its adhesion to the new Anglo-Japanese 
commercial treaty in the opening months of 1913. In 1906, Laurier had adhered to the treaty 
unconditionally, yet now, as Borden argued in a cabinet memorandum, he could no longer simply 
accept the treaty’s provisions for reciprocal free movement. There was a ‘deep-seated feeling’ in 
British Columbia, he noted, that a further Japanese influx ‘would mark the beginning of an era 
during which the northern half of this continent would probably pass from the control of the 
white races which now possess and inhabit it’.40 In February 1913, Borden duly informed the 
Japanese consul that Canada would only renew the treaty under the reservation that it would not 
interfere with the 1910 Immigration Act, which gave the government the power to impose a 
blanket ban on immigrants of ‘any race deemed unsuited to the climate or conditions of Canada’ 
– although he stressed that the act was unlikely to be invoked if Japan continued to restrict 
emigration ‘within proper and reasonable limits’.41  
 Ottawa, then, had already become increasingly dissatisfied with the Lemieux agreement 
as the sole instrument for limiting Japanese immigration. During the summer of 1913, when the 
controversy rising up in California once again threatened to spread to British Columbia, it 
became a matter of some urgency. Conditions were particularly volatile in the collieries of 
Vancouver Island, then in the midst of a prolonged industrial standoff. Riots broke out in several 
mining towns in August, sparked at least in part by the employment of Japanese and Chinese 
miners as strike breakers; in the town of South Wellington, the militia was forced to intervene as 
strikers attacked Chinese miners and burned their houses.42 There was a growing movement in 
British Columbia, The Times reported, to emulate the California land law.43 Borden continued to 
be pressed by his British Columbian correspondents to take an even sterner line on exclusion. 
‘The Japs [sic] are still coming in,’ wrote McBride, ‘and their invasion into industrial circles 
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becomes more marked from year to year.’44 After the mining riots, McBride travelled to Ottawa 
to petition Borden for further restrictions.45 In a sure sign of brewing trouble, T.R.E. McInnes 
again began to angle for employment as a special commissioner on immigration, urging Borden 
to enact domestic restrictions as a failsafe for the Lemieux agreement. Japan might object, but 
Canada would be able to count on the support of the United States instead: 
 
The same wall raised against an Asiatic influx on the Canadian coast as on that of the 
United States would insure to Canada the active support of the United States in any future Asiatic 
complications in which Canada might become involved, wither diplomatic or worse. For 
such purposes the American fleet on the Pacific would be ours.46  
 
 Borden wasted little time preparing to pull up the drawbridge. Echoing McBride, he 
declared to Pope that the Japanese and their ‘manifold activities’ in British Columbia were posing 
a serious problem for the future of the province: ‘These energetic people are reaching in every 
direction… the white races cannot possibly compete with them.’47 This was a familiar nexus of 
economics and race: the ‘efficiency’ of Japanese settlers, and their willingness to accept lower 
wages, threatened to drive down white living standards to the point where British Columbia 
would lose its appeal as a ‘white man’s country’.  Nothing short of a near-total ban on 
immigration, and the imposition of further restrictions on the economic activities of Japanese 
settlers, would suffice. Already since April 1912, the British Columbian government refused to 
issue logging or fishing licenses to businesses employing East Asian labour. 48  Finally, in 
December 1913, following rumours that the winter might bring an additional influx of 
immigration from India, and citing the ‘very severe’ condition of the British Columbian labour 
market, the government issued an Order-in-Council – which it would continuously renew until 
March 1916 – barring all labourers attempting to enter Canada through its Pacific ports.  
 This measure brought Canada more fully in line with the turn to exclusion that had 
swept through the British world in the preceding decades. Indeed, the blanket ban on the entry 
of labourers set a new standard for severity: South Africa and New Zealand introduced laws 
modelled on the Canadian one in 1913 and 1920, respectively.49 Yet it also brought Borden face 
to face with a familiar problem: how the effective exclusion of Japanese migrants could be 
reconciled with an at least nominal commitment to racial equality. The Order-in-Council 
provoked a strong protest from the Japanese consul, who was ‘very insistent in a courteous way’ 
(Borden noted in his diary) that it violated both the spirit and the letter of the Lemieux 
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agreement.50 Japan had earnestly restrained emigration to Canada precisely to avoid the necessity 
of this kind of measure, and the Japanese government was anxious ‘keep this principle  of the 
Lemieux understanding in its integrity and entirety’.51 After a few days of tense haggling, Borden, 
despite his earlier reservations, effectively reaffirmed the agreement with Japan: Canada would 
not apply the Order-in-Council to exempted classes of Japanese, provided that Tokyo kept 
numbers to an absolute minimum.  
 Canada’s engagement with Japan had now been well and truly shorn of the optimism 
that had marked it in the heady aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War; for Borden, the Pacific was 
to be a barrier, not a bridge. At the same time, he had been forced to tread cautiously: the 
California had shown where explicit discrimination might lead. The close relationship between 
Ottawa and British Columbia cut both ways, and it allowed Borden to mitigate the province’s 
anti-Japanese attitude without recourse to the ritualistic grandstanding of the Laurier years. 
McBride was quietly instructed to drop an alien land bill modelled on California in the spring of 
1914.52 The Lemieux agreement had been shaken, but Borden had decided it was worth keeping. 
Despite the popular agitation sparked by the Komagata Maru incident, when a vessel conveying 
nearly four hundred Indian passengers was held up in Vancouver harbour for several months, 
there was no repeat of the 1907 riots, no attempt to re-establish a pan-American exclusion 
league.53  
 
‘The only thing for which Australia would throw over the Empire’: The Pacific crisis, 1911-1914 
 
 The relative quiescence of British Columbia was not matched in the Australasian 
dominions, however, where the outbreak of the California crisis coincided with a deepening 
controversy about Britain’s ability to keep its Pacific possessions secure. During the 1911 
conference, the dominion premiers had discussed the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 
an atmosphere of relative strategic calm. Soon afterwards, however, competition with Germany 
again broke the surface. With the Agadir crisis of July 1911, the announcement of a new German 
naval law in January 1912, and the subsequent breakdown of the negotiations over a ‘naval 
holiday’, the naval race entered a new phase of intensity. London was left scrambling to find the 
ships to match Germany’s efforts in the North Sea and those of its allies, Italy and Austria-
Hungary, in the Mediterranean. With this, crucially, came a change of personnel: in August 1911, 
the navy’s inability to present a credible war plan forced McKenna’s resignation. His 
replacement, Winston Churchill, would oversee another dramatic shift in naval strategy: in 
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August 1912, most capital ships on the Mediterranean were moved to the North Sea.  A 
committed follower of A.T. Mahan, Churchill believed that the preservation of British sea power 
required the concentration of overwhelming forces against its most likely challenger, even at the 
cost of a withdrawal from strategic theatres of secondary importance. ‘Mastery of the seas,’ he 
noted in one early memorandum, hinged not on the ‘simultaneous occupation of every sea,’ but 
rather ‘upon the ability to defeat the strongest battlefleet or combination wh. can be brought to 
bear… The sea is all one, and war is all one.’54 The upshot was that Britain would lean more 
heavily on its allies – France in the Mediterranean and Japan in the Pacific – for the defence of its 
outer empire.  
 Churchill’s naval policies have been sometimes portrayed as the consummation of the 
shift towards concentration begun under Selborne and Fisher. In truth, they constituted a much 
more radical turn; the abandonment of the Mediterranean, certainly, marked a revolution in 
British grand strategy, and contemporaries perceived it as such. 55  As a strategic vision, 
concentrating the vast majority of British battleships in the North Sea could be justified as a 
necessary response to the naval race. Yet it required the ruthless subordination of competing 
claims on British power, and the Admiralty’s withdrawal from ‘subsidiary’ theatres was bitterly 
opposed, particularly by those who remembered Churchill’s membership of the ‘economist’ 
faction the 1909 naval scare and saw him as a ‘little Englander’ determined to run the defence of 
the empire on the cheap.56 ‘We exist as an Empire to-day,’ wrote an anxious Leo Amery, ‘by the 
grace of the Americans and Japanese. No empire can live for long by foreign favour or foreign 
alliances.’ 57  Churchill, for his part, was equally determined to bring the navy in line with the 
requirements of British strategy, and cut the habit of maintaining ships on distant stations for 
prestige reasons alone: ‘empty parades of foolish little ships “displaying the flag” in unfrequented 
seas,’ was his verdict.58 
 Mahanist strategy, combined with a scepticism towards dominion navalism that dated 
back to his time at the Colonial Office, made Churchill also inclined to revise the agreements for 
naval defence worked out with the dominions at the 1909 defence conference. In July 1910, 
while still Home Secretary, he had already protested against the Admiralty’s decision to send a 
newly completed battlecruiser to Hong Kong. If British naval supremacy had been so urgently at 
risk, as he and his fellow ‘economists’ had been led to believe in early 1909, then how could the 
Admiralty now have ships to spare for a strategic backwater? These views crystallised during his 
tenure as First Lord, as Churchill began an increasingly determined effort to scale down Britain’s 
commitments in the Pacific, and to direct imperial naval contributions to the North Sea. The 
HMS New Zealand, the battleship donated by Ward during the 1909 scare, and which the 
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Admiralty had earmarked as the new flagship of the China station, was ‘urgently required’ for the 
home fleet.59 The naval agreement with Australia he thought ‘not very satisfactory’ for similar 
reasons: ‘every ship possible should be brought home from Australian waters’.60 Nor were his 
efforts directed at the dominions alone: in the summer of 1913, he floated a proposal to offload 
the cost of the East Indies squadron – which he thought a form of ‘purely local Indian defence’ – 
onto the Indian exchequer.61  
 These centralising efforts received an early boon in the form of the prospect of a new 
naval settlement with Canada, following Borden’s elevation to the premiership. After decrying 
Laurier’s naval policies as overly cautious and unbefitting of Canada’s status – ‘silent and inactive’ 
was his verdict – Borden now saw his way clear to expand the dominion’s contribution to 
imperial defence. 62 During the premier’s visit to Britain in July 1912, Churchill, for his part, 
seized the opportunity to rewrite the rules of Anglo-dominion partnership. The new Canadian 
naval bill, finally laid before parliament in December, bore a distinct Churchillian stamp: Canada 
would fund the construction of three dreadnoughts, to be built in Britain and deployed in the 
North Sea. The announcement sent ripples of excitement through the imperialist press. The 
Times, under the influence of its Canadian correspondent, the Round Tabler John Willison, was 
ecstatic. The Round Table itself enthused that Canada had finally converted to the new gospel of 
empire: ‘It may well be that Mr. Borden’s declarations will mark the commencement of a new era 
in the Empire’s history.’63 Indeed, Churchill was already looking for ways to goad the other 
dominions into following the Canadian example. As early as April 1912, he proposed to Asquith 
that Borden might be persuaded to call another defence conference, where the 1909 agreement – 
with its awkward commitments to the Pacific – could be suspended. Instead, Australia and New 
Zealand would make direct contributions to a grand imperial fleet, that would patrol the world’s 
oceans, with Britain ‘holding off the big dog’ in the North Sea.64 Churchill expected that the 
realisation that their security ultimately rested with the primacy of the Royal Navy would bring 
the Pacific dominions, willy-nilly, into the fold.  
 As far as Japan was concerned, Churchill was effectively bringing British naval strategy 
in line with its foreign policy. Since the Russo-Japanese War, the Foreign Office had increasingly 
come to believe that the primary purpose of the Anglo-Japanese alliance was that it kept Britain’s 
hands free to concentrate on Germany. Thus far, however, that assumption had not fully trickled 
down into defence policy:  since the adoption of the ‘fleet unit’ scheme in 1909, the Admiralty 
had committed to develop a substantial naval presence in the Pacific. At the 1911 imperial 
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conference, again, the dominions had been urged to accelerate their local defence measures as a 
counterweight to the growth of Japanese power. Now, Churchill struck a very different tone. The 
1909 agreement would be abandoned. There would be no ‘fleet units’ on Hong Kong or 
Singapore to make up a ‘Pacific fleet’ in wartime. The New Zealand would be kept in the North 
Sea. And if his Canadian ploy was any indication, then Churchill – with the backing of the 
imperial centralisers clustered around The Times and the Round Table – now envisioned its 
‘partnership’ with the dominions as a return to direct contributions to the home fleet. For 
Richard Jebb, always a keen observer of empire, such a policy amounted to a dangerous return to 
a ‘hard-and-fast imperial federation’ that rode roughshod over local nationalism.65 It was certain 
to alienate the Pacific dominions, ‘whose naval policy is the direct result of their instinctive 
perception that their White Australia principle is a standing provocation to Japan and China’.66 
 Naval historians have debated whether Churchill’s abandonment of the 1909 agreement 
was a matter of sound strategic sense, or whether it needlessly aborted a sophisticated system of 
collective security.67 Either way, as Jebb had predicted, it was deeply unpopular in Australia. 
Arthur Jose, the fiercely independent Sydney correspondent of The Times, engaged in a protracted 
correspondence with his colleagues in London over the Admiralty’s decision to revise the naval 
arrangements for the Pacific without deigning to consult the Australians.68 ‘The whole basis of 
Australian self-defence,’ he wrote to his editor, the Round Tabler Edward Grigg, ‘is the firm 
belief that there must be eventually, and at no long interval, a concentration of Imperial naval 
power in the Pacific against Japan just as there is a concentration of it in the Atlantic against 
Germany.’ Australia would ‘do its share’, but it expected its naval contribution to be part of a 
larger imperial effort: ‘it could not, and it cannot, stand by itself’.69 For Churchill to revise the 
Pacific agreement now unilaterally, without providing an alternative source of security against 
Japan, was ‘simply indecent’.  
 Frederic Eggleston, a leading light in imperialist circles in Melbourne, drew up a similarly 
scathing critique. Concentration in the North Sea, he argued in the Round Table, left Australia 
isolated as ‘a lonely outpost of European civilisation,’ and acutely vulnerable to the ‘Yellow 
Peril’.70 London’s assurances that the security of the Pacific could be comfortably left to the 
Japanese betrayed a fundamental ignorance of Australian feeling on the subject: without a 
credible local naval presence, the Anglo-Japanese alliance could only be regarded as a ‘paper 
barrier’. Most worryingly of all, if Britain continued to neglect Australian fears of Japan, it would 
revive the old complaint that ‘England is notoriously out of sympathy with, and does not 
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understand, our exclusion policy.’ For Eggleston, the Australian predicament vindicated the 
policy of national navalism: only by building a credible national defence, establishing its own 
navy, and by inviting the cooperation of its fellow dominions, could Australia expect to have its 
own strategic views heard in London.  
 Such views had long been held in Australia, and following the election of Massey’s 
Reform party in August 1912, they were also nailed to the mast in New Zealand. James Allen, 
now minister of defence, was a leading advocate for an independent naval presence: the southern 
dominions, he had declared in 1909, should work together ‘to build up a fleet sufficiently 
strong… to repel any Japanese menace, and to keep them from attempting to come down to 
Australia and New Zealand’. 71 Now in government, Allen advocated ending New Zealand’s 
‘tributary’ naval subsidy, and joining with the Australians in organising a joint naval policy for the 
South Pacific. This in turn required consultation with the Admiralty, and in February 1913, Allen 
arrived in London to press the dominion’s new defence agenda on the imperial government. For 
Churchill, this was an embarrassment: New Zealand had been the greatest supporter of a policy 
of direct contributions to the Royal Navy; now, it was heading down the Australian path of 
national navalism. Worse, Churchill rightly suspected that Allen would demand that the return of 
the New Zealand to Pacific waters.  
 Just how divided their strategic priorities were quickly became clear. Churchill, for his 
part, framed his arguments in a classic exposition of Mahanian strategy. At the present time, ‘the 
naval power and the alliances based on the naval power of Great Britain’ kept the Australasian 
colonies ‘perfectly safe’. ‘The only event which could expose them to any danger,’ Churchill went 
on, ‘would be the destruction of the British naval power in Home waters.’ In that event, the 
predicament of the dominions would be hopeless: the Australasians could not possibly hope to 
match the Japanese fleet by themselves alone.72 Allen did not deny that the dominion’s security 
was tied up with British sea power; indeed he conceded that New Zealand would be ready to 
‘forego her own desires’ if Britain was acutely threatened in the North Sea.73 Yet relying 
exclusively on the British navy – let alone the Japanese alliance –would be a denial of New 
Zealand’s aspirations: ‘national sentiment and local patriotism’ demanded that New Zealand 
operated its own fleet. It was also risky: it was easy to imagine a scenario in which the naval 
situation in Europe would prevent Britain sending its main fleet east of Suez if and when Japan 
should turn hostile.74 Churchill attempted a hasty compromise by proposing to reorganise all 
dominions ships into an ‘imperial’ fleet based at Gibraltar. From there, he argued, where they 
could reinforce any threatened area ‘in a shorter time than any European force of equal power 
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could move’.75 It failed to mollify Allen, who retorted that such a fleet would still be too far away 
for comfort: ‘We do not fear a European force. That is the crux of the matter.’76  
  Churchill’s exchanges with Allen were the most wide-ranging discussions of the ‘Pacific 
problem’ since the 1909 defence conference, and although the two men were able to arrive at a 
face-saving agreement on a number of technical questions, the core strategic problem – the 
British world-system’s two-ocean dilemma – remained unresolved. Speaking at Vancouver on his 
return journey to New Zealand, Allen argued pointedly that London simply did not seem to 
grasp the urgency of the danger posed by the rise of Japan. What rankled him most of all was the 
British government’s inability to grasp that the empire’s future not only hinged on the defence of 
the home islands, but also on the consolidation of the white frontier in the Pacific: ‘They did not 
see the need of keeping the race pure.’ In the long run, Allen declared, a united empire would be 
strong enough to dispense with foreign alliances altogether.77 Eggleston, who forwarded a copy 
of Allen’s speech to his fellow Round Tablers in London, similarly fumed against ‘the 
impossibility of getting Englishmen to appreciate the views of the Dominions in regard to the 
admission of Asiatics’. 78  Britain needed to understand that for the majority of Australasians, this 
was the sine qua non of imperial cooperation. ‘If the Empire does not stand to protect the British 
race or nationality I do not know that it has any real justification for its existence as an Empire.’ 
From London, Grigg hastened to reassure him that the Round Table, and British opinion at 
large, remained committed to exclusion: ‘Everybody here believes in the white Australia policy 
and is determined to do the utmost to support it.'79  
 Allen’s castigations of British indifference resonated within a wider atmosphere of racial 
anxiety, reinforced by the crisis in California. From Washington, Spring-Rice noted that 
Australian politicians showed ‘strong sympathy’ on the Californian issue, and if the United States 
were to go to war with Japan, they would ‘probably have Canada and Australia fighting on their 
side’.80 The Australasian press stressed its solidarity with white Californians. ‘Wherever English is 
spoken around the Pacific there will be but one sentiment,’ declared the New Zealand Herald. ‘Ties 
of race and blood, community of interests, bonds of language and religion, leave no room for 
difference of opinion when American and Asiatic stand opposed to one another.'81 London’s 
apparent disregard for white cries of a ‘Yellow Peril’ also led some to revive the idea of 
partnership with the United States. Churchill himself had conceded that if British sea power 
should ever be broken on the North Sea, ‘the only course open to the five million of white men 
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in the Pacific would be to seek the protection of the United States’.82 A few months earlier, King 
O’Malley, Australia’s American-born minister for home affairs, had already argued along similar 
lines in a memorandum to Andrew Fisher. Mounting pressure in the North Sea was making it 
increasingly unlikely that Britain would be able to come to Australia’s aid if its security was 
imperilled. ‘In this connection,’ he believed, ‘thoughts naturally turn to the people speaking our 
own language already deeply interested in resisting foreign aggression in the Pacific—the people 
of the United States of America.’ In the future, Australia might have ‘to join with them as far as 
we may in keeping the Pacific for Anglo-Saxons’.83 Nor was the United States the only alternative 
protector, as Arthur Jose pointedly reminded The Times’ London office:  
 
White Australia, to which she believes Japan hostile, is the one thing for which Australia 
would throw over the Empire – I believe sincerely that she would accept German 
domination if that were the only apparent way of keeping herself white.84 
 
Such statements caused the naval writer Archibald Hurd, himself a committed Mahanist, to warn 
that the Admiralty’s failure to reassure the dominions that it took their racial security seriously 
was ultimately self-defeating. ‘This growing anxiety of the white peoples of the Pacific is 
undermining every sound principle of naval strategy.’85 
 The Admiralty remained largely oblivious to the panic its policies were provoking in 
Australasia. Churchill himself was merely irritated by the ‘loose talk’ in the dominions over his 
supposed abandonment of the dominions. He had no intention to lay imaginary fears to rest by 
sending real ships to the Pacific. ‘It is high time,’ Churchill grumbled to the ranking official at the 
Admiralty, ‘that the Dominions had the true strategic conception on which the Empire is 
conducted impressed upon them.’86 The Australian government was duly informed that the 
China squadron, as presently constituted, was more than capable of seeing off any likely enemy in 
those distant waters. Yet this assessment excluded Japan, which ‘in view of the existing alliance’ 
was not considered a likely enemy.87 The First Lord reiterated the point during his Parliamentary 
speech on the naval estimates on 17 March. Supremacy in the North Sea was the keystone of the 
empire’s global strategy. As long as Britain continued to hold a reasonable margin of superiority 
over the German fleet, the outer empire would be safe. By the same token, supremacy in the 
North Sea underpinned the Anglo-Japanese alliance, as Japan would continue depend on the 
British to keep the East Asian ring clear of European rivals. This was ‘the strong continuing 
bond of interest’ that kept the alliance intact, and in turn guaranteed the ‘true and effective 
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protection’ of the southern dominions. 88  Clearly, Churchill’s thinking had yielded little to 
Australasian objections: the sections of his speech dealing with the Pacific were copied verbatim 
from the memorandum prepared for Allen’s instruction in the CID the previous year.89  
 In one fell swoop, Churchill all but dismissed the Australasian naval efforts over the past 
decade as an exercise in strategic futility; only New Zealand’s dreadnought donation he praised as 
an act of ‘profound wisdom’. This was bound to antagonise the dominion governments, always 
prickly towards metropolitan condescension. Even worse was Churchill’s intimation that 
Australasia’s security could be entrusted to the Japanese alliance. To Churchill, this might have 
appeared obvious. Yet it seriously ruffled the Australians, to whom the alliance had been sold in 
1911 as a restraint on Japan, not as a contract for their protection. To now inform them 
otherwise was, as the journalist Henry Stead, who was visiting Australia, noted to the colonial 
secretary, ‘simply gall and woodworm to the Australians on whom the Asiatic danger has been 
worked for all its worth for many years’.90  
 The effect was explosive. In New Zealand, Massey declared that he ‘did not believe for 
one moment that the Anglo-Japanese alliance secured the safety of either Australia or New 
Zealand’.91 In a lengthy response to Churchill’s speech, Senator Millen, the Australian defence 
minister, railed against the fact that Australia was now being asked ‘to rely upon the Japanese 
treaty alone for the peace of the Pacific’.92 This was an interpretation of the alliance that the 
dominions had never agreed to, and it was fundamentally at odds with Australia’s aspirations to 
run its own Pacific navy. George Pearce fully endorsed Millen’s remarks. The Japanese alliance 
had its uses, he noted to the governor-general – it was certainly ‘better for Australia than a 
German-Japanese alliance would be’. Yet it could not be allowed to postpone or derail the 
establishment of a robust Pacific defence:  
 
We insist that there ought to be a British Fleet in the Pacific; without it British diplomacy 
is nullified in one of the great oceans of the world and we are compelled to allow our 
policy to be dictated by our ally.93 
 
The Australasian press, meanwhile, pilloried Churchill as a traitor to the white empire: the 
Melbourne Punch denounced the First Lord as an ‘arrant Little Englander’ and an ‘impetuous 
anti-imperialist’. The only true guarantee of a ‘White Australia’, it declared, ‘would be a white 
man’s fleet’.94 From the opposite end of the political spectrum, the editor of the Bulletin similarly 
accused Churchill of bargaining away Australia’s racial security. The moment that trouble should 
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break out in Europe, Japan would hold Australia at its mercy, ‘and we would have our northern 
shores immediately inundated with hordes of Japanese and Chinese immigrants’. Even German 
rule would be infinitely preferable to ‘yellow domination’.95  
 Churchill’s collision with the dominions illustrated, as the Round Table put it, the ‘pre-
Raphaelite’ character of the Pacific problem, ‘in which the values of foreground, middle distance 
and remoter distance are all the same’.96 The two Australasian dominions had never disputed that 
their present security hinged on the Royal Navy’s ability to see off the German threat; this was 
the calculus that underlay the dreadnought donations in 1909, and their acquiescence in the 
renewal of the alliance in 1911. Yet in the background, its contours clearly visible, stood Japan, 
and the looming danger of ‘a Pacific Armageddon’ that would decide Australasia’s racial 
destiny.97 Throughout the past decade, successive Australian and New Zealand governments had 
justified their defence policies as preparation for a distant, but inevitable confrontation with Asia. 
Imperial defence policy, by extension, was expected to serve the interests of the ‘British race’ in 
the Pacific as well as in the North Sea.   
 These diverging perspectives on the purpose of the British connection were again 
illustrated when General Ian Hamilton, who was visiting New Zealand in his capacity as 
inspector-general of Britain’s overseas garrisons, waded into the controversy. Congratulating the 
New Zealanders on their military preparations in a speech in Auckland on 13 May, Hamilton 
alluded in barely veiled terms to the danger of racial war, in which ‘it might be decided whether 
Asiatics or Europeans were going to guide the destinies of this planet’.98 To prolonged applause, 
he declared that Australia and New Zealand were on the edge of the ‘danger zone’, and 
accordingly needed to guard themselves against ‘people of low standards and low ideals,’ able to 
subsist ‘on a couple of meals of rice a day’. Hamilton’s audience was undoubtedly thrilled to find 
its geo-racial fears endorsed by a senior army officer, and coverage of his speech in the 
Australasian press was glowing.  Hamilton was sufficiently pleased to forward a copy of his 
speech to Richard McBride in British Columbia, with the request to publish it in Vancouver 
where, he added, ‘it seems that the Asiatic is [also] knocking at your gates’.99 Japan’s antagonism 
to the West was primordial, and required constant watchfulness: hence the British needed to 
keep ‘our race pure and our powder dry’; a truth, Hamilton believed, that its colonists grasped 
more firmly than metropolitan Britons. Such views would have resonated with the general’s 
interlocutors in New Zealand, which perhaps encouraged him to air them in a public forum.  
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 Hamilton’s speech, touching as it did on the ‘sore subject of racial prejudice’, sparked an 
outcry when it was reported in Japan, where Hamilton’s name was still familiar due to his role as 
military observer during the Russo-Japanese War. A week after the Auckland speech, the British 
ambassador reported that both the foreign minister and prime minister had come to see him to 
express their regret over the general’s indiscretions. This was part of a broader pattern: ever since 
the re-eruption of the California controversy, Japanese opinion had been acutely sensitive 
towards any sign of racial discrimination, and several newspapers had already come to the 
conclusion that Hamilton’s remarks reflected a widespread belief in ‘the irreconcilableness of the 
white and yellow races’, taking hold in the dominions as well as Britain itself.100 The Japan Times 
warned that if Japan was to be permanently kept in the outer circle of the international system, 
‘marked out by colour’, then the sooner it could rid itself of the alliance, ‘the better it will be both 
for ourselves and for our kindred races’.101 Japan’s ‘feeling of pique’ at being type-cast in the role 
of racial villain, the British embassy warned, ought to be taken seriously:  
 
It is this note of racial distrust, a note which is not confined to Australia, but has been 
sounded in Canada as well, which has spoilt the harmony produced in this country by 
Mr. Churchill's recent remarks in defence of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. 102 
 
The Foreign Office shared Greene’s concerns. As the head of the Far Eastern department noted 
sardonically, overt racial statements like Hamilton’s were best avoided, ‘considering that we have 




  Taken together, the events detailed in this chapter – the California land crisis, the 
rumblings in British Columbia, and the controversy over naval security in the Pacific –constituted 
another moment during which the ‘colour question’ intruded forcefully on British diplomacy. 
Once again, it offered a disturbing window on an alternative form of global politics, structured 
along racial rather than national divisions. The vision projected by many in the white dominions 
was almost Manichean in its simplicity: the current tensions between Japan and the United States 
portended a greater contest to decide the racial fortunes of the Pacific. ‘It is quite true that on 
account of the European situation as it exists to-day they have approved of the Alliance,’ one 
commentator noted, ‘but as far as their own needs are concerned they feel that the future holds 
for them a life and death struggle with Japan.’104 In turn, the same anxiety offered a deceptively 
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straightforward justification for the imperial connection. As Arthur Jose put it: ‘Australia will do 
anything for the Empire if the Empire will assure her against Japan.’105  
 Yet grafting a practical edifice of diplomatic or imperial cooperation onto the ideal of 
racial solidarity – the core ambition of Australasian defence policies since Tsushima – had proved 
a tortuous exercise. The more imaginative schemes of Alfred Deakin and Joseph Ward, for 
cooperation with the Americans and a more centralised system of defence, had fallen flat. By the 
end of 1912, the Pacific naval agreement, which had promised a measure of collective imperial 
security, had proved stillborn: instead, the dominions were now informed that the Japanese 
alliance would guarantee their external security. Observers like Allen, Jose, and Eggleston found 
themselves increasingly frustrated with the apparent one-sidedness of Britannic solidarity. The 
Australasian dominions, they insisted, were doing their part to advance the interests of the 
‘British race’, while London stubbornly clung to an out-dated notion that the dominions could be 
corralled like ‘a docile school class’.106 Yet this was hardly a narrowly nationalist argument; rather, 
it extrapolated particular aspects of Australian and New Zealand nationalism into a distinct vision 
of empire, animated by a similar spirit of racial egalitarianism that underpinned the national 
project within their own societies.  
  London’s outlook was fundamentally different. The dominance of the naval race with 
Germany, which consumed practically all of the navy’s resources between 1909 and 1914, left 
little space for distractions in the Pacific.107 On the contrary: the German danger emphasised the 
continued importance of Japan’s role as Britain’s naval buttress. It could ill afford to alienate its 
ally by indulging the dominions – or Washington, for that matter – in their Japanese paranoia, 
particularly since the growing friction over China was already placing considerable strain on the 
relationship with Tokyo.108 The wider point was that London was not indifferent to the racial 
dimensions of its alliance with Japan: it understood just how deeply the instinct of self-
preservation ran on the Pacific fringe of the British world. Yet it sought to mitigate the racial 
issue, not exacerbate it. To that end, Britain had supported the conclusion of low-key diplomatic 
arrangements, such as the Canadian ‘gentlemen’s agreement’, and tried to avoid giving the 
impression that it was colluding with the United States on the immigration issue. It was a delicate 
balancing act, but a necessary one. Indeed, to many, the evidence of global racial tensions seemed 
to reinforce, rather than detract from, the case for the Anglo-Japanese alliance. As the Round 
Table put it in its final issue before the war, the empire inhabited a world divided by the ‘facts of 
race’. Yet as a global system that spanned right across the racial divide, its ‘true purpose’ was to 
manage those divisions, and ‘ensure peace… between East and West’. The alliance with Japan, in 
this regard, still had a central role to play, not merely as a strategic partnership, but as an 
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instrument that supported the empire’s ability to act as a ‘mediating and reconciling office 
between Eastern and Western ways of life’.109  
 
   
                                                      





 ‘To a foreigner reading our press,’ Sir Thomas Sanderson, the permanent under-secretary 
at the Foreign Office, observed in 1907, ‘the British Empire must appear in the light of some 
huge giant sprawling over the globe, with gouty fingers and toes stretching in every direction, 
which cannot be approached without eliciting a scream.’1 Even if rumours of British decline or 
‘overstretch’ tended to be much exaggerated even at the time, but it was clear nonetheless that 
the Edwardian empire operated in a more crowded international environment than its Victorian 
predecessor. Yet of all the external forces pressing on the extremities of the British imperial 
system – gouty or otherwise – the rise of Japan was in some respects the most easily contained. 
In objective economic and military terms, Japan was at best a middling power, jostling with Italy 
for seventh place in steel production, per capita industrialisation, and the size of its army.2 Only 
in the naval sphere did it punch above its weight: here, it ranked fifth in warship tonnage in 1914, 
behind the United States and just ahead of Russia.3 The scope for direct friction with British 
interests remained narrow: the trajectory of Japan’s territorial expansion after 1905, into Korea 
and southern Manchuria, touched on few British interests, despite J.O.P. Bland’s best efforts to 
insert one. Instead, Britain had been able to co-opt Japanese power, placing it in the scale against 
more formidable rivals – first Russia, then Germany – and allowing it to close off the East Asian 
arena from great power competition.  
 Yet the rise of Japan also presented the British system with a very different set of 
challenges, some of them entirely new. Already by 1905, it was clear that the emergence of a new 
power centre in East Asia would have important long-term repercussions for Britain’s own 
regional interests, which had developed in the relative absence of geopolitical competition. 
Settlers in the treaty-ports already sounded dire warnings about the exposure of Britain’s 
commercial salient in China to the vigour and ‘drive’ of Japanese competition. The same was true 
of the Pacific, where Japan’s emergence forced the inhabitants of the white dominions to 
consider the vulnerability of their unprotected coastlines. Racial perceptions, moreover, 
magnified the psychological impact of Japanese ‘pressure’ far beyond its material proportions: in 
the rhetoric that accompanied the Vancouver riots, the Japanese influx represented nothing less 
than an existential menace to the racial future of British Columbia. Almost overnight, Tsushima 
had brought them face to face with the brave new world of global politics.   
 For the British world, the implications were considerable: just when the more 
competitive international climate seemed to require closer imperial coordination, the parallel 
challenges of Germany and Japan prompted a set of structural disagreements over foreign policy 
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and defence. As H.G. Wells noted, by the mid-1900s the British Empire had ‘no common enemy 
to weld it together from without’: where Britain was increasingly concentrated on Germany, the 
Pacific dominions were consumed, instead, ‘by hate and fear of Japan’.4 In a broader sense too, 
Japan became a focal point for searching questions on the future of the British system: what was 
the imperial connection for, Shanghailanders, Australians, and British Columbians asked, if not to 
protect the interests of the ‘British race’ against this new menace? During the Pacific crises of 
1907-8 and 1913-14, these differences had often appeared stark; some commentators even 
warned that a real split on the Japanese problem – and the wider ‘colour question’ it formed part 
of – might do irreparable damage to the imperial system. Yet these differences also need to be 
placed in perspective: most of the debates on ‘Asiatic’ immigration, or imperial defence, took the 
continuity of the imperial system, as well as the unity of the ‘British race’, for granted. If 
anything, concerns about their local security inclined local politicians in the Pacific dominions to 
demand ‘more empire’, in the form of robust structures that would advance the British cause in 
their own oceanic neighbourhood, rather than less. 
 The outbreak of the First World War threw these arguments off balance once again. In 
the pre-war months, political debate in Australia and New Zealand had been dominated by an ill-
tempered debate on the Admiralty’s failure to provide adequate defence in the Pacific. Almost 
overnight, the controversy was suspended in favour of conspicuous declarations of loyalty: 
Andrew Fisher’s assertion that Australia would fight ‘to the last man and the last shilling’ caught 
the public mood. Mass volunteering began immediately, and the first ANZAC troopships set sail 
from Western Australia on 1 November – a telling demonstration of the ‘global resonance of the 
British connection’.5 Remarkably too, also present was a Japanese cruiser, the Ibuki, who, along 
with one British and two Australian vessels, would escort them across the Indian Ocean. Its 
commanding officer, Captain Katō Kanji, had already noted that the war seemed to have brought 
a turn in Australian attitudes to Japan: when passing Fremantle on his way to New Zealand, the 
city had thrown him a welcome of ‘ecstatic proportions’ and it appeared to him that ‘the former 
fear of Japan was swept away to be replaced with an obvious genuine trust’.6 
 It suited both the dominions and the British government not to allow the memory of 
past disagreements to spoil this picture of Britannic harmony. While the war lasted, the Pacific 
controversy remained subdued. Derogatory references to Japan were avoided: in Australia, the 
worst offender, official censorship clamped down firmly on anti-Japanese references in the press 
or in parliament.7 Some hoped that the new spirit of enforced cordiality might lead to a more 
lasting reconciliation: Ronald Munro-Ferguson (Lord Novar), newly installed as the governor-
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general, reported that it was beginning to dawn on the Australian mind ‘that the immense service 
rendered to the Empire in general and Australia in particular by Japan… will have to be 
recognised.’8 Perhaps mistaking self-censorship for a shift in opinion, Munro-Ferguson was also 
happy to report that the ‘the anti-Japanese scurrilities… which have so long disgraced the 
Australian press’ had all but disappeared.9 In Canada, too, Japanese paranoia would not be 
allowed to distract from the war effort. When Richard McBride, the premier of British Columbia, 
voiced disquiet over Japan’s entry into the war, he was told to keep his concerns to himself. 
‘Japan enters war of her own free choice,’ as Churchill cabled to Borden. ‘She must be welcome 
as a comrade and an ally… Any declaration against entry of Japan into war would do harm… 
Please reassure [McBride] privately.’10  
 There were good reasons for discretion: despite the displays of wartime unity, the Anglo-
Japanese alliance was already in a brittle state. The British government had been doubtful about 
inviting Japanese participation, and some officials – including Jordan in Beijing – favoured 
supporting an American proposal to declare the Pacific a neutral zone.11 Such ambivalence 
reflected a sense that the growth of Japanese power was no longer working to Britain’s 
advantage. Since 1905, the Anglo-Japanese alliance had dominated the international politics of 
East Asia, and underpinned the territorial status quo. Initially, it had done so by discouraging third 
parties – particularly a possibly revanchist Russia – from further forward moves into China. By 
the time of its second renewal in 1911, however, its purpose had shifted: it was now conceived as 
a way to restrain the ambitions of Japan itself. That it was able to do so without a breakdown in 
relations owed less to the magic touch of British diplomacy, and more to the other constraints on 
Japanese expansion. While it was the strongest single power in East Asia, it still operated within 
the confines of a regional balance, in which France, Russia, Germany, and the United States were 
all significant actors. Its public finances remained weighed down by the legacy of the Russian 
war. Nor could the resilience of China itself be discounted, especially if it was able to act in 
concert with an external power, like the United States in the Manchurian controversies of 1909-
1910.  
 This proved an all too fragile equilibrium. The Chinese revolution of 1911 already 
loosened the reins on Japan, and the outbreak of war in Europe undid them further. The 
formulation of the so-called ‘Twenty-One Demands’ – whose full implementation would have 
effectively placed the Chinese central government under Japanese direction – in January 1915 
showed the direction of and scale of Tokyo’s ambitions. According to G.E. Morrison, now acting 
as an advisor to the government in Beijing, they constituted ‘the most serious attack on the 
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British position in the Far East yet attempted’.12 Yet the grim reality was that between the need 
for Japanese assistance, and the drained reserves of British power in Asia, there were few 
practical constraints that Britain could place on Japanese expansionism: ‘it is essential to humour 
Japan during the progress of the war’, argued Hardinge, now returned to the Foreign Office.13 
Other controversies – including Tokyo’s veto on China’s entry, and damaging rumours of its 
flirtation with the idea of a separate peace –added to the sense that the alliance had been all but 
hollowed out. ‘In England [the Japanese] were extolled as the best and most devoted of Allies,’ 
observed Conyngham Greene in Tokyo. ‘Today we have come to know that Japan – the real 
Japan – is a frankly opportunist, not to say selfish country… with a very exaggerated opinion of 
her role in the universe.’14    
 If the spectre of Japanese hegemony in the East unnerved London, it was a source of 
deep anxiety in the British Pacific. Japan’s southward sweep into the German colonial empire had 
brought its naval power a lot closer; already by the end of 1914, London had tacitly 
acknowledged that Japan was unlikely to surrender the island groups it now occupied.15 Strategic 
alarm, moreover, remained intertwined with the fear that Japan might use its military heft to 
force concessions on immigration. When in the spring of 1916, Sir Edward Grey suggested to 
Australia’s new prime minister, William Morris Hughes, that a symbolic modification of 
Australia’s exclusion policy along the lines of the Canadian ‘gentlemen’s agreement’, might help 
to preserve Japan’s loyalty to the Entente, the latter replied that ‘Australia would rather fight to 
the last ditch than allow Japanese to enter’.16 The spirit of rivalry persisted: ‘all our fears – or 
conjectures – that Japan was and is most keenly interested in Australia are amply borne out by 
facts,’ Hughes wrote home. The war sharpened such anxieties further: on the settler fringe of the 
British world, fear of the ‘teeming millions’ of Asia had expressed itself in demographic as much 
as strategic terms. Underpopulation and low rates of white immigration had been common 
features of the pre-war defence debates. In this regard, it was possible to interpret the war a 
distinctly racial catastrophe: ‘a headlong plunge into white race-suicide’, as the American racist 
Lothrop Stoddard put it.17 Jan Smuts, the apostle of white reconciliation in South Africa, thought 
the war  ‘a terrible business, which may put Europe and white civilization permanently back and 
hasten the day of the Yellow Peril’.18 In Australia, Hughes found his campaign for conscription 
defeated, twice over, at least in part on the argument that the haemorrhage on the Western Front 
was would undermine the biological foundations of White Australia. The next war, one anti-
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conscriptionist pamphlet predicted, would be ‘fought in the Pacific between the white and yellow 
races… we must prepare for the racial war to come’.19 Hughes, for his part, was not prepared to 
yield the racial argument to his opponents, retorting that Australia could only preserve itself 
through ensuring the survival of the imperial system: ‘once Britain is beaten we are doomed 
men’.20 For the moment, competing strategies and loyalties pulled the racial impulse in different 
directions.  
 Once the war was won, however, the ‘Pacific problem’ (code for the containment of 
Japan) re-emerged with a vengeance. Japan’s wartime expansion had kept talk of a ‘Yellow Peril’ 
fully alive. American-Japanese antagonism, which had driven the racial scares of 1907-8 and 
1913-14, was again becoming pronounced. Throughout the white Pacific, meanwhile, the 
pressures of demobilisation and the economic contraction, contributed to a sharpening anti-
immigration mood, of which Asians, and Japanese in particular, bore the brunt. In September 
1920, amid an election campaign that saw voters ‘deluged with anti-Japanese propaganda’, the 
Asiatic Exclusion League was re-established in California.21 British Columbia followed suit in July 
1921.22 In 1920, in response to a moral panic over a small increase in Asian immigration, New 
Zealand set a new standard for stringency, by amending its immigration act to require a postal 
application from the country of origin, exempting only those of British and Irish ancestry.23 Nor 
was this, again, a purely Pacific phenomenon: in South Africa, the newly formed ‘South Africans’ 
League’ campaigned, in the words of the government of India, ‘to repress the Indian settler by 
every possible means… to segregate him, and, if possible, to drive him out of the country’.24  
 At the Paris Peace conference, the ‘colour question’ elbowed its way onto the 
international stage in dramatic fashion. During the preliminary debates on the establishment of 
the new League of Nations, the Japanese delegation proposed a clause specifying that the 
League’s members would accord ‘equal and just treatment’ to each other, without discriminating 
‘on account of their race or nationality’.25 The ‘racial equality clause’ met with dismay among the 
American and British Empire delegations, unnerved by the implications for colonial self-
determination and domestic racial legislation. Hughes was particularly scathing: he announced he 
would rather walk into the Folies Bergère with his clothes off than agree to anything that might 
call the legitimacy of White Australia into question.26 British diplomats, who had kept a tight lid 
on the racial issue for the past two decades, were now forced to look on as Hughes subjected the 
Japanese proposal to an outright and very public rejection. In Japan, the defeat of the clause once 
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again seemed proof that its racial status still kept the country at the bottom end of the 
international pecking order. It compounded a growing sense that Japan would never be allowed 
to take its rightful place in the new ‘Anglo-Saxon’ world order that was constructed in Paris.  
 These new controversies reflected how much Japan’s standing in the international 
system, and the Anglo-Japanese relationship with it, had changed since the initial formation of 
the alliance in 1902. The British government had conceived of its Japanese treaty as an exercise in 
balance-of-power diplomacy, primarily to contain Russian expansion in northeast Asia. It had not 
involved the wider British world to any significant degree, nor was there any obvious reason why 
it should have: apart from the minor controversy of Japan’s objections to White Australia, to 
most in the dominions Japan remained a distant presence. The Russo-Japanese War had changed 
that. The extensive coverage of the war, and the symbolic significance of Japan’s defeat of a 
European power, now made it loom larger in the politics of the Pacific. Its post-war expansion, 
both material and imagined, had produced new channels of contact, connection, and friction 
with the British world. This in turn added a new layer of complexity to the Anglo-Japanese 
relationship, and London had to account for the fact that the alliance was now subject to 
pressures from unexpected directions. 
 Of these, the most troubling and complex was the controversy over Japanese migration. 
In the aftermath of the Russian war, optimists had expected the issue to either resolve itself, or 
remain a minor irritation; Canada’s signing of the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty, in the hope 
of instilling an appetite for its produce ‘in the stomach of the Orient’ was a promising sign. Such 
hopes proved misplaced. To whites on the Pacific coast, Japan’s ‘civilisational’ achievements did 
not invalidate the bar of race. If anything, its recent triumphs added an additional argument for 
exclusion, since the Japanese diaspora now enjoyed the potential support of a strong military 
power. A sense of geopolitical rivalry, shaped by rise of Japanese-American antagonism, 
intermeshed with older anti-Asian prejudices in an alarmist outlook on global politics, centred on 
the notion of a coming conflict between Asians and Anglo-Saxons for control of the Pacific. 
Reconciling Pacific whites’ commitment to racial security with Japan’s international status was 
always going to be difficult. Within the hothouse atmosphere of populist racialism fomented by 
the exclusion leagues, it proved almost impossible. The Vancouver riots and their aftermath 
pointedly illustrated that the immigration controversy would intensify, rather than dissipate, as 
Japan’s power grew. Potentially, moreover, immigration possessed the disruptive capacity to 
reorder the politics of the Pacific on georacialist lines – this was the intimation, after all, in 
Theodore Roosevelt’s suggestions for an Anglo-American pact to keep the Japanese ‘to their 
own side of the Pacific’.27  
 This was not the seamless integration that the Japanophiles had hoped for, or which 
some later histories of Japan’s ‘entry into international society’ have presented. Yet neither was it 
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an unqualified story of escalating racial conflict. The Anglo-Japanese alliance, crucially, provided 
several mechanisms to ease and manage the racial question. It allowed Japan to be secure in the 
knowledge that its status as the sole Asian power would not leave it internationally isolated, as 
had happened during the Triple Intervention in 1895, and as again seemed possible in the early 
1920s. During the Russo-Japanese War, the alliance’s small-l liberal undertones had provided an 
ideological framework within which the rise of Japan could be presented as a progressive, 
beneficial force. One did not have to be a full-blown Japanophile, moreover, to recognise that 
the alliance offered a degree of insulation against Japanese expansion, and that its strategic utility 
was a sound reason not to alienate Japan through ‘Yellow Perilist’ rhetoric. After 1905, the same 
logic came to extend to the dominions, and the necessity of dealing with Japan ‘in the spirit of 
the alliance’ proved a brake on the racial fears stoked by Tsushima – or at the very least, it 
restricted their airing in public.  
 The Canadian response to the Vancouver riots exemplified this well. Privately, several 
senior figures denounced Japanese immigration as a covert invasion of British Columbia, and 
even Laurier came to demand stringent restrictions. But this was to be achieved through 
diplomacy rather than a legislative colour bar. As Laurier later acknowledged, the successful 
conclusion of the Lemieux agreement owed everything to the alliance and Canada’s membership 
of the imperial system. At the 1911 imperial conference, he supported renewal wholeheartedly. In 
London, this policy of quiet diplomacy – quiet in comparison to the grand declarations and 
sweeping gestures with which Roosevelt attempted to resolve his own Japanese crisis – was 
welcomed with relief: it fitted comfortably alongside Whitehall’s own policy of managing the 
immigration question through legislative compromises, and not initiate a public controversy on 
the subject. To that end, London looked approvingly on the formation of the ‘gentlemen’s 
agreement’ and favoured its extension to other Asian countries.28  
 In Australia and New Zealand, a different set of issues predominated. Here, proposals to 
soften the impact of exclusion through a diplomatic agreement never made serious headway; 
Deakin toyed with the idea, but relented once it became clear that the British government would 
prefer not to raise the issue at all. Instead, Australasia’s ‘Japanese question’ came to concentrate 
on the issue of imperial defence, and particularly on the search for a robust naval presence that 
could guarantee the long-term security of ‘White’ Australia and New Zealand. It was recognised, 
in this regard, that the alliance provided a degree of insurance, and ‘breathing time’ to organise a 
local defence. It was on this understanding that Fisher and Pearce agreed to an extension in 1911. 
A decade later, Japan’s expansion in the Pacific had only reinforced this logic: at the 1921 
imperial conference, Hughes declared that the alliance was ‘a thing more precious than rubies’, 
and passionately argued for its continuation.29  
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 Australia’s (and New Zealand’s) desire to cling on to the alliance, even as Britain had lost 
enthusiasm for it, reflected the extent to which the post-war order had failed to lay to rest their 
dread of Japanese expansion that arose Tsushima’s wake. The roots of these fears, of course, 
stretched back further than 1905. The ‘Yellow Peril’ was not a new phenomenon: in Australasia 
and British Columbia, Japanese immigration was tarred with the well-worn brush that had been 
consistently applied to the Chinese from the 1870s onwards. After 1905, however, these fears 
were bundled around Japan; a threat credible enough to give strategic momentum to calls for an 
autonomous defence policy – hitherto framed mostly in constitutional terms. Yet the move 
towards a ‘national’ defence in Australia – and after 1912 in New Zealand – should not be seen 
out of its Britannic context: instead, to the Australasian elites, the move towards operating their 
own ships and training their own forces became a way to demonstrate their deepening 
participation in the system on which their white, British character depended. This was the logic 
that underpinned Deakin’s proposals for a national navy as well as Ward’s dreadnought donation, 
and on which Hughes would fight his campaign for conscription. ‘Australian influence in 
Imperial counsels,’ as Frederic Eggleston concluded a post-war memorandum, ‘will be in 
proportion to the activity it displays and the sacrifices it is prepared to make’.30  
 The main effect of the Japanese challenge, then, was to reinforce the case for 
Australasia’s attachment to the British world-system: this was the ‘solid national advantage 
accruing from the British connection’ that Richard Jebb had diagnosed in 1905.31 Yet underneath 
the rhetoric of Britannic unity, this often proved a conflicted process. With Australasian sacrifice, 
in treasure and blood, came an expectation of reciprocity, as the Pacific dominions expected 
London to share their aspiration to racial solidarity. Just as they understood that their own 
security was bound up with Britain’s global naval dominance, they also insisted that the 
supremacy of the ‘British race’ in the coming century would hinge on the growth of its 
demographic bridgeheads in the Pacific. For Eggleston, the core purpose of empire was ‘the 
realisation of the unity of the British race and its mission of civilization to the world’.32 Framing 
the imperial system in racial terms, in other words, could elevate their own interests to a position 
of equivalence to those of the ‘mother country’.  
 At moments of crisis, like the 1909 naval scare, or the outbreak of the First World War, 
this logic could harmonise imperial interests with concerns over local security to produce 
impressive displays of unity. Conflicts began when dominion politicians began to suspect that 
London was failing to live up to their standard of racial imperialism. Thus Churchill’s intimation 
in March 1914 that the Japanese alliance kept the Pacific secure struck many in the dominions as 
naïve and narrow-minded – though, of course, the First Lord judged their Japanese paranoia in 
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much the same way. Suspicions in this vein continued to fester during the war. In a 
memorandum on Pacific policy, drawn up in 1915, Arthur Jose, now secretary of the Australian 
naval board, noted that even after a decade of exertions, some in London still saw ‘White 
Australia’ as a liability rather than an asset: ‘the interest of maintaining in the Pacific a purely 
British stock, free from the admixture of Asiatic or other races,’ he wrote to Hughes, ‘seems to 
be regarded by a great many British publicists as hardly an Imperial interests at all’.33 Clearly, his 
exchanges with Chirol on the subject had left a lasting impression. The only way, Jose concluded, 
through which Australia could reverse this was to demonstrate its imperial value: by throwing 
itself ‘wholeheartedly into the war’.34    
 These criticisms were not entirely justified. If the observations of Mackenzie King can be 
taken as a rough indication, it seems clear that the immigration crisis of 1907-8 had convinced 
the majority of the British elite that exclusion was both justified and necessary. The racial-
imperial nexus articulated in Australasia, moreover, had its advocates among soi-disant 
‘imperialists’ in Britain. Yet these remained voices on the fringes; London was forced to operate 
in a more complex reality. While British officialdom was not as complacent about the growth of 
Japanese power as is sometimes suggested, competing strategic pressures, above all the German 
challenge in the North Sea, were more immediate. There was the obvious concern, moreover, 
that the new gospel of imperial cooperation excluded the majority of the empire’s subjects that 
did not fit its narrow racial definition. Indeed, if the rise of Japan had illustrated anything, a 
number of prominent commentators argued, it was that the future of the British system would 
increasingly hinge on its ability to manage the rising tide of Asian nationalism. Alienating the 
greatest Asian power by ranging the empire’s international politics along the ‘colour line’ would 
be deeply self-destructive: the only ‘Yellow Peril’ that Britain had to fear, as pro-Japanese 
commentators had cautioned during the Russo-Japanese War, was that which it helped to create. 
Like Pandora’s box, the window on a racially ordered world was best kept firmly shut. The 
argument persisted right until the end. ‘No greater calamity,’ Lloyd George told the assembled 
dominion leaders at the 1921 imperial conference, ‘could overcome the world than any further 
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